Oecd Reviews Of Regulatory Reform Russia 2005 Building Rules For The Market

This review of regulatory reform in Russia covers the overall economic context, the government’s capacity to manage regulatory reform, competition policy and enforcement, and market openness. It also examines the electricity and railroad sectors.

This review of regulatory reform in Russia covers the overall economic context, the government’s capacity to manage regulatory reform, competition policy and enforcement, and market openness. It also examines the electricity and railroad sectors.

OECD's periodic survey of the Russian economy. This 2009 edition includes chapters on stabilisation and renewed growth, growth-friendly fiscal policy, more flexible exchange rate policy and more effective monetary policy, making the banking sector ...

This 2006 edition of OECD's periodic review of the Russian economy finds an economy enjoying robust growth, but requiring strengthening of the macroeconomic framework to sustain that growth. Public administration urgently needs reform and raising ...

Few economic events have caused such controversy as the privatization process in Russia. Some see it as the foundation of political and economic freedom. For others it was economics gone wrong, and ended in "Russians stealing money from their own country". As Russia reasserts itself, and its new brand of capitalism, it is ever more important that policy makers and scholars understand the roots of the economic structure and governance of that country; what was decided, who made the decisions and why, what actually transpired, and what implications this has for the future of Russia. This work, written by two senior advisors to the Russian government, has unique access to documentation, tracking the decision making process in the Russian Mass Privatization process. By close reference to events, and supplemented by interviews with many of the key participants, it shows that the policies adopted were often influenced and shaped by different forces than those cited by current popular accounts. The book challenges the interpretation of Russian privatization by some of the West’s most eminent economists. It underlines that economists of all schools, who bring assumptions from the West to the analysis of Russia, may reach false or misleading conclusions. It is an essential guide for anyone interested in Russian economic reform, and anyone who seeks to understand this enigmatic country, and its actions today.

This book examines how Russia and Kazakhstan navigated the dilemmas associated with building regulatory state institutions on the ruins of the Soviet command and control system. The two nations developed predatory and wasteful crony capitalism but still improved their business climates and economic performance. To better understand these seemingly incompatible outcomes, the book advances a theory of authoritarian regulatory statehood. It argues that politicians use institutions of the state as a means to balance conflicting elite demands for economic rents and popular demands for public goods and economic growth. An effective balancing of the two prevents elite subversion and popular revolt in the short run and ensures elites' continued access to economic rents in the long run. Empirical analysis of nearly a million national and regional regulatory documents enacted in Russia and Kazakhstan between 1990 and 2020 shows that formal regulatory institutions the autocrats built have a profound effect on economic outcomes. Moreover, at times of political vulnerability, autocracies use formal regulatory mechanisms to discipline state agencies responsible for policy implementation. By reducing capricious policy implementation by the regulatory bureaucracy, autocrats are able to reinvigorate economic performance and rebalance elite and popular interests. The theoretical argument advanced in the book links the use of institutional instruments of policy implementation to the political survival strategy. This study effectively shows that regulatory state building has emerged as an effective tool for strengthening autocratic regimes and enhancing their long-term survival.

Chaisty looks at the legislative actors and institutions that have shaped economic law making in Russia since 1990. Assessing the influence of partisan, bureaucratic, regional and corporate interests in Russia's post-communist parliaments, the book considers Russia's political stability and economic development.

A typical image of the making and administration of policy suggests that it takes place on an incremental basis, involving public servants, their ministers and, to a more limited extent, a variety of interest groups. Yet, much policy making is based on similar policy developed in other jurisdictions and in the major international organizations such as the WTO and the OECD. In other words, significant aspects of nationally developed policies are copied from elsewhere in what is described as a process of policy transfer and learning. Hence, studies of policy transfer have pointed to a distinct limitation in most existing theoretical and empirical explanations as to how policy is made and implemented through their neglect of the role of policy transfer and learning. Moreover, policy transfer is not only a concern of academics, but a growing concern for governments. The latter are concerned to improve the performance of their policy and several have placed a greater, more systematic focus on policy transfer as a means to increasing performance. This book presents a variety of cases from differing national and international contexts that enable a valuable, comparative analysis that is absent from most literature currently available and that suggest a number of exciting research directions with implications for policy making, transference and implementation in the future.