Narrative Identity Autonomy And Mortality

In the last two decades, interest in narrative conceptions of identity has grown exponentially, though there is little agreement about what a "life-narrative" might be. In connecting Kierkegaard with virtue ethics, several scholars have recently argued that narrative models of selves and MacIntyre's concept of the unity of a life help make sense of Kierkegaard's existential stages and, in particular, explain the transition from "aesthetic" to "ethical" modes of life. But others have recently raised difficult questions both for these readings of Kierkegaard and for narrative accounts of identity that draw on the work of MacIntyre in general. While some of these objections concern a strong kind of unity or "wholeheartedness" among an agent's long-term goals or cares, the fundamental objection raised by critics is that personal identity cannot be a narrative, since stories are artifacts made by persons. In this book, Davenport defends the narrative approach to practical identity and autonomy in general, and to Kierkegaard's stages in particular.

In the last two decades, interest in narrative conceptions of identity has grown exponentially, though there is little agreement about what a "life-narrative" might be. In connecting Kierkegaard with virtue ethics, several scholars have recently argued that narrative models of selves and MacIntyre's concept of the unity of a life help make sense of Kierkegaard's existential stages and, in particular, explain the transition from "aesthetic" to "ethical" modes of life. But others have recently raised difficult questions both for these readings of Kierkegaard and for narrative accounts of identity that draw on the work of MacIntyre in general. While some of these objections concern a strong kind of unity or "wholeheartedness" among an agent's long-term goals or cares, the fundamental objection raised by critics is that personal identity cannot be a narrative, since stories are artifacts made by persons. In this book, Davenport defends the narrative approach to practical identity and autonomy in general, and to Kierkegaard's stages in particular.

This book engages in a critical discussion on how to respect and promote patients’ autonomy in difficult cases such as palliative care and end-of-life decisions. These cases pose specific epistemic, normative, and practical problems, and the book elucidates the connection between the practical implications of the theoretical debate on respecting autonomy, on the one hand, and specific questions and challenges that arise in medical practice, on the other hand. Given that the idea of personal autonomy includes the notion of authenticity as one of its core components, the book explicitly includes discussions on underlying theories of the self. In doing so, it brings together original contributions and novel insights for “applied” scenarios based on interdisciplinary collaboration between German and Serbian scholars from philosophy, sociology, and law. It is of benefit to anyone cherishing autonomy in medical ethics and medical practice.

On Art and Selfhood lies at the intersection of existentialism and the philosophy of art. On the philosophy of art side, it addresses questions about why art matters and how we ought to appreciate it. On the existentialism side, it attends to questions pertaining to authenticity or authentic selfhood. That is to say, it focuses on issues and problems having to do with our personal identity or our sense of who we are. The goal of the book is to bring together these two topics in a productive manner by showing that works of art matter partly because they can help us with the project of selfhood. In other words, works of art are important in part because they can offer us much needed guidance and support as we try to figure out who we really are. To make the case for this thesis, On Art and Selfhood draws on the works of the Danish thinker, Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55). It mines his writings for insights regarding aesthetics and personal identity, and then uses these insights to contribute to current discussions of these topics. Thus, the book speaks not only to those with interests in contemporary analytic philosophy but also to those with interests in historical scholarship on Kierkegaard.

For the first time, this collection brings together figures in both contemporary philosophy and Kierkegaard studies to explore pressing issues in the philosophy of personal identity and moral psychology.

Markus Mühling presents an epistemological theory of revelation as perception and a relational-narrative theological ontology based on the concept of dramatic coherence, in which the triune life is understood not as an anomaly within ontology, but rather as the decisive condition of its possibility. Mühling further demonstrates that potential for resolving certain theological problems arises if new insights from the natural sciences, such as the theory of the ecological brain in the neurosciences and the theory of niche-construction in evolutionary theory, are taken into account. Similarly, he also proposes that neuroscience and evolutionary biology can procure advantages from a dialogue with theology.

One of the most basic and important distinctions we draw is between those entities with the capacity of agency and those without. As humans we enjoy agency in its full-blooded form and therefore a proper understanding of the nature of agency is of great importance to appreciate who we are and what we should expect and demand of our existence. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency is an outstanding reference source to the key issues, problems, and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising 42 chapters by an international team of contributors, the Handbook is divided into eight clear parts: The Metaphysics of Agency Kinds of Agency Agency and Ability Agency: Mind, Body, and World Agency and Knowledge Agency and Moral Psychology Agency and Time Agency, Reasoning, and Normativity. A broad range of topics are covered, including the relation of agency to causation, teleology, animal agency, intentionality, planning, skills, disability, practical knowledge, self-knowledge, the will, responsibility, autonomy, identification, emotions, personal identity, reasons, morality, the law, aesthetics, and games. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency is essential reading for students and researchers within philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of psychology, and ethics.

Anthony Rudd presents a striking new account of the self as an ethical, evaluative being. He draws on Kierkegaard's thought to present a case for an ancient and currently neglected view: that the tensions which are constitutive of selfhood can only be reconciled through the understanding of the self as guided by an objective Good.