Oversight Of The Federal National Mortgage Association Fannie Mae And The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Freddie Mac

Explains the purpose and function of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Describes how the housing GSEs segment in the secondary market works. Provides insights on alternative funding strategies and risk, and the necessity of congressional oversight. Focuses on the federal costs of Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation). Contains 17 charts, tables and graphs.

Because two disparate clients demand loyalty from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, these government-sponsored entities must fulfill two ultimately irreconcilable roles.

Congress estab. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises) with 2 key housing missions: (1) provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages; and (2) serve the mortgage credit needs of targeted groups such as low-income borrowers. To accomplish these goals, the enterprises issued debt and stock, and purchased mortgages from lenders with the proceeds. On Sept. 6, 2008, the Fed. Housing Finance Agency placed the enterprises into conservatorship out of concern that their deteriorating financial condition would destabilize the financial system. This report discusses the enterprises' performance in meeting mission requirements, identifies and analyzes options to revise their structures, and discusses key transition issues. Illus.

Using detailed information on lobbying and mortgage lending activities, we find that lenders lobbying more on issues related to mortgage lending (i) had higher loan-to-income ratios, (ii) securitized more intensively, and (iii) had faster growing portfolios. Ex-post, delinquency rates are higher in areas where lobbyist' lending grew faster and they experienced negative abnormal stock returns during key crisis events. The findings are robust to (i) falsification tests using lobbying on issues unrelated to mortgage lending, (ii) a difference-in-difference approach based on state-level laws, and (iii) instrumental variables strategies. These results show that lobbying lenders engage in riskier lending.