Moral Dilemmas And Moral Theory

Do moral dilemmas truly exist? What counts as a moral dilemma? Can an adequate moral theory admit the possibility of genuine conflicts of moral obligations? In this book, twelve prominent moral theorists examine these and other questions from a wide variety of philosophical perspectives. Concerned throughout with the implications of moral dilemmas for moral theory, this collection of essays captures in striking fashion the full scope and vitality of the current moral dilemmas debate. Including both realist and anti-realist meta-ethical positions, and Kantian and consequentialist normative views, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory sheds new light on several standing controversies in moral philosophy while raising a fresh set of challenging issues. Contributors include Simon Blackburn, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Alan Donagan, Terrance McConnell, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Mary Mothersill, Norman Dahl, David Brink, Peter Railton, Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Christopher Gowans, and H.E. Mason.

Moral Dilemmas in Real Life purports to supply ways of thinking of, perhaps even dealing with, the ins and outs of ethical argument. The world today presents both individuals and communities with situations, which demand moral and ethical deliberations. From the more general issues of universal globalization to the very specific problems of every-day existence encountered by active agents, contemporary life is replete with moral and ethical conundrums. Any thinking person is required, so it seems, to be concerned, involved, or – at the very least – conversant with these issues and this book supplies the wherewithal needed. Applied ethics is that intellectual locale where theory meets praxis. Moral Dilemmas in Real Life is designed to make that meeting point explicit, by presenting a series of issues in well-grounded philosophical formulations. The book begins with the general relation between the individual and society – instilling ethical tension, and even clashes, between the private and the public in our discourse. Going on, from general to specific, it gradually narrows the ethical playing field to touch on medical ethics, the family, and the practice of punishment. In all cases, the book addresses both consensual and conventional social institutions and distortions thereof.

Moral Dilemmas is the second volume of collected essays by the eminent moral philosopher Philippa Foot. It fills the gap between her famous 1978 collection Virtues and Vices (now reissued) and her acclaimed monograph Natural Goodness, published in 2001. Moral Dilemmas presents the best of Professor Foot's work from the late 1970s to the 1990s. In these essays she develops further her influential critique of the 'non-cognitivist' approaches that have dominated moral philosophy over the last fifty years. She shows why it is a mistake to think of morality in terms of special psychological states, expressed in special kinds of judgement and a special 'moral' kind of language. Instead she portrays thoughts about the goodness of human will and action as a particular case of the evaluation of other operations of human beings, and indeed of all living things. Among other topics, she discusses the nature of moral judgement, practical rationality, and the conflict of virtue with desire and self-interest. Moral Dilemmas, alongside Professor Foot's other two books, completes the summation of her distinctive and lasting contribution to twentieth-century moral philosophy.

Moral dilemmas set a challenge for ethical theory. They are situations where agents seem to be under an obligation both to do, and to refrain from doing, a specific act. Are such situations possible? What is their exact nature? These are the questions that Moral Dilemmas tries to answer. The book argues that moral theories should not allow for the possibility of irresolvable dilemmas, for situations in which no right answer exists. To this end, arguments seeking to prove the existence of irresolvable dilemmas, especially the argument from the incommensurability of values, are discussed at length and refuted. The book shows that though on the normative level dilemmas are resolved, they typically involve a high moral cost for which there is no adequate compensation. This moral cost is the source of the regret and pain suffered by agents in moral dilemmas. Thus, moral dilemmas do not point to any inconsistency in our moral reasoning or theory, but to a problematic aspect of the human condition; at times (probably less often than is usually believed), human beings are justified, and even required, to dirty their hands by behaving in ways that in ordinary situations would be strictly forbidden and condemned.

The essays in this volume illuminate a central topic in ethical theory: moral dilemmas. Some contemporary philosophers dispute the traditional view that a true moral dilemma - a situation in which a person has two irreconcilable moral duties - cannot exist. The book provides the historical background to the on-going debate with selections from Kant, Mill, Bradley, and Ross. The best recent work is represented in essays by Donagan, Foot, Hare, Marcus, Nagel, van Fraassen, Williams, and others.

This book deals with moral dilemmas and the development of ethical reasoning in two senses. First, the editor focuses on dilemmas, both real and hypothetical, which require moral judgments. The ""Heinz dilemma,"" part of Kohlberg's scoring system for level of moral development, is in some cases used as a point of departure for discussion. Problems with this particular dilemma as a scoring item are examined in detail, along with problems generated by similar dilemmas for moral reasoning in everyday life.Those who study moral reasoning and its development are in somewhat of a dilemma as they attempt to integrate information from the domains of philosophy and psychology. These essays investigate domain issues in varied cultural settings, and across genders and age ranges for what have been proposed as universals in moral judgment, as well as formulate theories that reflect both empirical evidence and logical process.The essays share a conception of human nature as inherently social, as well as a healthy respect for the problems or dilemmas which human sociality carries in its wake. Some of these problems are theoretical, such as those having to do with the moral reasoning or the classic issues of values justification. Other problems are practical, such as those having to do with distributive justice or methods of moral education. This volume will shed light on the process of resolving dilemmas both within philosophy and psychology.