Nuclear Proliferation And Safeguards

Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy, Second Edition is a comprehensive reference covering the cutting-edge technologies used to trace, track and safeguard nuclear material. Sections cover security, the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, improvised nuclear devices, and how to prevent nuclear terrorism. International case studies of security at nuclear facilities and illegal nuclear trade activities provide specific examples of the complex issues surrounding the technology and policy for nuclear material protection, control and accountability. New case studies include analyses of nuclear programs of important countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Kazakhstan, among others. This is a thoroughly updated, must-have volume for private and public organizations involved in driving national security, domestic and international policy issues relating to nuclear material security, non-proliferation, and nuclear transparency. Covers the continuing efforts to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals Highlights the challenges of verifying nuclear weapons reduction Summarizes issues from the 2015 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference Illuminates the evolving status of nonproliferation and safeguards in Iran and DPRK

From the dawn of the nuclear age, nuclear power has been recognized as a 'dual-use' technology. The same nuclear reactions that give bombs the destructive force of many thousands of tons of high explosive can, when harnessed in a controlled fashion, produce energy for peaceful purposes. The challenge for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime-the collection of policies, treaties, and institutions intended to stem the spread of nuclear weapons-is to prevent nuclear proliferation while at the same time permitting nuclear energy's peaceful applications to be realized. One of the key institutions involved in meeting these two objectives is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an international organization created in 1957 as a direct outgrowth of president Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' program. The IAEA Statute, which creates the legal framework for the agency, charges it to 'accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world.' At the same time, it gives the agency the authority to enter into so-called safeguards agreements with individual nations or groups of nations to ensure that nuclear materials, equipment, or facilities are not used to produce nuclear weapons. The IAEA's mission and its safeguards responsibilities were extended with the enactment in 1970 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (also known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT). The Treaty requires non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the accord to enter into safeguards agreements with the IAEA covering all nuclear materials on their territory (e.g., uranium and plutonium, whether in forms directly usable for weapons or forms that require additional processing before becoming usable in weapons).

The role of organizational culture in international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. In Transforming Nuclear Safeguards Culture, Trevor Findlay investigates the role that organizational culture may play in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, examining particularly how it affects the nuclear safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the paramount global organization in the non-proliferation field. Findlay seeks to identify how organizational culture may have contributed to the IAEA’s failure to detect Iraq’s attempts to acquire illicit nuclear capabilities in the decade prior to the 1990 Gulf War and how the agency has sought to change safeguards culture since then. In doing so, he addresses an important piece of the nuclear nonproliferation puzzle: how to ensure that a robust international safeguards system, in perpetuity, might keep non-nuclear states from acquiring such weapons. Findlay, as one of the leading scholars on the IAEA, brings a valuable holistic perspective to his analysis of the agency’s culture. Transforming Nuclear Safeguards Culture will inspire debate about the role of organizational culture in a key international organization—a culture that its member states, leadership, and staff have often sought to ignore or downplay.

From the John Holmes Library collection.

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. Originally published in 1985, this book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It breaks new ground by focusing on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures, and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. Safeguarding the Atom gives an analysis of the following questions: What are IAEA safeguards and how do they work? How effective are they? How can they be reinforced? What sanctions can be imposed in the event of non-compliance? IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty had recently undergone its third formal review by its signatories, who had assessed its effectiveness and considered how it might better be implemented. This book, originally published in 1987, written by experts many of whom were leading participants in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime at the time, examines the whole range of issues connected with nuclear non-proliferation and the treaty. It looks at non-proliferation from the point of view of nuclear nations, non-nuclear nations and the nuclear industry. It assesses the work of the international monitoring bodies and reconsiders the place of non-proliferation in the changing balance of global nuclear power. It concludes by discussing the way forward.