Mind And World

Modern philosophy finds it difficult to give a satisfactory picture of the place of minds in the world. In Mind and World, one of the most distinguished philosophers writing today offers his diagnosis of this difficulty and points to a cure.

John McDowell's Mind and World has, since its publication in 1994, become a seminal text, putting forward many new ideas on the manner in which concepts mediate the relation between minds and the world. Yet McDowell's ideas are not easy to comprehend. In this book Sandra Dingli both elaborates and simplifies McDowell's ideas in order to give greater clarity to them and to assist in the understanding and appreciation of his work. Dingli selects five particular contemporary philosophical topics which McDowell deals with and investigates in detail the implications of particular points of view, analysing the current literature on each topic and drawing out shortcomings and possibilities for overcoming them. This work is, then, both a critique and complement to McDowell's text. McDowell's project is to dissolve a number of dualisms such as sensibility and understanding, conceptual and non conceptual content, scheme and content, and reason and nature. Dingli critically analyses each of these and claims that a proper understanding of the philosophical method of quietism is important for a correct understanding of this text, concluding that McDowell does not go far enough in his attempt to attain peace for philosophy as traditional dichotomies such as that of realism and anti-realism still appear to exert a grip on his thinking.

Reading McDowell: On Mind and World brings together an exceptional list of contributors to analyse and discuss McDowell's challenging and influential book, one of the most influential contributions to contemporary philosophy in recent years. In it McDowell discusses issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics as well as surveying the broader remit of philosophy. Reading McDowell clarifies some of these themes and provides further material for debate across philosophy of mind, ethics, philosophy of language and epistemology. The internationally renowned contributors include: Richard Bernstein, Gregory McCulloch, Hilary Putnam, Charles Taylor, Crispin Wright, Jay Bernstein, Rudiger, Bubner, Robert Pippin, Charles Lamour, Axel Honneth, Barry Stround, Robert Brandom and Michael Williams. In conclusion, John McDowell responds to all the contributions. This critical contribution to analytic philosophy is likely to shape philosophical debate for years to come. It will be of interest to professional philosophers, as well as students of contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics.

The 14 specially commissioned chapters in this superb collection enrich McDowell and Dreyfus's debate over perceptual experience, rationality, reflectiveness, and perception. Mind, Reason and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate should be considered essential reading for both students and scholars of analytic philosophy and phenomenology.

Theory of "conceptual pragmatism" takes into account both modern philosophical thought and modern mathematics. Stimulating discussions of metaphysics, a priori, philosophic method, much more.

First published in 1995. Since Descartes, the mind has been thought to be `in the head', separable from the world and even from the body it inhabits. Gregory McCulloch, in The MInd and its World, considers the latest debates in philosophy and cognitive science about whether the thinking subject actually requires an environment in order to be able to think. McCulloch explores the argument from Descartes, through Locke, Frege and Wittgenstein up to the present day. He then offers an original defence of his own version of externalism - that the mind is constituted by the objectw which are its phenomena. The Mind and its World provides a clear and accessible introduction to a cluster of contemporary controversies in the area of the philosophy of mind and language. It is designed to be read by students with no previous knowledge of the issues, but will also be of interest to specialists in the field.

This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem. Arguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially reductionist solution on the basis of a novel model of reduction. Retaining the informal tone of the lecture format, the book is clear yet sophisticated.

Cognitive science arose in the 1950s when it became apparent that a number of disciplines, including psychology, computer science, linguistics, and philosophy, were fragmenting. Perhaps owing to the field's immediate origins in cybernetics, as well as to the foundational assumption that cognition is information processing, cognitive science initially seemed more unified than psychology. However, as a result of differing interpretations of the foundational assumption and dramatically divergent views of the meaning of the term information processing, three separate schools emerged: classical cognitive science, connectionist cognitive science, and embodied cognitive science. Examples, cases, and research findings taken from the wide range of phenomena studied by cognitive scientists effectively explain and explore the relationship among the three perspectives. Intended to introduce both graduate and senior undergraduate students to the foundations of cognitive science, Mind, Body, World addresses a number of questions currently being asked by those practicing in the field: What are the core assumptions of the three different schools? What are the relationships between these different sets of core assumptions? Is there only one cognitive science, or are there many different cognitive sciences? Giving the schools equal treatment and displaying a broad and deep understanding of the field, Dawson highlights the fundamental tensions and lines of fragmentation that exist among the schools and provides a refreshing and unifying framework for students of cognitive science.