Naval War College Review

Learning War examines the U.S. Navy’s doctrinal development from 1898–1945 and explains why the Navy in that era was so successful as an organization at fostering innovation. A revolutionary study of one of history’s greatest success stories, this book draws profoundly important conclusions that give new insight, not only into how the Navy succeeded in becoming the best naval force in the world, but also into how modern organizations can exploit today’s rapid technological and social changes in their pursuit of success. Trent Hone argues that the Navy created a sophisticated learning system in the early years of the twentieth century that led to repeated innovations in the development of surface warfare tactics and doctrine. The conditions that allowed these innovations to emerge are analyzed through a consideration of the Navy as a complex adaptive system. Learning War is the first major work to apply this complex learning approach to military history. This approach permits a richer understanding of the mechanisms that enable human organizations to evolve, innovate, and learn, and it offers new insights into the history of the United States Navy.

This is a fascinating insight into China’s strategic abilities and ambitions, probing the real depths of its plans for the twenty-first century. China's Rising Sea Power explores similarities between China’s strategic outlook today and that of earlier continental powers whose submarine fleets challenged dominant maritime powers for regional hegemony: Germany in two World Wars and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Using insights from classical naval strategic theory, Peter Howarth examines Beijing’s strategic logic in making tactical submarines the keystone of China’s naval force structure. He also investigates the influence of Soviet naval strategy and ancient Chinese military thought on the PLA Navy’s strategic culture, contending that China’s increasingly capable submarine fleet could play a key role in Beijing’s use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of security and strategic studies, Asian politics, geopolitics and military (naval) strategy.

A study of the historic World War II naval battle, the first involving aircraft carriers and first in which neither warship was in sight of the other. By the beginning of May 1942, five months after the Pearl Harbor attack, the US Navy was ready to challenge the Japanese moves in the South Pacific. When the Japanese sent troops to New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, the Americans sent the carriers Lexington and Yorktown to counter the move, setting the stage for the Battle of the Coral Sea . . . In this book,historian Robert C. Stern analyzes the Battle of the Coral Sea, the first major fleet engagement where the warships were never in sight of each other. Unlike the Battle of Midway, the Battle of the Coral Sea has received remarkably little study. Stern covers not only the action of the ships and their air groups but also describes the impact of this pivotal engagement. His analysis looks at the short-term impact as well as the long-term implications, including the installation of inert gas fuel-system purging on all American aircraft carriers and the push to integrate sensor systems with fighter direction to better protect against enemy aircraft. The essential text on the first carrier air campaign, Scratch One Flattop is a landmark study on an overlooked battle in the first months of the United States’ engagement in World War II. “His research into sources on both sides is exhaustive and he has used Japanese translators where necessary and appropriate to best illuminate materials. His effort has taken years of meticulous scholarship and it shows. . . . Highly recommended.” —Lisle A. Rose, The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord

In the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy expressed concern that Communist sponsored unconventional warfare was one of the most pervasive threats to American security and that the U.S. military establishment was inadequately prepared to counter the threat. To correct this deficiency, the White House put pressure on the services, especially the U.S. Army, to develop the doctrine and forces necessary to conduct what was variously called counterinsurgency, counterguerrilla warfare, special warfare, special operations, or stability operations. As the military's capability to engage in unconventional warfare grew, so, too, did the opportunities to translate this capability into action. One such opportunity was the crisis in the Dominican Republic in 1965. In "Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966," Dr. Lawrence A. Yates vividly describes the role of the military in what today would be termed peacetime contingency and peacekeeping operations. After tracing the origins of the Dominican crisis, Dr. Yates analyzes the concerns that led to U.S. intervention; the joint planning, command and control arrangements, and intelligence gathering efforts that preceded and followed the introduction of U.S. marines and paratroopers into the country; the missions of those forces and the difficulties they encountered; the formation of an inter-American peace force that transformed unilateral intervention into a multilateral undertaking; and the way in which military forces provided the foundation upon which a political settlement was negotiated. In virtually every phase of the Dominican intervention, political considerations far outweighed military requirements. In this sense, "Power Pack" illustrates the kind of political military operations U.S. armed forces are most likely to engage in today under conditions short of all-out war. Many of the problems the military experienced in playing a supporting role to the diplomats and civil authorities instead of occupying stage center would later be reprised in Vietnam. In some respects, the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic was a dress rehearsal for Vietnam. In other respects, the dissimilarities are equally striking. In the Dominican Republic, the United States deployed, in the course of one week, a force large enough to end a civil war, suppress a potential insurgency, assist in restoring order and democracy, prevent a Communist takeover, and, having accomplished all this, leave the country one year later with its objectives achieved. The intervention in the Dominican Republic represents a successful application of U.S. power and diplomacy and an instructive case study for professional officers today.

Author of Lincoln and His Admirals (winner of the Lincoln Prize), The Battle of Midway (Best Book of the Year, Military History Quarterly), and Operation Neptune, (winner of the Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Naval Literature), Craig L. Symonds has established himself as one of the finest naval historians at work today. World War II at Sea represents his crowning achievement: a complete narrative of the naval war and all of its belligerents, on all of the world's oceans and seas, between 1939 and 1945. Opening with the 1930 London Conference, Symonds shows how any limitations on naval warfare would become irrelevant before the decade was up, as Europe erupted into conflict once more and its navies were brought to bear against each other. World War II at Sea offers a global perspective, focusing on the major engagements and personalities and revealing both their scale and their interconnection: the U-boat attack on Scapa Flow and the Battle of the Atlantic; the "miracle" evacuation from Dunkirk and the pitched battles for control of Norway fjords; Mussolini's Regia Marina-at the start of the war the fourth-largest navy in the world-and the dominance of the Kidö Butai and Japanese naval power in the Pacific; Pearl Harbor then Midway; the struggles of the Russian Navy and the scuttling of the French Fleet in Toulon in 1942; the landings in North Africa and then Normandy. Here as well are the notable naval leaders-FDR and Churchill, both self-proclaimed "Navy men," Karl Dönitz, François Darlan, Ernest King, Isoroku Yamamoto, Erich Raeder, Inigo Campioni, Louis Mountbatten, William Halsey, as well as the hundreds of thousands of seamen and officers of all nationalities whose live were imperiled and lost during the greatest naval conflicts in history, from small-scale assaults and amphibious operations to the largest armadas ever assembled. Many have argued that World War II was dominated by naval operations; few have shown and how and why this was the case. Symonds combines precision with story-telling verve, expertly illuminating not only the mechanics of large-scale warfare on (and below) the sea but offering wisdom into the nature of the war itself.