Metaphysics And The Philosophy Of Science

The question of the proper role of metaphysics in philosophy of science is both significant and contentious. The last few decades have seen considerable engagement with philosophical projects aptly described as "the metaphysics of science:" inquiries into natural laws and properties, natural kinds, causal relations, and dispositions. At the same time, many metaphysicians have begun moving in the direction of more scientifically-informed ("scientistic" or "naturalistic") metaphysics. And yet many philosophers of science retain a deep suspicion about the significance of metaphysical investigations into science. This volume of new essays explores a broadly methodological question: what role should metaphysics play in our philosophizing about science? These new essays, written by leading philosophers of science, address this question both through ground-level investigations of particular issues in the metaphysics of science and by more general methodological inquiry.

This volume of essays will explore the relationship between science and metaphysics, asking what role metaphysics should play in philosophizing about science. The essays will address this question both through ground-level investigations of particular issues in the metaphysics of science and more general methodological investigations. They thereby contribute to an ongoing discussion concerning the future, the limits, and the possibility of metaphysics as a legitimate philosophical project.

Metaphysics and science have a long but troubled relationship. In the twentieth century the Logical Positivists argued metaphysics was irrelevant and that philosophy should be guided by science. However, metaphysics and science attempt to answer many of the same, fundamental questions: What are laws of nature? What is causation? What are natural kinds? In this book, Markus Schrenk examines and explains the central questions and problems in the metaphysics of science. He reviews the development of the field from the early modern period through to the latest research, systematically assessing key topics including: dispositions counterfactual conditionals laws of nature causation properties natural kinds essence necessity. With the addition of chapter summaries and annotated further reading, Metaphysics of Science is a much-needed, clear and informative survey of this exciting area of philosophical research. It is essential reading for students and scholars of philosophy of science and metaphysics.

This collection brings together the latest new work within an emerging philosophical discipline: the metaphysics of science. A new definition of this line of philosophical enquiry is developed, and leading academics offer original essays on four key topics at the heart of the subject—laws, causation, natural kinds, and emergence.

Original essays by leading philosophers of science explore the question of whether metaphysics can and should be naturalised - conducted as part of natural science. They engage with a range of approaches and disciplines to argue that if metaphysics is to be capable of identifying objective truths, it must be continuous with and inspired by science.

As notions of postmodernism and deconstruction have become exceedingly fashionable in recent times, scholars have attempted to remake epistemology as a subjectivist enterprise. Why Science Needs Metaphysics deplores this state of affairs and attempts to correct it by reviving rational metaphysics as well as some of the sound ideas of the Vienna circle. (A rational metaphysics maintains that the world around us is real, and has a specific nature independent of our thoughts or feelings.) In arguing for a rational metaphysics, Zahar corrects and extends Karl Popper's approach to epistemological problems and develops Lakatos's Methodology of Scientific Research Programs into his own methodology. The book ends with two short case studies, one on the development of atomic theory, and the other on Einstein's philosophy of science. Both illustrate that realist metaphysics are crucial to the work of our greatest scientists.

Does science have all the answers? Can it even deal with abstract reasoning beyond the world we experience? How can we ensure that the physical world is sufficiently ordered to be intelligible to humans? How can mathematics, a product of human minds, unlock the secrets of the physical universe? Should all such questions be considered inadmissible if science cannot settle them? Metaphysics has traditionally been understood as reasoning beyond the reach of science, sometimes even claiming realities beyond its grasp. Because of this, metaphysics is often contemptuously dismissed by scientists and philosophers who wish to remain within the bounds of what can be scientifically proven. Yet scientists at the frontiers of physics unwittingly engage in metaphysics, as they are now happy to contemplate whole universes that are, in principle, beyond human reach. Roger Trigg challenges those who deny that science needs philosophical assumptions. Trigg claims that the foundations of science themselves have to lie beyond science. It takes reasoning apart from experience to discover what is not yet known and this metaphysical reasoning to imagine realities beyond what can be accessed. “In Beyond Matter, Roger Trigg advances a powerful, persuasive, fair-minded argument that the sciences require a philosophical, metaphysical foundation. This is a brilliant book for newcomers to the philosophy of science and experts alike.” —Charles Taliaferro, professor of philosophy, St. Olaf College