The Art Of Warfare In The Age Of Napoleon

Some 12 years ago it was estimated that well over 300,000 works existed on this period and since then several thousand more have appeared. Therefore, it might be reasonably argued that there is little room for another volume. Nonetheless, this vast outpouring of literature has usually dealt with major leaders, specific battles or campaigns, and with certain branches of the service. Moreover, at least in English, the literature tends to concentrate primarily on the French or British armies. There appears to be a lack of works combining a description of the major changes and trends in the art of war, especially at the cutting edge of events, with a discussion of the French military establishment and the armies of the major opponents, British as well as continental. And while this book is only a brief survey, I do believe that it may serve as a contribution towards filling this gap in our historical knowledge of military institutions and fighting men.

Napoleon Bonaparte's ascent to power was meteoric. Ever the outsider and regarded by many as an upstart, his extraordinary determination, courage, and tactical skill saw him rise from ordinary beginnings to become the greatest military commander of his age. A brigadier general by the age of 24, crowned Emperor of France by age 35, he had conquered most of the countries of Europe by the time he was 45. Napoleon's maxims for conduct on the battlefield gives a fascinating insight into his knowledge, intuition, and resourcefulness. His ideas have shaped the opinion of generations of military strategists, politicians, and business entrepreneurs, and are still relevant today. The translation, by British army officer Colonel George D'Aguilar, contains notes exploring the background to Napoleon's theories of war and the leaders who inspired him. This edition also contains an historical introduction by Frederick C. Schneid, Professor of History at High Point University, North Carolina.

Napoleon. The passage of time has not dimmed the power of his name. A century and a half after his death, Napoleon remains the greatest military genius of the modern world. Yet unlike Machiavelli, Clausewitz, or Sun Tzu, his name has not crowned any single literary work. The subject of thousands of biographies and treatises on warfare, he is the author of none. Until now. The great general and conqueror of Europe may not have written any books, but he was a prolific writer. Thousands of his missives to subordinates survive, and these documents reflect the broad range of a fearless and incisive mind. From them, military historian Jay Luvaas has wrought a seamless whole. Luvaas has spent decades culling, editing, and arranging Napoleon's thoughts into coherent essays and arguments. In the remarkable result. Napoleon speaks without interruption in a work that will forever change the way we view him. Luvaas covers every subject Napoleon wrote about, from the need for preparation -- "Simply gathering men together does not produce real soldiers; drill, instruction, and skill is what makes real soldiers." -- to the essence of victory -- "To win is not enough: It is necessary to profit from success." On education, leadership, strategy and history, Napoleon speaks with an authority unique to those who have ruled a continent. In these pages lies the wisdom of a giant who knew life's greatest achievements and its lowest lows: triumph and conquest, exile and disgrace. Whether you are a student of military strategy or a business professional eager to learn from the greatest manager of personnel that the world has ever known, Napoleon on the Art of War has something for you. From the specifies of Napoleon's use of cavalry and unique reliance upon artillery to an all-encompassing vision of life from a man of supreme confidence and success, you'll find it here. This is the only straightforward explanation of Napoleon's campaigns and philosophy by the man himself.

The final volume of a major work on warfare in the Napoleonic age The author of this substantial multi-volume history, Theodore A Dodge, was not only an historian of stature and note but also a soldier. He wrote several well regarded histories of the campaigns and battles of the Civil War and other works of military history. Perhaps his most outstanding achievement was a series of books, published under the umbrella title 'the Art of War, ' focusing on different historical periods as typified by their most notable military commanders-including the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar in the ancient world and the wars of the 17th and 18th century as fought by great captains including Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick and Marlborough. This volume is part of his in depth study of the Napoleonic period, which in its entirety was comprised of four huge volumes that benefited from the inclusion of almost 800 small scale uniform drawings, portraits of notable personalities and numerous theatre, campaign and battlefield maps. This retitled Leonaur edition has been revised to form volumes of approximately equal size reformatted to enable us to enlarge all the illustrations and maps for the benefit of the reader. This series is an excellent history of the campaigns and battles of the Napoleonic Age but it goes far beyond the historical record. Dodge critically examines the strategies and tactics of all the military commanders in such a clear and authoritative manner that the student of military history can clearly understand the errors of those about to suffer defeat and the expertise-or in the case of Napoleon Bonaparte, the military genius-of the victors. This is an invaluable guide to warfare in the age of Napoleon and is highly recommended. This final volume of Dodge's brilliant account of the 'art of war' in the Napoleonic Age concludes with the period to the end of the First Empire when the fortunes of the imperial allies turned in their favour and Napoleon and his forces, weakened by reverses, were unable to contain them. Napoleon's brilliance in the campaigns of 1814 showed that he was still an incomparable grand commander on the field of battle, especially in engagements when the odds were against him. The war had turned to one of attrition so the Empire fell, the emperor abdicated, the Bourbon monarchy was restored and Europe breathed a collective sigh of relief. But it was not quite the end-Napoleon's last great gamble for a return to power, 'The Hundred Days' and the Campaign of 1815 culminating in the great battle of Waterloo on June 18th 1815, brought the most significant commanders of both sides to a field of conflict for the first and last time. Leonaur editions are newly typeset and are not facsimiles; each title is available in softcover and hardback with dustjacket; our hardbacks are cloth bound and feature gold foil lettering on their spines and fabric head and tail bands.

The Military Maxims of Napoleon will provide the reader with the very essence of the Napoleonic art of war. This book is a collection of maxims which directed the military operations of the greatest captain of modern times, Napoleon Bonaparte. This extraordinary collection shades light to the period of French domination over Europe, which was build on Napoleon's great military and political skills. On War is one of the most important treatises on political-military analysis and strategy ever written, and remains both controversial and influential on strategic thinking. It was written by Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, after the Napoleonic wars, between 1816 and 1830. Clausewitz had set about revising his accumulated manuscripts, but did not live to finish the task. On War represents his theoretical explorations. Clausewitz analyzed the conflicts of his time along the line of the categories Purpose, Goal and Means. He reasoned that the Purpose of war is one's will to be enforced, which is determined by politics. The Goal of the conflict is therefore to defeat the opponent in order to exact the Purpose. The Goal is pursued with the help of a strategy that might be brought about by various Means such as by the defeat or the elimination of opposing armed forces or by non-military Means (such as propaganda, economic sanctions and political isolation). Thus, any resource of the human body and mind and all the moral and physical powers of a state might serve as Means to achieve the set goal.