Nato S Air War For Kosovo

This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.

This book examines the conduct and results of Operation Allied Force at the strategic and operational levels. An earlier and less developed version appeared as a chapter in the author's previous book The Transformation of American Air Power, which was published by Cornell University Press in September 2000. The research documented herein was carried out in Project AIR FORCE's Strategy and Doctrine Program and was completed in August 2001. All photographs included in this study were provided by the U.S. Department of Defense. The book should be of interest to USAF officers and other members of the U.S. national security community concerned with strategy and force employment issues raised by NATO's air war for Kosovo and with the implications of that experience for force development, air power doctrine, and concepts of operations for joint and coalition warfare.

After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.

The Clinton administration and the other NATO governments boast that the alliance won a great victory in its war against Yugoslavia.

This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Servian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations.

More than any other episode since the end of the Cold War, the conflict in Kosovo revealed the distinctive attributes of a new American "way of war." In so doing, Kosovo also brought into sharp focus the military, political, and moral dilemmas confronting a liberal democracy intent on wielding preeminent power on a global scale. What are the moral implications posed by waging high-tech warfare for humanitarian purposes? Does the precedent set by intervention of this type point toward peace and stability or toward more war? How well suited are the United States military and American society as a whole to the security challenges of the age of globalization? According to Bacevich and Cohen, gauging the "success" achieved in Kosovo yields important answers to these and related questions. The volume includes a well-crafted historical overview of the war and six essays that place it in a broader context. The contributors explore the conflict's relationship to U.S. grand strategy, the Revolution in Military Affairs, and American civil-military relations, among other topics. Contributors: William A. Arkin, Andrew J. Bacevich, Eliot A. Cohen, Alberto R. Coll, James Kurth, Anatol Lieven, Michael Vickers

The Air War over Kosovo opens with an exploration of the ethnic conflict in the Balkans. From this foundation, the book examines the weapons systems that were utilized. The author scrutinize the missiles employed, review the diverse bomber systems used, and highlight the nuances of the air lift operations. Additionally, the author explores the tactics and strategies that the American military administration designed and implemented over the Balkans. The author studied specific missions and scrutinize the memories and experiences of Lt. General Michael Short, General Charles Horner and General Wesley K. Clark to proffer an overview of the scope of this air-directed campaign.

A focused, illustrated history and analysis of perhaps the most complete air power victory in modern times, NATO's war against Serbian forces over Kosovo. On the night of March 24, 1999, NATO forces began military action to stop Serbia's campaign of repression during the Kosovo War. Initially planned to be a 72-hour operation, it took 78 days of sustained air warfare for Operation Allied Force to cause Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw his forces. Despite such setbacks as the loss of an F-117 stealth fighter and the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Allied Force ended with perhaps the most complete airpower victory of modern times. However, there is a dearth of written histories on NATO's air war over Kosovo. In this book Dr Brian D. Laslie, one of the leading scholars of modern air power operations, offers a complete history of the campaign, based on a wide range of primary and secondary sources. Although predominantly a USAF effort, the campaign also featured multinational contributions as well as significant naval aviation. Using spectacular original battlescenes, maps and 3D diagrams, Dr Laslie examines the aircraft, weapons and doctrine used, the Serbian air defenses, how the Allied forces planned and launched their air campaign, and how NATO had to rapidly adapt its initial plans to achieve success.