Naturalism In The Cognitive Sciences And The Philosophy Of Mind

The philosophy of mind is one of the most alive research sectors in the field of philosophical studies nowadays. But there is no universal agreement on what exactly naturalism in the philosophy of mind is, and there is even less agreement on how naturalism in the philosophy of mind relates to naturalism as a general philosophical outlook. At the most general level, naturalism is often characterized by slogans such as -Everything that exists is part of the natural order-, or -The methods of natural science provide the only avenue to truth-, or -There is no place for a first philosophy prior to natural science-. Naturalistic theories of mind explicitly or tacitly accept or presuppose the following principles: Minds (as well as consciousness, spirit or subjectivity) are part of the real world. Nature is the whole real world. Therefore minds, consciousness and subjectivity are part of the nature. Nature can be known only by empirical sciences. There is no knowledge a priori (or obtained by methods that are different from the methods of empirical sciences) of any part of nature. Therefore minds, consciousness and subjectivity, as part of the nature, can be known only by means of empirical sciences."

Naturalism is currently the most vibrantly developing approach to philosophy, with naturalised methodologies being applied across all the philosophical disciplines. One of the areas naturalism has been focussing upon is the mind, traditionally viewed as a topic hard to reconcile with the naturalistic worldview. A number of questions have been pursued in this context. What is the place of the mind in the world? How should we study the mind as a natural phenomenon? What is the significance of cognitive science research for philosophical debates? In this book, philosophical questions about the mind are asked in the context of recent developments in cognitive science, evolutionary theory, psychology, and the project of naturalisation. Much of the focus is upon what we have learned by studying natural mental mechanisms as well as designing artificial ones. In the case of natural mental mechanisms, this includes consideration of such issues as the significance of deficits in these mechanisms for psychiatry. The significance of the evolutionary context for mental mechanisms as well as questions regarding rationality and wisdom is also explored. Mechanistic and functional models of the mind are used to throw new light on discussions regarding issues of explanation, reduction and the realisation of mental phenomena. Finally, naturalistic approaches are used to look anew at such traditional philosophical issues as the correspondence of mind to world and presuppositions of scientific research.

A dialogue between contemporary neuroscience and John Dewey’s seminal philosophical work Experience and Nature, exploring how the bodily roots of human meaning, selfhood, and values provide wisdom for living. The intersection of cognitive science and pragmatist philosophy reveals the bodily basis of human meaning, thought, selfhood, and values. John Dewey's revolutionary account of pragmatist philosophy Experience and Nature (1925) explores humans as complex social animals, developing through ongoing engagement with their physical, interpersonal, and cultural environments. Drawing on recent research in biology and neuroscience that supports, extends, and, on occasion, reformulates some of Dewey's seminal insights, embodied cognition expert Mark L. Johnson and behavioral neuroscientist Jay Schulkin develop the most expansive intertwining of Dewey's philosophy with biology and neuroscience to date. The result is a positive, life-affirming understanding of how our evolutionary and individual development shapes who we are, what we can know, where our deepest values come from, and how we can cultivate wisdom for a meaningful and intelligent life.

This volume presents new essays exploring important aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy in connection with two major themes: mind and nature. A team of leading experts address questions including: What is Nietzsche's conception of mind? How does mind relate with the (rest of) nature? And what is Nietzsche's conception of nature? They all express the thought that Nietzsche's views on these matters are of great philosophical value, either because those views are consonant with contemporary thinking to a greater or lesser extent or because they represent a rich alternative to contemporary attitudes. The essays engage with Nietzsche's metaphysics; his philosophy of mind in light of contemporary views; the question of panpsychism in Beyond Good and Evil 36; the rejection of dualism in favour of monism (in particular a monism of value); Nietzsche's positions on consciousness and embodied cognition in light of recent cognitive science; a conception of freedom and agency based on an intrinsically motivating; embodied sense of self-efficacy; a Nietzschean account of valuing understood as drive-induced affective orientations of which an agent approves; the idea of ressentiment conceived as a process of intentional, not reflectively strategic, self-deception about one's own conscious mental states; and a defence of a Nietzschean naturalism.

The aim of this collection of papers is to present different philosophical perspectives on the mental, exploring questions about how to define, explain and understand the various kinds of mental acts and processes, and exhibiting, in particular, the contrast between naturalistic and non-naturalistic approaches. There is a long tradition in philosophy of clarifying concepts such as those of thinking, knowing and believing. The task of clarifying these concepts has become ever more important with the major developments that have taken place over the last century in the human and cognitive sciences - most notably, psychology, sociology, linguistics, neurophysiology, AI, and cognitive science itself. In all these sciences, there is a need to delineate the domain of the mental and to elucidate the key concepts and underlying assumptions. This need is widely recognized, but approaches and answers vary significantly. Some stress the representational features involved in most of our mental processes, others the inferential dimension; some stress the necessity of using empirical data, others the need to refine ideas before pursuing and drawing on empirical research. The papers collected in this volume are grouped into four parts, on language and thought, on knowledge, belief and action, on intentionality, and on naturalism. The volume will be welcomed by all those engaged and interested in debates about the mental in philosophy and the human and cognitive sciences. Table of Contents PART I: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT Andrew Woodfield, Public Words Considered as Vehicles of Thinking Andrea Bianchi, Speaking and Thinking (Or: A More Kaplanian Way to a Unified Account of Language and Thought) Stefano Predelli, The Strange Case of the Missing Constituent PART II: KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF AND ACTION Pascal Engel, Taking Seriously Knowledge as a Mental State Carlo Gabbani, Epistemology and the Eliminative Stance Jennifer Hornsby, Knowledge, Belief and Reasons for Acting Wolfgang Künne, Some Varieties of Deception PART III: INTENTIONALITY Sandro Nannini, Intentionality Naturalised Elisabetta Sacchi, Thought and Thinking: the Ontological Ground of Intentionality Elisabeth Pacherie, Is Collective Intentionality Really Primitive? PART IV: NATURALISM Marcello Frixione, Do Concepts exist? A Naturalistic Point of View Tim Crane, Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: the Challenge of the Explanatory Gap Achim Stephan and Robert C. Richardson, What Physicalism Should Provide Us With Mario De Caro, The Claims of Naturalism

A collection of essays concerning the mind that explores the prospects for, and limits of, appealing to facts about evolutionary history and current environment-organism interaction in explaining the nature and workings of the mental. Includes papers in ethology, psychology, neuroscience. Each paper contributes to the discussion of what discoveries in this field can tell us about particular issues in the philosophy of mind. Some of the papers in this issue have had a high profile: Mel Goodale was recently on the CBC talking about how each of us has two types of vision (it was a fascinating piece that is not actually written by a philosopher ).

This is the only contemporary text to cover both epistemology and philosophy of mind at an introductory level. It also serves as a general introduction to philosophy: it discusses the nature and methods of philosophy as well as basic logical tools of the trade. The book is divided into three parts. The first focuses on knowledge, in particular, skepticism and knowledge of the external world, and knowledge of language. The second focuses on mind, including the metaphysics of mind and freedom of will. The third brings together knowledge and mind, discussing knowledge of mind (other minds and our own) and naturalism and how epistemology and philosophy of mind come together in contemporary cognitive science. Throughout, the authors take into account the needs of the beginning philosophy student. They have made very effort to ensure accessibility while preserving accuracy.

To naturalists, there is no such thing as complete justification for any claim, and so requiring complete warrant for naturalist proposals is an unreasonable request. The proper guideline for naturalist proposals seems thus clear: develop it using the methods of science; if this leads to a fruitful stance, then explicate and reassess. The resulting offer will exhibit virtuous circularity if its explanatory feedback loop involves critical reassessment as the explanations it encompasses play out. So viewed, naturalism is a philosophical perspective that seeks to unite in a virtuous circle the natural sciences and non-foundationalist, broadly-based empiricism. Other common lines of antinaturalist complaint are that naturalization efforts seem fruitful only in some areas, also that several endeavors outside the sciences serve as sources of knowledge into human life and the human condition, especially in areas where science does not reach terribly far as yet. It seems hard not to grant some truth to many allegories from literature, art and some religions. Naturalism has room for knowledge gathered outside science, provided the imported claims satisfy also by naturalistic methods. Naturalism and the debate about its scope and limits thrive on discrepancy. We hope that, collectively, the selected essays that follow will give a fair view of the vitality and tribulations of naturalism as a variegated contemporary philosophical perspective.