Moral Philosophy And The Holocaust

How far can we ever hope to understand the Holocaust? What can we reasonably say about right and wrong, moral responsibility, praise and blame, in a world where ordinary reasons seem to be excluded? In the century of Nazism, ethical writing in English had much more to say about the meaning of the word `good` than about the material reality of evil. This book seeks to redress the balance at the start of a new century. Despite intense interest in the Holocaust, there has been relatively little exploration of it by philosophers in the analytic tradition. Although ethical writers often refer to Nazism as a touchstone example of evil, and use it as a case by which moral theorising can be tested, they rarely analyse what evil amounts to, or address the substantive moral questions raised by the Holocaust itself. This book draws together new work by leading moral philosophers to present a wide range of perspectives on the Holocaust. Contributors focus on particular themes of central importance, including: moral responsibility for genocide; the moral uniqueness of the Holocaust; responding to extreme evil; the role of ideology; the moral psychology of perpetrators and victims of genocide; forgiveness and the Holocaust; and the impact of the `Final Solution` on subsequent culture. Topics are treated with the precision and rigour characteristic of analytic philosophy. Scholars, teachers and students with an interest in moral theory, applied ethics, genocide and Holocaust studies will find this book of particular value, as will all those seeking greater insight into ethical issues surrounding Nazism, race-hatred and intolerance.

In Moral Responsibility in the Holocaust, David H. Jones goes beyond historical and psychological explanations of the Holocaust to directly address the moral responsibility of individuals involved in it. While defending the view that individuals caught up in large-scale historical events like the Holocaust are still responsible for their choices, he provides the philosophical tools needed to assess the responsibility, both negative and positive, of perpetrators, accomplices, bystanders, victims, helpers, and rescuers.

This volume documents the still-rare encounter of moral-philosophical, historiographic and medical-ethical research on National Socialism, and looks at the ethical aspects of the National Socialist ideology, as well as at the moral convictions of National Socialist perpetrators, some of whom acted as “perpetrators with a good conscience”. It furthermore discusses questions such as the content and rationale of Nazi race ethics, the “euthanasia” killings and the Nazi ethics of racial warfare and the role of the SS as the vanguard of the National Socialist race state, the moral conditioning of Nazi perpetrators and their self-exoneration strategies after the defeat of Nazism, and German Holocaust memory politics. Due to the broad range of topics covered and methodologies discussed, this book will interest academic readers of various disciplines of the humanities, including German history, Holocaust studies, Jewish studies philosophy and medical ethics. It will also appeal to the common public interested in Nazi ideology and ethics, and their implications for current ethical issues and challenges, such as the consequences of moral indifference as well as the debate on euthanasia and mercy killing.

The Double Binds of Ethics after the Holocaust advances the idea that the Holocaust undermined confidence in basic beliefs about human rights and shows steps of salvage and retrieval that need to be taken if ethics is to be a significant presence in a world still besieged by genocide and atrocity.

Using concepts of systems theory, proposes a three-level approach to explain the genesis of the Final Solution: it was a result of the interplay between antisemitic ideology, Nazi totalitarianism, and situational factors, such as the war in the East. The idea of the extermination of Jews had existed long before the Nazi takeover, but the genocide was not predetermined from the 1920s - it was Nazi totalitarianism that made the solution of the "Jewish question" part of the bureaucratic program, and the war that made the genocide the most feasible solution. Argues that Nazism had an ethics of its own - its main value was Aryan German community; criticizes other views on this question. Concludes that the Holocaust was essentially the destruction of the Other's Face, and thus a unique crime. It epitomizes one of the basic trends of modernity: the biological transfiguration of evil.

How should Augustine, Plato, Calvin, Kant, Nietzsche, and Bonhoeffer be read today, in light of postcolonial theory and twenty-first-century understandings? This book offers a reader-friendly introduction to Christian liberationist ethics by having scholars "from the margins" explore how questions of race and gender should be brought to bear on twenty-four classic ethicists and philosophers. Each short chapter gives historical background for the thinker, describes that thinker's most important contributions, then raises issues of concern for women and persons of color.

This work is an analysis of the ideology, causal patterns, and means employed in the Nazi genocide against the Jews. It argues that the events of the genocide compel reconsideration of such moral concepts as individual and group responsibility, the role of knowledge in ethical decisions, and the conditions governing the relation between guilt and forgiveness. It shows how the moral implications of genocide extend to linguistic and artistic presentations of the Nazi extermination of the Jews.

The vast majority of studies of Hannah Arendt's thought are concerned with her as a political theorist. This book offers a contribution to rectifying this imbalance by providing a critical engagement with Arendtian ethics. Arendt asserts that the crimes of the Holocaust revealed a shift in ethics and the need for new responses to a new kind of evil. In this new treatment of her work, Arendt's best-known ethical concepts – the notion of the banality of evil and the link she posits between thoughtlessness and evil, both inspired by her study of Adolf Eichmann – are disassembled and appraised. The concept of the banality of evil captures something tangible about modern evil, yet requires further evaluation in order to assess its implications for understanding contemporary evil, and what it means for traditional, moral philosophical issues such as responsibility, blame and punishment. In addition, this account of Arendt's ethics reveals two strands of her thought not previously considered: her idea that the condition of 'living with oneself' can represent a barrier to evil and her account of the 'nonparticipants' who refused to be complicit in the crimes of the Nazi period and their defining moral features. This exploration draws out the most salient aspects of Hannah Arendt's ethics, provides a critical review of the more philosophically problematic elements, and places Arendt's work in this area in a broader moral philosophy context, examining the issues in moral philosophy which are raised in her work such as the relevance of intention for moral responsibility and of thinking for good moral conduct, and questions of character, integrity and moral incapacity.