Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures And Restraint Regime In South Asia

This Book Examines The Prospects Of `Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures And A Restraint Regime In South Asia` Which Would Minimize The Risks Of Accidental, Unauthorized, Or Inadvertent Use Of Indian And/Or Pakistani Nuclear Weapons. It Recommends Effective Barriers Against The Danger Of Loose Nukes And Facility-Related Problems. Furthermore, The Book Explains The Nuclear Perils In The South Asian Strategic Environment, Along With Possible Solutions For Viable Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures And A Nuclear Restraint Regime In South Asia.

The essys in this collection explore and analyze how to reduce the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. Contributors work to introduce the theory and methodology of nuclear risk reduction, to provide specific measures that might work best in the region, and to consider the consequences of missile defense options for stability in Asia. Much work is needed to recduce nuclear dangers between India and Pakistan. While the fact that both countries possess nuclear weapons may prevent a full-blown conventional or nuclear war, the presence of these weapons in the region may also encourage the use of violence at lower levels expecting escalation to be contained by a mutual desire to avoid the nuclear threshold. One only needs to look at the Kashmir conflict for confirmation of this paradox, with serious crises coming more frequently with more severity since the nuclear tests of 1998. Sustained efforts along the line suggested by the contributors of this volume are a crucial step toward reducing nuclear risk on the Subcontinent.

The Prospect Of A Nuclear War In South Asia Has Drawn Global Attention And Concern. This Book Studies Nuclear Risks In The Indo-Pakistani And Sino-Indian Contexts And Suggests A Wide Range Of Measures By Which India, Pakistan And China Could Reduce Nuclear Dangers In South Asia. The Only Full-Length Study And A Timely Epilogue Of Latest Nuclear Dialogues Between India And Pakistan. Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures In South Asia Will Be A Standard Reference Not Only For Political Scientists And Strategic Analysts, But Also For Policy Makers, Diplomats, Journalists, Defence Personnel And The Informed General Reader.

An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics. Unlike other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how they are employed by India and Pakistan in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape.

Hagerty analyzes how India and Pakistan interacted in diplomatic and military crises before their 1998 nuclear tests. He presents detailed studies of the January 1987 Indo-Pakistani crisis, precipitated by India's Brasstacks military exercises, and the 1990 confrontation over Kashmir. Hagerty concludes that relations between India and Pakistan in recent years support the argument that nuclear proliferation does not necessarily destabilize international relations and may even reduce the risk of war.

India and Pakistan have developed and flight tested seventeen new nuclear weapon delivery vehicles since testing nuclear devices in 1998 - an average of more than one per year. Military doctrines have also evolved to emphasize more rapid mobilization to engage in limited conventional warfare. Diplomacy to reduce nuclear risks has lagged far behind nuclear weapon-related advances and doctrinal change. Since 1998, Pakistan and India have negotiated four notable military-related Confidence-Building and Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures. No new measures have been agreed upon since 2007. There is no basis for deterrence stability on the Subcontinent when diplomacy and nuclear risk reduction are moribund while nuclear capabilities grow and military doctrines evolve. The most desirable off-ramp to increased nuclear dangers is to secure normal relations with a nuclear-armed neighbor. This collection of essays - the product of bi-monthly discussions at the Stimson Center - provides analysis and ideas for deterrence stability and escalation control on the Subcontinent. This pursuit awaits leadership in India and Pakistan that is strong enough to persist in the face of violent acts designed to disrupt progress.

As the nuclear weapon states continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals and international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons are reinvigorated, South Asia remains a unique region almost entirely unencumbered by nuclear arms control. Despite the recent popularity of the notion that nuclear deterrence is stabilizing the Indo-Pakistani conflict, there is good reason to believe that the risks of war and the use of nuclear weapons are not fully appreciated. Nevertheless, the prospects for negotiated measures to improve the situation are not good because of the domestic politics on both sides. Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban sheds new light on the risks of the current stand-off, the hidden costs of the nuclear options, and the domestic sources of the region's inertia, bringing together Indian, Pakistani and Chinese perspectives.