Negotiating Hostage Crises With The New Terrorists

This book is about the role of negotiation in resolving terrorist barricade hostage crises. What lessons can be learned from past deadly incidents so that crisis negotiators and decision makers can act with greater effectiveness in the future? What are the lessons the terrorists are learning and how will they affect the dynamics of future incidents? What can we learn about the terrorist threat, and about preventing the escalation of future terrorist hostage-taking situations? While there are many trained crisis negotiators around the world, almost none of them has ever had contact with a terrorist hostage-taking incident. Further, the entire training program of most hostage negotiators focuses on resolving crises that do not take into consideration issues such as ideology, religion, or the differing sets of strategic objectives and mindsets of ideological hostage takers. This is especially true with regard to the terrorists of the new breed, who have become less discriminate, more lethal, and more willing to execute hostages and die during the incident. Further, many of the paradigms and presumptions upon which the contemporary practice of crisis negotiation is based do not reflect the reality of the new terrorists. The main focus of this book is on the detailed reconstruction and analysis of the two most high-profile cases in recent years, the Moscow theater and the Beslan school hostage crises, with a clear purpose of drawing lessons for hostage negotiation strategies in the future. This is an issue of top priority. Terrorist manuals from countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq reveal that terrorist organizations are very closely observing and analyzing the lessons learned from these two incidents, suggesting that we are likely to see this type of new terrorist hostage taking involving large numbers of suicide fighters and executions of hostages at some point in the future. This raises a wide array of questions about appropriate responses and negotiation strategies. From the first glance, it is clear that we are not prepared.

This edited volume addresses the important issue of negotiating with terrorists, and offers recommendations for best practice and processes. Hostage negotiation is the process of trying to align two often completely polarised parties. Authorities view hostage taking as unacceptable demands made by unacceptable means. However terrorists view their actions as completely justified, even on moral and religious grounds. If they are to try and reconcile these two sides, it is essential for hostage negotiators to understand terrorist culture, the hostage takers’ profiles, their personality, their view of the world and also the authorities, their values and their framing of the problem raised by the taking of hostages. Although not advocating negotiating with terrorists, the volume seeks to analyse when, why, and how it is done. Part I deals with the theory and quantifiable data produced from analysis of hostage situations, while Part II explores several high profile case studies and the lessons that can be learnt from them. This volume will be of great interest to students of terrorism studies, conflict management, negotiation, security studies and IR in general. I William Zartman is the Jacob Blaustein Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Organization and Conflict Resolution and former Director of the Conflict Management and African Studies Programs, at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC. He is a member of the Steering Committee of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria. He is author/editor of over 20 books on negotiation, conflict and mediation. Guy Olivier Faure is Professor of Sociology at the Sorbonne University, Paris I, and a member of the Steering Committee of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria. He has served as an advisor to French government on hostage negotiations.

How should we analyze and assess new terrorist behaviors? What are the particular risks and challenges from new terrorism? Should we negotiate with terrorists, and, if so, how? When should we use force against terrorists? Countering New(est) Terrorism: Hostage-Taking, Kidnapping, and Active Violence—Assessing, Negotiating, and Assaulting improves our knowledge of new terrorist behaviors, and our skills in responding to such attacks. The term "new terrorism" has been in circulation since the late 90’s. This book analyzes the "newest terrorism" that has emerged in recent years—characterized by increased hostage-taking, kidnapping, and active violence—and develops best practices for countering these emerging threats. Along the way, it challenges fashionable wishful thinking that all terrorists are open to rational negotiation or de-radicalization, that military responses always reflect badly on the official side, and that terrorists are not constrained by their own doctrines. The new terrorists are dramatically more ideological, murderous, and suicidal. They are generally less reconcilable, less trusting of official negotiators, less likely to release detainees, and more likely to kill detainees. They are less likely to demand ransoms yet more likely to release hostages in cases in which they do demand ransom. They are more informed about the official side’s policies, tactics, techniques, and procedures. They are more likely to use new information and communication technologies against responding agencies and officials. They are more capable fighters—they kill more people despite deploying fewer fighters per hostage. Most disturbing is the fact that they take advantage of free-er societies to access easier targets. Features: Includes evidence-based definitions and descriptions of political, religious, Jihadi, and new terrorism Presents the first large-n comparison of old and new terrorism, using an original extension of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), with added codes for each of 10,735 hostage crises and more than 500,000 data points from 1970 through 2016 Details a further extension of the GTD covering all terrorist events from 2004 through 2016, roughly 5 million data points. Offers prescriptive advice and visual decision trees on how to negotiate crises, assess the risk of terrorism, and how and when to assault terrorists Reviews official practices, interviews with experienced officials, and real-world simulations of recent terrorist events and attacks Countering New(est) Terrorism will be of interest to researchers, students enrolled in terrorism and Homeland Security programs, crisis negotiators, and police, security, intelligence, and military authorities tasked with counterterrorism and anti-terrorism efforts.

How effective are the methods currently used to deal with hostage situations? This study attempts to answer that question by examining the ways in which terrorists manipulate the hostage/ barricade tactic—one of the most formidable and frightening devices in their arsenal—and by analyzing the response of law enforcement officers and policymakers to its use. Drawing on case materials and interviews with high-level decision makers, both in the United States and abroad, who are involved with domestic and international terrorist operations, Professor Miller analyzes the political and psychological motifs of hostage/barricade dramas. He then looks at terrorism, particularly political terrorism, within the broader theoretical context of the general study of political violence and the operational concerns of public decision makers and law enforcement personnel.

International Negotiation Series, 1 (International Studies Library, 1) Negotiating with terrorists is possible, within limits, as the chapters in this book show and explore. Limits come initially in the distinction between absolute and contingent terrorists, and then between revolutionary and conditional absolutes and between barricaders, kidnappers and hijackers in the contingent category. Revolutionary absolutes are nonnegotiable adversaries, but even conditional absolutes are potentially negotiable and contingent terrorists actually seek negotiation. The official negotiator is faced with the task of giving a little in order to get the terrorist to give a lot, a particularly difficult imbalance to obtain given the highly committed and desperate nature of terrorists as they follow rational but highly unconventional tactics. Such are the challenges of negotiating with terrorists that this first volume of the "International Negotiation Series" explores and elucidates. (Previously published in International Negotiation, Volume 8:3) Table of Contents List of Contributors Introduction - I. William Zartman 1.Chapter 1: Negotiating the Non-Negotiable: Dealing with Absolutist Terrorists - Richard E. Hayes, Stacey R. Kaminski and Steven M. Beres 2.Chapter 2: Negotiating with Terrorists: The Hostage Case - Guy Olivier Faure 3.Chapter 3: Contrasting Dynamics of Crisis Negotiations: Barricade versus Kidnapping Incidents - Adam Dolnik 4.Chapter 4: Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations - William A. Donohue and Paul J. Taylor 5.Chapter 5: Negotiating under the Cross: The Story of the Forty Day Siege of the Church of Nativity - Moty Cristal 6.Chapter 6: The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: The Perpetrators, their Tactics, and the Russian Response - Adam Dolnik and Richard Pilch 7.Chapter 7: Negotiating with Villains Revisited: Research Note - Bertram I. Spector Index About the Editor I. William Zartman is Professor Emeritus at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University. The Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organizations and Conflict Resolution, he is the former director of the SAIS Conflict Management Program and former director of the SAIS African Studies Program. He has authored seven books, edited 15 others, and is co-author and editor of the SAIS African Studies Library, which numbers 18 books so far. The past president of both the Middle East Studies Association and the American Institute for Maghrib Studies, Dr. Zartman has been a Distinguished Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Halévy Professor at the Institute of Political Studies of the Universities of Paris, and Olin Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. He currently carries the distinction of Professor Emeritus at SAIS

How should we analyze and assess new terrorist behaviors? What are the particular risks and challenges from new terrorism? Should we negotiate with terrorists, and, if so, how? When should we use force against terrorists? Countering New(est) Terrorism: Hostage-Taking, Kidnapping, and Active Violence�Assessing, Negotiating, and Assaulting improves our knowledge of new terrorist behaviors, and our skills in responding to such attacks. The term "new terrorism" has been in circulation since the late 90�s. This book analyzes the "newest terrorism" that has emerged in recent years�characterized by increased hostage-taking, kidnapping, and active violence�and develops best practices for countering these emerging threats. Along the way, it challenges fashionable wishful thinking that all terrorists are open to rational negotiation or de-radicalization, that military responses always reflect badly on the official side, and that terrorists are not constrained by their own doctrines. The new terrorists are dramatically more ideological, murderous, and suicidal. They are generally less reconcilable, less trusting of official negotiators, less likely to release detainees, and more likely to kill detainees. They are less likely to demand ransoms yet more likely to release hostages in cases in which they do demand ransom. They are more informed about the official side�s policies, tactics, techniques, and procedures. They are more likely to use new information and communication technologies against responding agencies and officials. They are more capable fighters�they kill more people despite deploying fewer fighters per hostage. Most disturbing is the fact that they take advantage of free-er societies to access easier targets. Features: Includes evidence-based definitions and descriptions of political, religious, Jihadi, and new terrorism Presents the first large-n comparison of old and new terrorism, using an original extension of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), with added codes for each of 10,735 hostage crises and more than 500,000 data points from 1970 through 2016 Details a further extension of the GTD covering all terrorist events from 2004 through 2016, roughly 5 million data points. Offers prescriptive advice and visual decision trees on how to negotiate crises, assess the risk of terrorism, and how and when to assault terrorists Reviews official practices, interviews with experienced officials, and real-world simulations of recent terrorist events and attacks Countering New(est) Terrorism will be of interest to researchers, students enrolled in terrorism and Homeland Security programs, crisis negotiators, and police, security, intelligence, and military authorities tasked with counterterrorism and anti-terrorism efforts.

Psychological Aspects of Crisis Negotiation, Third Edition, explores the methods and strategies for confronting the nine types of subjects typically encountered in hostage/suicide sieges by correctional staff and law enforcement crisis negotiators. Strentz, an experienced negotiator who designed and directed the FBI’s hostage negotiator program, lays out the critical elements that are required for a successful encounter with a hostage taker or other malfeasant. This book highlights psychological dynamics of negotiations as they apply to the negotiator, the hostage, and the subject. It discusses the predictors of surrender versus the need for a tactical intervention and examines the phases of a hostage crisis and the changing focus as the crisis develops. Referencing historical events such as the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Challenger and Columbia incidents, this text demonstrates how faulty group decision making can spell tragedy. Enhanced with case studies to put the material into context, this third edition also includes new chapters on the SWAT team/crisis negotiator interface and on the genesis of the increased incidence of mentally ill hostage takers. Based on decades of experience in the fi eld and practical advice from a national expert, this volume arms negotiators with the knowledge and tools they need to defuse crises and increase the odds that hostages will survive.