On The Sources And Consequences Of Oil Price Shocks

Building on recent work on the role of speculation and inventories in oil markets, we embed a competitive oil storage model within a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. This enables us to formally analyze the impact of a (speculative) storage demand shock and to assess how the effects of various demand and supply shocks change in the presence of oil storage facility. We find that business-cycle driven oil demand shocks are the most important drivers of U.S. oil price fluctuations during 1982-2007. Disregarding the storage facility in the model causes a considerable upward bias in the estimated role of oil supply shocks in driving oil price fluctuations. Our results also confirm that a change in the composition of shocks helps explain the resilience of the macroeconomic environment to the oil price surge after 2003. Finally, speculative storage is shown to have a mitigating or amplifying role depending on the nature of the shock.

Analyzing macroeconomic impacts of oil price changes requires first to investigate different sources of these changes and their distinct effects. Kilian (2009) analyzes the effects of an oil supply shock, an aggregate demand shock, and a precautionary oil demand shock. The paper's aim is to model macroeconomic consequences of these shocks within a new Keynesian DSGE framework. It models a small open economy and the rest of the world together to discover both accompanying effects of oil price changes and their international transmission mechanisms. Our results indicate that different sources of oil price fluctuations bring remarkably diverse outcomes for both economies.

The authors study the effects of oil-price shocks on the U.S economy combining narrative and quantitative approaches. After examining daily oil-related events since 1984, they classify them into various event types. They then develop measures of exogenous shocks that avoid endogeneity and predictability concerns. Estimation results indicate that oil-price shocks have had substantial and statistically significant effects during the last 25 years. In contrast, traditional vector auto-regression (VAR) approaches imply much weaker and insignificant effects for the same period. This discrepancy stems from the inability of VARs to separate exogenous oil-supply shocks from endogenous oil-price fluctuations driven by changes in oil demand. Illustrations.

How should monetary authorities react to an oil price shock? A trade-off between stabilizing inflation and the welfare relevant output gap arises in a distorted economy once one recognizes: (1) that oil (energy) cannot be easily substituted by other factors in the short-run; (2) that there is no fiscal transfer available to policymakers to neutralize the steady-state distortion due to monopolistic competition; and (3) that increases in oil prices also directly affect consumption by raising the price of fuel, heating oil, and other energy sources. The author derives an interest rate feedback rule that mimics the optimal plan in all relevant dimensions but that depends only on observables, namely core inflation, oil price inflation, and the growth rate of output. Illus.

First published in 1982. The sharp increase in the price of imported oil in the early 1970s generated much interest in the economic impact of large oil price hikes and related energy price increases. The main focus is on oil, and Dr. Feldman’s monograph is a needed contribution, revealing the quantitative price impacts of recent oil price shocks in great detail.

The decline in oil prices in 2014-16 was one of the sharpest in history, and put to test the resilience of oil exporters. We examine the degree to which economic fundamentals entering the oil price decline explain the impact on economic growth across oil exporting economies, and derive policy implications as to what factors help to mitigate the negative effects. We find that pre-existing fundamentals account for about half of the cross-country variation in the impact of the shock. Oil exporters that weathered the shock better tended to have a stronger fiscal position, higher foreign currency liquidity buffers, a more diversified export base, a history of price stability, and a more flexible exchange rate regime. Within this group of countries, the impact of the shock is not found to be related to the size of oil exports, or the share of oil in fiscal revenue or economic activity.

This paper studies the effects of demand and supply shocks in the global crude oil market on several measures of countries' external balance, including the oil and non-oil trade balances, the current account, and changes in net foreign assets (NFA) during 1975-2004. We explicitly take a global perspective. In addition to the U.S., the Euro area and Japan, we consider a number of country groups including oil exporters and middle-income oil-importing economies. We find that the effect of oil shocks on the merchandise trade balance and the current account, which depending on the source of the shock can be large, depends critically on the response of the nonoil trade balance, and differs systematically between the U.S. and other oil importing countries. Using the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti NFA data set, we document the presence of large and systematic (if not always statistically significant) valuation effects in response to oil shocks, not only for the U.S., but also for other oil-importing economies and for oil exporters. Our estimates suggest that increased international financial integration will tend to cushion the effect of oil shocks on NFA positions for major oil exporters and the U.S., but may amplify it for other oil importers.