Nixon S Back Channel To Moscow

Most Americans consider détente—the reduction of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union—to be among the Nixon administration's most significant foreign policy successes. The diplomatic back channel that national security advisor Henry Kis

Most Americans consider détente -- the reduction of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union -- to be among the Nixon administration's most significant foreign policy successes. The diplomatic back channel that national security advisor Henry Kissinger established with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin became the most important method of achieving this thaw in the Cold War. Kissinger praised back channels for preventing leaks, streamlining communications, and circumventing what he perceived to be the US State Department's unresponsive and self-interested bureaucracy. Nixon and Kissinger's methods, however, were widely criticized by State Department officials left out of the loop and by an American press and public weary of executive branch prevarication and secrecy. Richard A. Moss's penetrating study documents and analyzes US-Soviet back channels from Nixon's inauguration through what has widely been heralded as the apex of détente, the May 1972 Moscow Summit. He traces the evolution of confidential-channel diplomacy and examines major flashpoints, including the 1970 crisis over Cienfuegos, Cuba, the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), US dealings with China, deescalating tensions in Berlin, and the Vietnam War. Moss argues that while the back channels improved US-Soviet relations in the short term, the Nixon-Kissinger methods provided a poor foundation for lasting policy. Employing newly declassified documents, the complete record of the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel -- jointly compiled, translated, annotated, and published by the US State Department and the Russian Foreign Ministry -- as well as the Nixon tapes, Moss reveals the behind-the-scenes deliberations of Nixon, his advisers, and their Soviet counterparts. Although much has been written about détente, this is the first scholarly study that comprehensively assesses the central role of confidential diplomacy in shaping America's foreign policy during this critical era.

The essential history of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) during the Nixon Administration How did Richard Nixon, a president so determined to compete for strategic nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, become one of the most successful arms controllers of the Cold War? Drawing on newly opened Cold War archives, John D. Maurer argues that a central purpose of arms control talks for American leaders was to channel nuclear competition toward areas of American advantage and not just international cooperation. While previous accounts of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have emphasized American cooperative motives, Maurer highlights how Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird shaped negotiations, balancing their own competitive interests with proponents of cooperation while still providing a coherent rationale to Congress. Within the arms control agreements, American leaders intended to continue deploying new weapons, and the arms control restrictions, as negotiated, allowed the United States to sustain its global power, contain communism, and ultimately prevail in the Cold War.

Since the advent of the contemporary US national security apparatus in 1947, entrepreneurial public officials have tried to reorient the course of the nation's foreign policy. Acting inside the National Security Council system, some principals and high-ranking officials have worked tirelessly to generate policy change and innovation on the issues they care about. These entrepreneurs attempt to set the foreign policy agenda, frame policy problems and solutions, and orient the decision-making process to convince the president and other decision makers to choose the course they advocate. In National Security Entrepreneurs and the Making of American Foreign Policy Vincent Boucher, Charles-Philippe David, and Karine Prémont develop a new concept to study entrepreneurial behaviour among foreign policy advisers and offer the first comprehensive framework of analysis to answer this crucial question: why do some entrepreneurs succeed in guaranteeing the adoption of novel policies while others fail? They explore case studies of attempts to reorient US foreign policy waged by National Security Council entrepreneurs, examining the key factors enabling success and the main forces preventing the adoption of a preferred option: the entrepreneur's profile, presidential leadership, major players involved in the policy formulation and decision-making processes, the national political context, and the presence or absence of significant opportunities. By carefully analyzing significant diplomatic and military decisions of the Johnson, Nixon, Reagan, and Clinton administrations, and offering a preliminary account of contemporary national security entrepreneurship under presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, this book makes the case for an agent-based explanation of foreign policy change and continuity.

[Henry Kissinger and American Power] effectively separates the man from the myths." —The Christian Science Monitor | Best books of August 2020 The definitive biography of Henry Kissinger—at least for those who neither revere nor revile him Over the past six decades, Henry Kissinger has been America’s most consistently praised—and reviled—public figure. He was hailed as a “miracle worker” for his peacemaking in the Middle East, pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union, negotiation of an end to the Vietnam War, and secret plan to open the United States to China. He was assailed from the left and from the right for his indifference to human rights, complicity in the pointless sacrifice of American and Vietnamese lives, and reliance on deception and intrigue. Was he a brilliant master strategist—“the 20th century’s greatest 19th century statesman”—or a cold-blooded monster who eroded America’s moral standing for the sake of self-promotion? In this masterfully researched biography, the renowned diplomatic historian Thomas Schwartz offers an authoritative, and fair-minded, answer to this question. While other biographers have engaged in hagiography or demonology, Schwartz takes a measured view of his subject. He recognizes Kissinger’s successes and acknowledges that Kissinger thought seriously and with great insight about the foreign policy issues of his time, while also recognizing his failures, his penchant for backbiting, and his reliance on ingratiating and fawning praise of the president as a source of power. Throughout, Schwartz stresses Kissinger’s artful invention of himself as a celebrity diplomat and his domination of the medium of television news. He also notes Kissinger’s sensitivity to domestic and partisan politics, complicating—and undermining—the image of the far-seeing statesman who stands above the squabbles of popular strife. Rounded and textured, and rich with new insights into key dilemmas of American power, Henry Kissinger and American Power stands as an essential guide to a man whose legacy is as complex as the last sixty years of US history itself.

Perhaps the best-known American diplomatist of the twentieth century, Henry Kissinger is a major figure in world history, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, and arguably one of the most brilliant minds ever placed at the service of American foreign policy, as well as one of the shrewdest, best-informed, and most articulate men ever to occupy a position of power in Washington. The eagerly awaited third and final volume of his memoirs completes a major work of contemporary history. It is at once an important historical document and a brilliantly told narrative of almost Shakespearean intensity, full of startling insights, unusual (and often unsparing) candor, and a sweeping sense of history. Years of Renewal is the triumphant conclusion of a major achievement and a book that will stand the test of time as a historical document of the first rank.

President Woodrow Wilson riding down the Champs-Élysées in December 1918 to meet with the leaders of the victorious Allies at the Paris Peace Conference marked a break from a long tradition where US presidents directed foreign policy, and direct engagement with foreign counterparts was not considered a central duty. Not until the arrival of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration over a decade later would this change. In The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H. W. Bush Tizoc Chavez reveals the long-overlooked history of the rise of personal diplomacy as one of the core responsibilities of the modern president. The modern presidency as it took shape during the FDR era is characterized by rising expectations, sensitivity to public opinion, activism in the legislative arena, a propensity to act unilaterally, and a vast executive branch bureaucracy, all of which contributed to shaping the necessity and practice of presidential personal diplomacy. Tizoc Chavez takes a comprehensive approach and provides a thorough, archival-based examination of the causes that led presidents to conduct diplomacy on a more personal level. He analyzes personal diplomacy as it was practiced across presidential administrations, which shifts the focus from the unique or contingent characteristics of individual presidents to an investigation of the larger international and domestic factors in which presidents have operated. This approach clarifies similarities and connections during the era of the modern presidency and why all modern presidents have used personal diplomacy regardless of their vastly different political ideologies, policy objectives, leadership styles, partisan affiliations, and personalities, making the practice a central aspect of the presidency and US foreign affairs. This cross-administration exploration of why the presidency, as an institution, resorted to diplomacy at the highest level argues that regardless of who occupied the modern White House, they turned to personal diplomacy for the same reasons: international crises, domestic politics, foreign leaders seeking them out, and a desire for control. The Diplomatic Presidency bridges the gap between history and political science by balancing in-depth case studies with general explanations of broader developments in the presidency and international and domestic politics for a better understanding of presidential behavior and US foreign relations today.