Meaning And Saying Essays In The Philosophy Of Language

[Frank Ebersole is a philosopher] whose contribution to philosophy . . . is the greatest of anyone this [the 20th] century, especially in the areas of philosophy of language, theory of knowledge, and perception.from Wittgenstein, Empiricism, and Language by John W. Cook (Oxford University Press, 1999). Meaning and Saying has five chapters that address philosophical problems about language and knowledge, and one essay (chapter 6: "Postscript") that provides insights into some of Frank Ebersoles basic ideas about philosophy. The five essays let you participate in his unique struggles to come to terms with such questions as: Is the meaning of a word central to the philosophy of language? Is the meaning of a word the part the word plays in speech acts? How does the action of making sounds fit into speech? Are conditions for knowing something the same as conditions required for saying one knows something? Should philosophers still be doing conceptual analysis? Can G. E. Moore really refute the philosophical skeptic by displaying his hand and saying "I know this is my hand"? This and its companion volume, Language and Perception, are not just other philosophy books about the philosophy of language. In both books Ebersole, by carefully using examples, convincingly shows that the problems are products of philosophical pictures. The examples also make the pictures less compelling. How the Second Edition Differs from the First Edition This edition differs from the first edition (University Press of America, 1979) in several ways. Two more essays are included: "Saying and Meaning" (chapter 4) is a revised version of an essay originally published in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Language, eds. Alice Ambrose and Morris Lazerowitz (George Allen and Unwin, London and Humanities Press, New York, 1972), pp. 186221. "Saying What You Know" (chapter 5) was first read as a paper in Coos Bay, Oregon on May 26, 1996 at the conference, "Where the Action Is." A modified version of the paper was then published in Philosophical Investigations, vol. 23, no. 3, July 2000. Now it has been expanded and revised. Material that was formerly part of the preface is now revised and placed as chapter 6 at the end, entitled Postscript. The text is improved. Throughout the book, Ebersole has made corrections, stylistic improvements, and changed wording to remove ambiguities. Summary Language and logic provide philosophers with a dual problem: (1) How is language connected to the world and (2) how can philosophers use language and logic with care so as not to contaminate their own thinking? Speech acts and the use of sentences are thought to be better ways for philosophers to understand language and logic. But do they do the job? Preface In the early 1920s philosophers argued that philosophy should be philosophy of language; but this was just old wine in new bottles; then the Wittgensteinian revolution occurred, which identified meaning as the use of words and thereafter identified the meaning of a word with the use of a word. The book addresses some problems with this revolution. Chapter 1: Meaning and Use

[Frank Ebersole is a philosopher] “whose contribution to philosophy . . . is the greatest of anyone this [the 20th] century, especially in the areas of philosophy of language, theory of knowledge, and perception.”—from Wittgenstein, Empiricism, and Language by John W. Cook (Oxford University Press, 1999). Language and Perception has nine chapters: seven that address philosophical problems about language and two (chapters 2 and 9) that are more metaphilosophical The metaphilosophical chapters discuss philosophical pictures and some of Frank Ebersole’s basic ideas about philosophy. The other seven essays let you participate in his unique struggles to come to terms with such questions as: What is the meaning of a word? Isn’t Wittgenstein’s idea that things called by the same name have family resemblances significantly flawed? Does language determine what we perceive? Does a thing’s being red cause it to look red (the causal theory of perception)? Must the action of speaking be analyzed into simpler actions such as making sounds? Can a bodily movement be part of an action? Is fatalism implied by "what one might say" about the future? Are "natural-kind" words like proper names?—are they rigid designators? This and its companion volume, Meaning and Saying, are not just other philosophy books about the philosophy of language. In both books Ebersole, by carefully using examples, convincingly shows that the problems are the products of philosophical pictures. The examples also make the pictures less compelling. How the Second Edition Differs from the First Edition This edition differs from the first edition (University Press of America, 1979) in several ways. Pictures: Material that was formerly part of a postscript to chapter 1 has been revised and is now its own chapter, chapter 2, "Pictures and Wittgenstein on Pictures." As a result the following chapters were renumbered. Essay removed: Chapter 7 in the first edition, "Truth and Fate: Future Actions," has been removed. Essay added: A new essay, entitled "Proper Names and Other Names," has been added to the volume. It’s a revised version of an essay originally published in Philosophical Investigations, Oct., 1982, with the title "Stalking the Rigid Designator." Postscript: Material that was formerly part of the preface is now revised and placed as chapter 9 at the end, entitled "Postscript." Improved text: Throughout the book, Ebersole has made corrections, stylistic improvements, and changed the wording to remove ambiguities. Preface The book is concerned with questions about the "relations of language to reality": Does physical reality predetermine the form of our language? Does it determine the kinds of words in our simple, basic vocabulary? Does our language in basic ways determine the way we perceive reality? Does our language embody the outlines of a certain theory of perception? And does it incorporate a certain view of human actions and of the future? These questions are expressions of the problems in the philosophy of language that people inevitably get themselves into while dealing with other philosophical problems. And these are problems in the philosophy of language that have direct consequences for the way one deals with problems in other branches of philosophy. At

[Frank Ebersole is a philosopher] "whose contribution to philosophy . . . is the greatest of anyone this [the 20th] century, especially in the areas of philosophy of language, theory of knowledge, and perception." from Wittgenstein, Empiricism, and Language by John W. Cook (Oxford University Press, 1999). Language and Perception has nine chapters: seven that address philosophical problems about language and two (chapters 2 and 9) that are more metaphilosophical The metaphilosophical chapters discuss philosophical pictures and some of Frank Ebersole's basic ideas about philosophy. The other seven essays let you participate in his unique struggles to come to terms with such questions as: What is the meaning of a word? Isn't Wittgenstein's idea that things called by the same name have family resemblances significantly flawed? Does language determine what we perceive? Does a thing's being red cause it to look red (the causal theory of perception)? Must the action of speaking be analyzed into simpler actions such as making sounds? Can a bodily movement be part of an action? Is fatalism implied by "what one might say" about the future? Are "natural-kind" words like proper names? are they rigid designators? This and its companion volume, Meaning and Saying, are not just other philosophy books about the philosophy of language. In both books Ebersole, by carefully using examples, convincingly shows that the problems are the products of philosophical pictures. The examples also make the pictures less compelling. How the Second Edition Differs from the First Edition This edition differs from the first edition (University Press of America, 1979) in several ways. Pictures: Material that was formerly part of a postscript to chapter 1 has been revised and is now its own chapter, chapter 2, "Pictures and Wittgenstein on Pictures." As a result the following chapters were renumbered. Essay removed: Chapter 7 in the first edition, "Truth and Fate: Future Actions," has been removed. Essay added: A new essay, entitled "Proper Names and Other Names," has been added to the volume. It's a revised version of an essay originally published in Philosophical Investigations, Oct., 1982, with the title "Stalking the Rigid Designator." Postscript: Material that was formerly part of the preface is now revised and placed as chapter 9 at the end, entitled "Postscript." Improved text: Throughout the book, Ebersole has made corrections, stylistic improvements, and changed the wording to remove ambiguities. Preface The book is concerned with questions about the "relations of language to reality": Does physical reality predetermine the form of our language? Does it determine the kinds of words in our simple, basic vocabulary? Does our language in basic ways determine the way we perceive reality? Does our language embody the outlines of a certain theory of perception? And does it incorporate a certain view of human actions and of the future? These questions are expressions of the problems in the philosophy of language that people inevitably get themselves into while dealing with other philosophical problems. And these are problems in the philosophy of language that have direct consequences for the way one deals with problems in other branches of philosophy. At

Frege is now regarded as one of the world's greatest philosophers, and the founder of modern logic. Mark Sainsbury argues that we must depart considerably from Frege's views if we are to work towards an adequate conception of natural language. This is an outstanding contribution to philosophy of language and logic and will be invaluable to all those interested in Frege and the philosophy of language.

Philosophy of language has a rich and varied history stretching back to the Ancient Greeks. Twelve specially written essays explore this richness, from Plato and Aristotle, through the Stoics, to medieval thinkers, both Islamic and Christian; from the Renaissance and the early modern period, all the way up to the twentieth Century. Among the many topics that arise across this 2500-year trajectory are metaphysical questions about linguistic content. A first focal point of the volume is the issue of which broad ontological family linguistic contents belong to. Are linguistic contents mental ideas, physical particulars, abstract Forms, social practices, or something else again? And do different sorts of linguistic contents belong to different ontological categories-e.g., might it be that names stand for ideas, whereas logical terms stand for mental processes? The second focal point is the metaphysical grounding of linguistic content: that is, in virtue of what more basic facts do content facts obtain? Do words mean what they do because of natural resemblances? Because of causal relations? Because of arbitrary conventional usage? Or because of some combination of the above?