Ministry Of Defence Main Estimates 2012 13

The MoD is requesting net resources of some £39.8 billion and capital expenditure of some £10 billion for 2012-13. Within the total requested the MoD has asked from some £3.6 billion to cover the costs of operations, some 18 percent less than 1011-12. Resource expenditure is also planned to fall in line with the Spending Review 2010. The Committee recommends, along with other requests and general recommendations, that the Main Estimate for the MoD is approved by Parliament and have indentified no issues which require a debate before it does so

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) must put into the public domain the full cost of military operations in Afghanistan. This report notes that although there are obvious standing expenses, the Afghan deployment brings with it additional costs in terms of training opportunities cancelled or deferred and equipment wear and tear that will eventually have to be met. The Committee is also disappointed by the Department's inability to provide the detailed information requested about expected write-offs such as Nimrod and the Type 22 Frigate. The MoD was not clear but the Committee deduce that some of the 2010-11 provision for depreciation and write-offs will be carried forward to 2011-12 or even later years. There is also concern that the voluntary redundancy programme has been over-subscribed and that applications (or even resignations) have been received from individuals who might have achieved high command and asks the MoD to show how it will ensure that the voluntary redundancy process does not impact on the future leadership capability and effectiveness of the Armed Services

The MoD sought, in the Estimate, a net increase in Capital and Resource Expenditure (Departmental Expenditure Limits-DELs) of £2,804 million which generated an additional cash requirement of £644 million. It also sought a reduction in Annually Managed Expenditure of some £1,063 million. The Committee welcomes the MoD's efforts to improve the management of assets and stock. They recognise that such exercises and the implementation of the Strategic Defence Security Review are likely to result in significant write-offs, but we would expect the MoD to have a greater understanding of the financial implications of these write-offs and, therefore, greater certainty of the non-cash costs by the time the Main Estimates and the Supplementary Estimates for 2012-13 are prepared. They recommend that, if the way expenditure is classified is changed in future, the MoD should provide a comparison of expenditure on a like-for-like basis between years within its memorandum on the Supplementary Estimates and should also provide full details of the items and amounts affected and the reasons for the changes. In general, while the Committee has no argument with the content of the MoD's Supplementary Estimate, it is unreasonable to expect Committees and Parliament to scrutinise the Supplementary Estimates in less than three weeks. More time is needed to consider the Supplementary Estimate, the associated memorandum and the MoD's responses to questions on the Estimate.

In this report the Defence Committee says the information published so far by the Scottish Government on the defence and security implications of Scottish independence falls far short of requirements. The Committee also cannot currently judge the likely running costs of the proposed Scottish defence force, given the limited information it has so far received. The Committee is, however, unconvinced that the proposed budget of £2.5bn can support both the proposed Scottish defence force and the purchase of new equipment including fast jets and submarines. The report seeks answers to the following questions: how would a sovereign Scottish Government ensure the defence and security of an independent Scotland? For what purposes would Scottish armed forces be used? How would Scottish armed forces be structured and trained, and where would they be based? How much would it cost to equip, support and train an independent Scotland's armed forces and how much of this could be procured and delivered domestically? And how many jobs in the defence sector would be placed at risk? The Committee also raises detailed questions about the proposed Scottish defence force: the numbers and types of aircraft and naval vessels which would be needed and how they would be procured and maintained; the numbers of combat troops the Scottish Government envisages (including its plan to re-instate historic Scottish regiments); and the availability of training facilities to maintain the appropriate professional standards. In the event of independence, the defence industry in Scotland would face a difficult future.

This book explores the process by which defence policy is made in contemporary Britain and the institutions, actors and conflicting interests which interact in its inception and continuous reformulation. Rather than dealing with the substance of defence policy, this study focuses upon the institutional actors involved in this process. This is a subject which has commanded far more interest from public, Parliament, government and the armed forces since the protracted, bloody and ultimately unsuccessful British military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The work begins with a discussion of two contextual factors shaping policy. The first relates to the impact of Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States over defence and intelligence matters, while the second considers the impact of Britain’s relatively disappointing economic performance upon the funding of British defence since 1945. It then goes on to explore the role and impact of all the key policy actors, from the Prime Minister, Cabinet and core executive, to the Ministry of Defence and its relations with the broader ‘Whitehall village’, and the Foreign Office and Treasury in particular. The work concludes by examining the increasing influence of external policy actors and forces, such as Parliament, the courts, political parties, pressure groups and public opinion. This book will be of much interest to students of British defence policy, security studies, and contemporary military history.

A series of Ofsted inspections on Army Apprenticeships conducted in 2013 rated the overall effectiveness as good. This was an improvement over the last inspection in 2009, rated as satisfactory (now called 'requires improvement'). Some 28 per cent of Army recruits were less than 18 years of age. Further information is needed on why the Army is so dependent on recruiting personnel under the age of 18 years compared to the other two Services, and whether steps are being taken to reduce this dependency. Of those recruited in 2012, 3.5 per cent of the Army were rated at entry level 2 for literacy (that of a 7 to 8 year old) and 39 per cent had a literacy level of an eleven year old. If as the MoD states, it has to recruit personnel at whatever level of attainment is available, then it should boost remedial action when recruitment entry standards are particularly low. In light of changes brought about by Future Force 2020, it may be that recruiting personnel with higher levels of attainment would better meet the future needs of the Armed Forces. Whilst the Committee recognises that some recruits may not be eager to take further academic exams, the MoD should encourage more recruits to undertake English and Maths GCSEs which would stand them in good stead for future employment. The MoD has carried out some useful pilot projects with paramedic training and should identify more potential projects to ensure that vital skills paid for by the MoD are not lost to the country

UK military personnel as individuals are properly subject to UK and international law wherever they serve and there are processes to ensure scrutiny of their individual behaviour and legal compliance but, in the last ten years, legal judgments in the UK and elsewhere against the MoD have raised a number of legal, ethical and practical questions for the Armed Forces and their conduct of operations. The growing number of such challenges is leading to a feeling of disquiet amongst military personnel and informed commentators about the extent and scale of judicial involvement in military matters.There are two aspects of the use of human rights law in military operations that most concern the Committee: The extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights has allowed claims in the UK courts from foreign nationals. However, the requirement for full and detailed investigations of every death resulting from an armed conflict is putting a significant burden on the MoD and the Armed Forces. Secondly, there has been a failure of the accepted principle of combat immunity, most recently evidenced in the Supreme Court majority judgment in June 2013 allowing families and military personnel to bring negligence cases against the MoD for injury or death. This seems to us to risk the judicialisation of war and to be incompatible with the accepted contract entered into by Service personnel and the nature of soldiering.

The MoD's financial settlement in the next Comprehensive Spending Review must be made in the light of the need to retain a credible deterrent capacity in the country's Armed Forces. The Committee welcomes the emphasis that the Government places on the importance of cyber defence and the commitment of resources to a new cyber strike capability. But the difficulty in identifying actors in a cyber attack makes the ability to deter that much harder. Similar questions arise in deterrence against the asymmetrical threat of terrorism as it is difficult to identify interests and groups against which a response can be legitimately targeted. The Committee is calling on the MoD to set out how it can make clear that both cyber and terrorist attack will elicit an appropriate and determined response. Looking at the nuclear deterrent, the Committee points out that the UK's ability to effect a nuclear response is not credible in dealing with all threats, and so strong conventional deterrence is also required. And given the importance of communication to the concept of deterrence, investment in diplomatic and intelligence assets must be integral to the UK's security apparatus. The Committee concludes that it would be naive to assume that a decision not to invest in the nuclear deterrent would release substantial funds for investment in other forms of security. The Committee believes that the decision on the retention of the nuclear deterrent, should be made on its own merits.