Medical Support Of The U S Army In Vietnam 1965 1970

As written by the Army's Deputy Surgeon General in 1972 as war raged in Vietnam. Full text in book's front matter. Full understanding of medical operations in Vietnam requires some appreciation of the nature: of the country and of the war that has been waged there. The Republic of Vietnam lies entirely within the Tropics. Saigon is halfway around the world from Washington, D.C. There is a 12-hour difference in time between the two cities. The nearest off-shore U.S. hospital is almost 1,000 miles away at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. The nearest logistical support base is about 1,800 miles away in Okinawa. The nearest complete hospital center is in Japan, some 2,700 miles distant. Patients being evacuated to the United States must travel some 7,800 miles to reach Travis Air Force Base in California, or almost 9,000 miles to reach Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, D.C. Because of these distances. even with modem air transport, the need (or self-sufficiency in the zone of operations is greater than that normally required within a combat zone. This fact is reflected by a higher ratio of combat service support troops (including medical ) to combat troops than is normally provided in more conventional situations. Vietnam is actually a combat zone combined with the advanced section of a communications zone. The distance of Vietnam from the logistical support base also has an adverse effect on the efficiency and morale of troops newly arrived in-country. . . . The conflict has involved highly mobile, small tactical units, and has not been a war of mass movement of major military formations. Search and destroy operations by small units from relatively secure base areas and for relatively short periods of time have been characteristic. There has been a high reliance on organic Amy air mobility for the conduct and support of these operations. The Army Medical Department's deployments and procedures have reflected these tactical realities. Treatment facilities located in base areas receive casualties by air from operating combat elements. Because there was no need to move frequently, it was practicable to construct semi-permanent medical facilities, thereby allowing the utilization of more sophisticated equipment and providing a general upgrading of the level of medical care.

"Most important, there is no evidence that the good will built by U.S. doctors transferred to the South Vietnamese forces, and in fact the opposite may have been true: American programs may have emphasized the inability of the South Vietnamese government to provide basic health care to its own people. Furthermore, the programs may have demonstrated to Vietnamese civilians that foreign soldiers cared more for them than their own troops did. If that is the case, the programs actually did more harm than good in the attempt to win hearts and minds."--BOOK JACKET.

The U.S. Army Center of Military History is pleased to present a new pamphlet in its U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War series. Buying Time, 1965 1966, by Frank L. Jones, begins with President Lyndon B. Johnson s decision to commit the U.S. military to an escalating role in the ground war against the Communist government of North Vietnam and its allies in South Vietnam known as the Viet Cong. Beginning in 1965, William C. Westmoreland, the commanding general of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), sent large numbers of soldiers on search-and-destroy missions against Viet Cong forces. His strategy in Vietnam depended on the superiority of U.S. firepower, including intensive aerial bombardments of regular enemy units. The goal was to inflict more losses than the Communist forces could sustain. During 1966, the United States gradually built up not just its forces, but also the logistical and administrative infrastructure needed to support them. Pacification, which took a lesser role during the military buildup, remained central to the allies approach to the war, with the White House taking additional measures to elevate its importance. As 1966 drew to a close, General Westmoreland was in position to launch the type of large, sustained military campaign that he hoped would both cripple the enemy and enable the South Vietnamese to make substantial progress toward pacification. The tide had been stemmed, yet no one was under the illusion that the task ahead would be either easy or quick. Indeed, the events of 1965 and 1966 had shown the enemy to be a dangerous and able foe, unshaken despite heavy losses in his own pursuit of victory. The true struggle had just begun."

As long ago as 1957, U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers were in the Republic of Vietnam. going about their business of training, advising, and assisting members of the Vietnamese Army. Despite the old Army witticism about never volunteering for anything, the Special Forces soldier is. in fan, a double volunteer, having first volunteered for airborne training and then again for Special Forces training. From a very meager beginning but sustained by a strong motivation and confidence in his mission, the Special Forces soldier has marched through the Vietnam struggle in superb fashion. In 1957 some fifty-eight Vietnamese soldiers were given military training by Special Forces troops. Ten years later the Special Forces were advising and assisting over 40,000 paramilitary troops, along with another 40,000 Regional Forces and Popular Forces soldiers. This monograph traces the development and notes the progress, problems. successes, and failures of a unique program undertaken by the U.S. Army for the first lime in its history. It is hoped that all the significant lessons learned have been recorded and the many pitfalls of such a program uncovered. I am responsible for the conclusions reached, yet my thought processes could not escape the influence of the many outstanding officers and men in the Special Forces who joined in the struggle. Particularly, I must lake note of the contributions of the Special Forces noncommissioned officers, without question the most competent soldiers in the world. With the withdrawal of the Special Forces from Vietnam in 1971, the Army could honestly lay claim to a new dimension in ground warfare-the organized employment of a paramilitary force in sustained combat against a determined enemy. I know I speak for my predecessors and successors in claiming that the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was the finest collection of professional soldiers ever assembled by the U.S. Army, anywhere, anytime. Francis John Kelly Colonel, Armor 1972