Monetary Policy During Transition An Overview

January 1997 In transition economies monetary stability goes hand in hand with adjustment in the real sectors. Subsidies and central bank support of public enterprises to help maintain employment and output are ultimately financed by creating money, reducing the options for market-based monetary policy regardless of how market-oriented the monetary system. De Melo and Denizer examine monetary policy in 26 transition countries in Europe and Central Asia from 1989 to 1995. In a socialist economy money and credit are largely determined as a residual. In a market economy monetary policy plays an active role in economic management and economic efficiency is believed to be improved by variety and sophistication in financial instruments. De Melo and Denizer classify these 26 countries by the extent of market orientation in the use of instruments of monetary policy, by indicators of policy stance, and by broad measures of effectiveness. They evaluate these three dimensions by cross-country comparison over the transition period and at the time of stabilization. They find several clear patterns. By the end of 1994 slightly fewer than half the countries were relying mainly on market-oriented monetary instruments. More than half exhibited low to moderate reliance on them. Countries that quickly formulated a monetary policy response after the break from central planning were more likely to switch to market-oriented instruments. Central and Eastern European countries moved more rapidly than countries of the former Soviet Union toward these instruments. The use of credit ceilings was helpful in the year of stabilization, especially in the Central and Eastern European countries. The elimination of credit controls was associated with effective stabilization. Policy stance, as measured by base money growth and the real discount rate, was effective in helping to reverse undesirable inflation and disintermediation trends. But the relationship between effectiveness and market orientation of monetary policy instruments is less clear. Financial depth is associated with the elimination of credit ceilings and the development of markets for government paper, and inflation is associated with the elimination of directed credit and the establishment of a market-oriented refinancing window. The overall index of the market orientation of monetary policy instruments is negatively related to inflation, but the direction of causality is unclear. On balance, inflation control and financial depth seem to be more directly related to policy stance, which is in turn related to broader structural reform. Monetary stability goes hand in hand with adjustment in the real sectors. Subsidies and central bank support of public enterprises to help maintain employment and output are ultimately financed by creating money, reducing the options for market-based monetary policy regardless of how market-oriented the monetary system. This paper - a product of the Public Economics Division and the Macroeconomics and Growth Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to provide a comparative overview of the progress in transition from a planned to a market economy.

Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.

This book explores the disastrous economic consequences of pseudo lending for pseudo reforms that occurred when the IMF, as a representative of the West, pretended to aid the transition economy of post-communist Russia through stabilization while the Russian government promised reforms.

Over the past two decades, many low- and lower-middle income countries (LLMICs) have improved control over fiscal policy, liberalized and deepened financial markets, and stabilized inflation at moderate levels. Monetary policy frameworks that have helped achieve these ends are being challenged by continued financial development and increased exposure to global capital markets. Many policymakers aspire to move beyond the basics of stability to implement monetary policy frameworks that better anchor inflation and promote macroeconomic stability and growth. Many of these LLMICs are thus considering and implementing improvements to their monetary policy frameworks. The recent successes of some LLMICs and the experiences of emerging and advanced economies, both early in their policy modernization process and following the global financial crisis, are valuable in identifying desirable features of such frameworks. This paper draws on those lessons to provide guidance on key elements of effective monetary policy frameworks for LLMICs.

Miroslav Beblav an experienced policy maker, examines monetary policy and monetary institutions in Eastern European and looks at monetary policy, more generally, in less developed, but highly open and financially integrated market economies.

A leading academic authority and policymaker discusses monetary policy strategy from the perspectives of both scholar and practitioner, offering theory, econometric evidence, and extensive case studies. This book by a leading authority on monetary policy offers a unique view of the subject from the perspectives of both scholar and practitioner. Frederic Mishkin is not only an academic expert in the field but also a high-level policymaker. He is especially well positioned to discuss the changes in the conduct of monetary policy in recent years, in particular the turn to inflation targeting. Monetary Policy Strategy describes his work over the last ten years, offering published papers, new introductory material, and a summing up, “Everything You Wanted to Know about Monetary Policy Strategy, But Were Afraid to Ask,” which reflects on what we have learned about monetary policy over the last thirty years. Mishkin blends theory, econometric evidence, and extensive case studies of monetary policy in advanced and emerging market and transition economies. Throughout, his focus is on these key areas: the importance of price stability and a nominal anchor; fiscal and financial preconditions for achieving price stability; central bank independence as an additional precondition; central bank accountability; the rationale for inflation targeting; the optimal inflation target; central bank transparency and communication; and the role of asset prices in monetary policy.

This paper reviews the performance of the UK's flexible inflation targeting framework against the internationally-accepted monetary policy objective of price stability, a pre-requisite to longer-term growth and macroeconomic stability. Chapters cover the historical and international context, monetary policy frameworks and monetary policy instruments. The paper gives the Monetary Policy Committee's revised remit at Budget 2013. The Government has retained a flexible inflation target framework. The inflation target of 2 per cent, as measured by the 12-month increase in the Consumer Prices Index, is re-affirmed. The remit has been updated to clarify the trade-offs that are involved in setting monetary policy to meet a forward-looking inflation target, and in forming and communicating its judgements the MPC should promote understanding of these trade-offs. The remit continues to require an exchange of open letters between the Governor of the Bank of England and the Chancellor of the Exchequer if inflation moves away from the target by more than 1 percentage point in either direction. The open letter from the Governor should now be sent alongside the minutes of the MPC meeting that followed the publication of the CPI data. The remit requests that the MPC provides in its August 2013 inflation report an assessment of the merits of using intermediate thresholds - policy commitments conditional on future economic developments. The remit also reflects the Government's intention that the frameworks for monetary policy and macro-prudential policy, operated by the MPC and FPC of the Bank of England respectively, should be coordinated.