North Atlantic Treaty Organization And Libya Reviewing Operation Unified Protector

On March 17, 2011, a month after the beginning of the Libyan revolution, with up to dead 2,000 civilians, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided on backing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. While France, Great Britain, and the United States took immediate military action using air and missile strikes, considerations to hand over military actions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged within days of the operation. On March 22 2012, NATO agreed to enforce the arms embargo against Libya; 2 days later, it announced to take over all military aspects of the UNSC 1973. On March 31, 2012, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) began. OUP turned out to be one of NATO's shorter, and seemingly also less controversial, missions. Mandated by both the League of Arab States and the UN as the regime of Colonel Qaddafi was launching assaults on peacefully demonstrating citizens, its aim was to protect civilians from the air and sea. Described as a "war of choice" rather than a "war of necessity," NATO achieved its goals more by accident than by design, according to some critics. The lessons which can be drawn from OUP are both military and political in nature. The overestimation of air power as a result of "no boots on the ground" might be a dangerous conclusion for future cases; the lack of cultural advice very likely prolonged the mission, while the shortcomings in strategic communication gave input to improve an area that is still new to NATO. The operation also highlighted a strategic dimension the Alliance was not ready to perceive -- that the Mediterranean, and its Southern states, is likely to continue being a source of instability for NATO, particularly after the Arab Spring. In legal terms, the Alliance faced an important communication gap between its legal, and therefore military, mandate -- the legal interpretations of UNSCR 1973 made clear that the operation did not seek to topple Colonel Gaddafi's regime, let alone assassinate him. Its aim was solely the protection of civilians in a situation of internal conflict, and, therefore, it conformed to the norm of "Responsibility to Protect." On the political level, heads of NATO member states made contradictory remarks calling for Gaddafi's departure, thereby compromising the clarity of the mission. Last but not least, the aftermath of NATO's Libya operation was not planned at all as the Libyan National Transitional Council firmly rejected any military personnel on the ground, not even UN observers. As the regime's security forces had virtually imploded, Libya's security therefore fell into the hands of the multiple militias which continued to proliferate after the conflict had ended.

On March 17, 2011, a month after the beginning of the Libyan revolution, with up to dead 2,000 civilians, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided on backing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. While France, Great Britain, and the United States took immediate military action using air and missile strikes, considerations to hand over military actions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged within days of the operation. On March 22 2012, NATO agreed to enforce the arms embargo against Libya; 2 days later, it announced to take over all military aspects of the UNSC 1973. On March 31, 2012, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) began. OUP turned out to be one of NATO's shorter, and seemingly also less controversial, missions. Mandated by both the League of Arab States and the UN as the regime of Colonel Qaddafi was launching assaults on peacefully demonstrating citizens, its aim was to protect civilians from the air and sea.

This book explores ‘lessons learned’ from the military intervention in Libya by examining key aspects of the 2011 NATO campaign. NATO’s intervention in Libya had unique features, rendering it unlikely to serve as a model for action in other situations. There was an explicit UN Security Council mandate to use military force, a strong European commitment to protect Libyan civilians, Arab League political endorsement and American engagement in the critical, initial phase of the air campaign. Although the seven-month intervention stretched NATO’s ammunition stockpiles and political will almost to their respective breaking points, the definitive overthrow of the Gaddafi regime is universally regarded as a major accomplishment. With contributions from a range of key thinkers and analysts in the field, the book first explains the law and politics of the intervention, starting out with deliberations in NATO and at the UN Security Council, both noticeably influenced by the concept of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It then goes on to examine a wide set of military and auxiliary measures that governments and defence forces undertook in order to increasingly tilt the balance against the Gaddafi regime and to bring about an end to the conflict, as well as to the intervention proper, while striving to keep the number of NATO and civilian casualties to a minimum. This book will be of interest to students of strategic studies, history and war studies, and IR in general.

Key Points: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation Unified Protector could become the symbol of American success in convincing its Allies that Europeans must take a greater share of the burden and assume greater responsibility for security in Europe and its periphery. NATO should prepare for a strategy review on Libya in the context of the 2012 Chicago Summit. The summit could be an opportunity to highlight allied capabilities with the necessary partners' contributions to conduct limited interventions -- short term 6 month "bridging missions", mandated by the United Nations -- from the open crisis to stabilization that paves the way for reconstruction.

Between March and October 2011, a coalition of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states and several partner nations waged a war against Muammar Qaddafi's Libyan regime that stemmed and then reversed the tide of Libya's civil war, preventing Qaddafi from crushing the nascent rebel movement seeking to overthrow his dictatorship and going on to enable opposition forces to prevail. The central element of this intervention was a relatively small multinational force's air campaign operating from NATO bases in several countries, as well as from a handful of aircraft carriers and amphibious ships in the Mediterranean Sea. The study details each country's contribution to that air campaign, examining such issues as the limits of airpower and coordination among nations. It also explores whether the Libyan experience offers a potential model for the future.

"The Two NATO-led Military Operations in Libya" is an incisive and comprehensive exploration of NATO's military involvement in Libya, focusing on two critical operations: the 2011 intervention during the Libyan Civil War and a subsequent, lesser-known operation aimed at stabilizing the post-Gaddafi era. This book offers an in-depth analysis of the strategic, political, and humanitarian dimensions of these interventions, set against the backdrop of regional instability and international geopolitical interests. The narrative begins with an overview of the political climate in Libya leading up to the 2011 Arab Spring, setting the stage for the NATO-led intervention. The book provides a detailed account of Operation Unified Protector, examining the factors that led to international involvement, the coalition's strategic objectives, and the military tactics employed, including the controversial NATO air campaign. Each chapter delves into different aspects of the operations, from the initial decision-making process and the challenges of building a multinational coalition to the execution of air strikes and naval blockades. The author analyzes the impact of these military actions on the ground, including their role in the eventual overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi's regime. The book also examines the second, less publicized NATO operation in Libya, focusing on its objectives to provide stability and security in a nation grappling with civil conflict and the rise of extremist groups. This part of the narrative explores the complexities of post-conflict reconstruction, the difficulties in nation-building, and the international community's efforts to support a new Libyan government. A key focus of "The Two NATO-led Military Operations in Libya" is the evaluation of the outcomes of these interventions. It critically assesses their success in achieving stated goals, the humanitarian consequences, the long-term impact on Libya's political landscape, and the broader implications for NATO and international interventionist policy. This book is a crucial resource for students of international relations, military strategy, and Middle Eastern politics. It provides a nuanced understanding of the challenges and dilemmas faced by international coalitions in modern conflict zones and offers a comprehensive perspective on NATO's role and legacy in Libya.