Market Volatility And Foreign Exchange Intervention In Emes

This paper analyzes the effects of intervention on the level and volatility of the exchange rate in Mexico and Turkey, two emerging countries that have floating exchange rate regimes. The paper finds mixed evidence on the effectiveness of intervention. In Mexico, foreign exchange sales have a small impact on the exchange rate level and raise short-term volatility, while in Turkey, intervention does not appear to affect the exchange rate level but reduces its shortterm volatility. In both cases, the findings are consistent with officially stated policy objectives, which aim to minimize the effect of intervention on the exchange rate, but cast doubt on claims that intervention is a useful tool for smoothing volatility. Although these findings cannot be generalized to other emerging markets, intervention's apparently limited effectiveness highlights the need for central banks to use their scarce foreign reserves selectively and parsimoniously.

This paper presents a rule for foreign exchange interventions (FXI), designed to preserve financial stability in floating exchange rate arrangements. The FXI rule addresses a market failure: the absence of hedging solution for tail exchange rate risk in the market (i.e. high volatility). Market impairment or overshoot of exchange rate between two equilibria could generate high volatility and threaten financial stability due to unhedged exposure to exchange rate risk in the economy. The rule uses the concept of Value at Risk (VaR) to define FXI triggers. While it provides to the market a hedge against tail risk, the rule allows the exchange rate to smoothly adjust to new equilibria. In addition, the rule is budget neutral over the medium term, encourages a prudent risk management in the market, and is more resilient to speculative attacks than other rules, such as fixed-volatility rules. The empirical methodology is backtested on Banco Mexico’s FXIs data between 2008 and 2016.

This paper examines foreign exchange intervention practices and their effectiveness using a new qualitative and quantitative database for a panel of 15 economies covering 2004 - 10, with special focus on Latin America. Qualitatively, it examines institutional aspects such as declared motives, instruments employed, the use of rules versus discretion, and the degree of transparency. Quantitatively, it assesses the effectiveness of sterilized interventions in influencing the exchange rate using a two-stage IV-panel data approach to overcome endogeneity bias. Results suggest that interventions slow the pace of appreciation, but the effects decrease rapidly with the degree of capital account openness. At the same time, interventions are more effective in the context of already ?overvalued' exchange rates.

This paper offers guidance on the operational aspects of official intervention in the foreign exchange market, particularly in developing countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. A brief survey of the literature and country experience is followed by an analysis of the objectives, timing, amount, degree of transparency, and choice of markets and counterparties in conducting intervention. The analysis highlights the difficulty of detecting exchange rate misalignments and disorderly markets, and argues in favor of parsimony in official intervention. Determining the timing and amount of intervention is a highly subjective excercise, and some degree of discretion is almost necessary, though policy rules may serve as "rules of thumb."

We study the effect of foreign exchange intervention on the exchange rate relying on an instrumental-variables panel approach. We find robust evidence that intervention affects the level of the exchange rate in an economically meaningful way. A purchase of foreign currency of 1 percentage point of GDP causes a depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rates in the ranges of [1.7-2.0] percent and [1.4-1.7] percent respectively. The effects are found to be quite persistent. The paper also explores possible asymmetric effects, and whether effectiveness depends on the depth of domestic financial markets.