Naval Aviation News Article On Fleet Support Supporting The Fleet

With the demise of Soviet Union, the U.S. Navy found itself without an adversary that could challenge its conventional war-fighting capability. It sought relevance and had to decide where to accept budgetary reductions. Abandoning high-dollar weapon systems and accompanying tactics became a tough issue. Throughout the cutbacks, naval aviation remained at the heart of the Navy's force. Naval aviation received support even though much of its capability outpaced all potential adversaries. Critics cite the cost of the aircraft carrier fleet relative to the missions the Navy now performs, and the steady improvement in anti-access weapons as reasons to invest in other technologies or decrease carrier numbers. Many now question whether the nation uses and operates the carrier force effectively. Nevertheless, naval aviation continues to provide the United States with a strong and creditable (although conventional and expensive) ability to accomplish America's worldwide commitment and conduct contingency operations.

Within Naval Aviation, Common Support Equipment (CSE) plays a critical yet unglamorous role in maintaining aircraft material readiness. Defense of CSE dollars is difficult because the Output of Aviation Support Equipment is not measurable. The ability to quantity and defend that role has been the nemesis of the Aviation Support Equipment Integrated Program Team members over the past two budget cycles. This study's intent is to provide an argument in defense of adequate program funding. The premise of this argument is: Inventory validity is a major consideration in making sound investment decisions. If the Fleet SE inventory validity is within acceptable limits, then the Fleet's input into the re-capitalization decision support system is valid. If the Fleet's SE inventory validity is poor, then the Fleet's buyout input is suspect. The foundation of this research is to determine how accurately the Fleet's on-hand assets reflect in the automated inventory database used to manage those assets. This research concludes that the mean SE validity for a reporting custodian's Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) or 0rganizational Maintenance Activity (OMA) account is 72.4%. Fleet Individual Material Readiness List (IMRL) inventory control processes are hampered by a lack of quantifiable metrics, duplicative and conflicting inventory control methods, and lack of a single source directive detailing inventory procedures. Failure to control these processes degrades the IMRL decision support system, hampers re-capitalization decisions, and inhibits the ability to determine how SE, or the lack thereof, impacts aircraft material readiness.

The United States Naval Air Station at Quonset Point, Rhode Island, originally built as a Neutrality Patrol seaplane base, became a unique and fundamental asset to our nation's armed forces. In World War II, more than half of all U-boats sunk by U.S. aviation were destroyed by Quonset-trained shore and carrier-based squadrons. In the years following World War II, Quonset Point Naval Air Station remained a premier industrial naval air station, sending squadrons or overhauling equipment for use in the Korean, Vietnam, and Cold War conflicts. For 34 years and through four wars, the Quonset Point Naval Air Station stood proud and tall on behalf of the U.S. military. This second volume of Quonset Point images uncovers nearly 200 more scenes of the installation's achievements and activities during the entire period of its service.