Maritime Strategy And Continental Wars

Rear Admiral Raja Menon contends that nations embroiled in Continental wars have historically had poor maritime strategies. He develops the argument that navies that have been involved in such wars have made poor contributions to politial objectives, and outlines future strategies.

Rear Admiral Raja Menon contends that nations embroiled in Continental wars have historically had poor maritime strategies. He develops the argument that navies that have been involved in such wars have made poor contributions to politial objectives, and outlines future strategies.

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy is a book by Julian Stafford Corbett. It delves into maritime theory of war and naval strategy with actual examples throughout history.

DIVThis brilliant exposition by a great strategist proposes that the key to maritime dominance lies in effective use of sea lines for communications and in denying that use to the enemy. /div

Taken for granted as the natural order of things, peace at sea is in fact an immense and recent achievement—but also an enormous strategic challenge if it is to be maintained in the future. In Maritime Strategy and Global Order, an international roster of top scholars offers historical perspectives and contemporary analysis to explore the role of naval power and maritime trade in creating the international system. The book begins in the early days of the industrial revolution with the foundational role of maritime strategy in building the British Empire. It continues into the era of naval disorder surrounding the two world wars, through the passing of the Pax Britannica and the rise of the Pax Americana, and then examines present-day regional security in hot spots like the South China Sea and Arctic Ocean. Additional chapters engage with important related topics such as maritime law, resource competition, warship evolution since the end of the Cold War, and naval intelligence. A first-of-its-kind collection, Maritime Strategy and Global Order offers scholars, practitioners, students, and others with an interest in maritime history and strategic issues an absorbing long view of the role of the sea in creating the world we know.

A collection of essays on British and American maritime relationships in the 20th century together with details on the British organization of warfare, Anglo-American maritime theory, their rivalries and coalitions and their plans for dealing with a future war in the nuclear age.

"Through colourful and lively historical illustrations as well as strategic theory, Gray shows how sea power, when integrated with land and air power, increases the combatant's opportunities and choices. With dozens of examples from the Greek and Persian wars of the fifth century B.C. through the recent war in the Gulf, Gray systematically demonstrates the ways sea power has been used, and how it might have been used, to win battles and wars. His thought-provoking commentary is certain to become essential reading for the makers of defense policy today. The Leverage of Sea Power is an important and original contribution to the science of warfare historically and in the nuclear age." --

In his excellent book explaining naval strategy, Julian S. Corbett examines sound maritime strategy. Crucially, he advances the view that navies could perform much better if their role in assisting land warfare and amphibious forces were increased. Writing in the early 20th century, Corbett draws upon centuries of naval battles and identifies several common strains. The development of war strategies at sea often entailed trial and error - the author elects to explain how strategy evolved as much from calamity as practice. How naval force should be assembled, how it should form up, and how concentrations and dispersal of ships should be organized each receive discussion. Although naval warfare has substantially changed since this book's original publication, it continues to be consulted for its timeless and sound advice. Corbett's era predated the extensive use of submarines and aeroplanes in naval combat, but his conclusions remain sound and sought after even in the tutoring of modern maritime strategy.