Nato S Balkan Interventions

Examines NATO's Balkan interventions over the entire decade starting with the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992. Focusing on the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, it traces the record of early transatlantic failures and later successes as once bitterly divided allies were able, finally, to unite around some basic principles. By the time of the Kosovo intervention in spring 1999, the allies agreed on the necessity of taking sides and using military force in conflicts that were complicated, but far from morally opaque. The book concludes with some lessons around which the transatlantic allies might reasonably hope - despite other pressing concerns - to stay engaged and stay united.

This thesis examines Bulgarian political and economic issues regarding NATO's military intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999. It studies: Bulgarian policy regarding Kosovo crisis; the domestic political attitudes and discussions over NATO's military intervention and over government's foreign policy on this issue; the impact of the war in Yugoslavia and post-war order on Bulgarian economy and Bulgarian domestic and foreign politics. The thesis attempts to evaluate some cost-effective assessments about short and long term consequences for Bulgaria. In spite of the initial highly negative and catastrophic expectations of the Bulgarian public, the country gained significant political dividends. Bulgarian prospects for EU and NATO membership now seem to be much more realistic than ever in the past. At the same time, NATO intervention and the postwar settlements have not solved the ethnic, political, military and economic problem on the Balkans, but complicated them and posed serious new risks for Bulgaria and for the Balkans in general. The war also brought certain negative ecologic effects. The intervention in Yugoslavia and its support by the Bulgarian government complicated Bulgarian- Russian relations, which most probably will have long-term negative effect on Bulgarian economy.

This is the first book in any language on the Kosovo conflict to bring together opposing viewpoints from internationally known and regionally renowned Western and Balkan authors. Many of the contributors have names recognized around the world -- Slobodan Milosevic, Henry Kissinger, Jurgen Habernas, Kofi Annan, Javier Solana, Vaclav Havel, and dthers -- but distinguished contributors with less familiar names also appear together here for the first time in English.

The Clinton administration and the other NATO governments boast that the alliance won a great victory in its war against Yugoslavia.

A number of distinguished dissidents voice their opinions on the intervention by NATO in the former Yugoslavia. The collection also provides background historical information on the conflict in the Balkans.

This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.

A discussion of the political illusion created by the humanitarian bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 that tests popular beliefs

In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.