Napoleon S Heavy Cavalry

During the Napoleonic Wars the supreme battlefield shock weapon was the heavy cavalry – the French cuirassiers, and their British, Austrian, Prussian and Russian counterparts. Big men mounted on big horses, the heavy cavalry were armed with swords nearly a metre long, used for slashing or thrusting at their opponents; many wore steel armour, a practice revived by Napoleon. They were tasked with smashing a hole in the enemy's line of battle, with exploiting a weakness, or with turning a flank. Their classic manoeuvre was the charge; arrayed in close-order lines or columns, the heavy cavalry would begin their attack at the walk, building up to a gallop for the final 50 metres before impact. Illustrated with diagrams, relevant paintings and prints and specially prepared colour plates, this is the first volume of a two-part study of the cavalry tactics of the armies of Napoleon and those of his allies and opponents. Written by a leading authority on the period, it draws upon drill manuals and later writings to offer a vivid assessment of how heavy cavalry actually fought on the Napoleonic battlefield.

Napoleon’s rise to power in the late eighteenth century occurred at a time when the structure of most European armies was based on the paradigm army of Frederick the Great. Napoleon, however, changed all of this and in a few short years transformed the French army into the most powerful force on the continent of Europe. During the period of 1805 to 1813, Napoleon’s army had no equal with regard to operational effectiveness. Speed and positioning of forces were the two main characteristics that made the French army so successful. These same two characteristics were also inherent to French cavalry units. Thus, the central research question is: What influence did cavalry have upon Napoleon’s operations? To facilitate this study, two campaigns were examined that illustrate cavalry’s impact on Napoleon’s operations. The first campaign was the Jena Campaign of 1806; the second was the Saxony Campaign of 1813. The Jena Campaign demonstrated that with the employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could render his victories decisive through the complete destruction of the enemy army. Conversely, the Saxony Campaign demonstrated that without the effective employment of sufficient and well-trained cavalry, Napoleon could not obtain the complete destruction of the enemy army and thus, his victories were hollow, or at best Pyrrhic. Therefore, based on the analysis of these two campaigns, this study has concluded that Napoleon’s cavalry was a key element for Napoleon achieving complete destruction of the enemy army, thus rendering his victories decisive.

Dressed in outrageously romantic uniforms and led by a flamboyant clique of aristocrats and ex-troopers, Napoleon's cavalry fought in Austria, Germany, Egypt, Italy, Poland, Belgium, and Spain. This account of the most remarkable and successful cavalry in history is the culmination of 30 years of research.

Many books have been written about Napoleon and his campaigns, but very little about the soldiers of his armies and of the organization and conditions under which they lived and served. In this classic study, now reissued in paperback, H.C.B. Rogers examines Napoleon's army in terms of its staff systems, its arms and its supporting services as it existed and changed during the long period that separated the battles of Valmy and Waterloo. This is not another history of Napoleon's campaigns. Apart from the brief narrative of the opening chapter designed to serve as an aide-memoire, military operations are only cited to illustrate organization, tactics, equipment and administration. The author seeks to show how, as Lord Wavell put it, Napoleon inspired 'a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight as it did'.

Some 12 years ago it was estimated that well over 300,000 works existed on this period and since then several thousand more have appeared. Therefore, it might be reasonably argued that there is little room for another volume. Nonetheless, this vast outpouring of literature has usually dealt with major leaders, specific battles or campaigns, and with certain branches of the service. Moreover, at least in English, the literature tends to concentrate primarily on the French or British armies. There appears to be a lack of works combining a description of the major changes and trends in the art of war, especially at the cutting edge of events, with a discussion of the French military establishment and the armies of the major opponents, British as well as continental. And while this book is only a brief survey, I do believe that it may serve as a contribution towards filling this gap in our historical knowledge of military institutions and fighting men.