Paradoxes Of Belief And Strategic Rationality

The purpose of this book is to develop a framework for analyzing strategic rationality, a notion central to contemporary game theory, which is the formal study of the interaction of rational agents, and which has proved extremely fruitful in economics, political theory, and business management. The author argues that a logical paradox (known since antiquity as "the Liar paradox") lies at the root of a number of persistent puzzles in game theory, in particular those concerning rational agents who seek to establish some kind of reputation. Building on the work of Parsons, Burge, Gaifman, and Barwise and Etchemendy, Robert Koons constructs a context-sensitive solution to the whole family of Liar-like paradoxes, including, for the first time, a detailed account of how the interpretation of paradoxial statements is fixed by context. This analysis provides a new understanding of how the rational agent model can account for the emergence of rules, practices, and institutions.

Is law paradoxical? This book seeks to unravel the riddle of legal paradoxes. It focuses on two main questions: the nature of legal paradoxes, and their social ramifications. In exploring the structure of legal paradoxes, the book focuses both on generic paradoxes, such as those associated with the self-referential character of legal validity and the endemic incoherence of legal discourse, and on paradoxes that permeate more restricted fields of law, such as contract law, euthanasia, and human rights (the prohibition of torture). The discussion of the social effects of legal paradoxes focuses on the role of paradoxes as drivers of legal change, and explores the institutional mechanisms that ensure the stability of the law, in spite of its paradoxical makeup. The essays in the book discuss these questions from various perspectives, invoking insights from philosophy, systems theory, deconstruction and economics.

We live in times of uncertainty and insecurity, at a personal, national and global level. Writers such as Samuel P. Huntington and Robert D. Kaplan, respectively, have spoken of an emerging 'clash of civilizations' and of 'coming anarchy'. This book is also concerned with the future of civilization, in particular with the conflict between economic growth and the sustainability of the biophysical lifesupport systems of the planet, arguing that the flawed system of orthodox neo-classical economics has justified the modernist belief in the necessity of unending economic growth and the ceaseless exploitation of nature.

. This major new book will be of particular interest not only to philosophers but to decision theorists, political scientists, economists, and researchers in artificial intelligence.

The problem of truth and the liar paradox is one of the most extensive problems of philosophy. The liar paradox can be avoided by assuming a so-called theory of partial truth instead of a classical theory of truth. Theories of partial truth, however, cannot solve the so-called strengthened liar paradox, which is the problem that many semantic statements about the so-called strengthened liar cannot be true in a theory of partial truth. If such semantic statements were true in the theory, another paradox would emerge. To proponents of contextual accounts, which assume that the concept of truth is context-dependent, the strengthened liar paradox is the core of the liar problem. This book provides an overview of current contextual approaches to the strengthened liar paradox. For this purpose, the author investigates formal theories of truth that result from formal reconstructions of such contextual approaches.

Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing.

Based on more than three decades of observation, Robert Jervis concludes in this provocative book that the very foundations of many social science theories--especially those in political science--are faulty. Taking insights from complexity theory as his point of departure, the author observes that we live in a world where things are interconnected, where unintended consequences of our actions are unavoidable and unpredictable, and where the total effect of behavior is not equal to the sum of individual actions. Jervis draws on a wide range of human endeavors to illustrate the nature of these system effects. He shows how increasing airport security might actually cost lives, not save them, and how removing dead trees (ostensibly to give living trees more room) may damage the health of an entire forest. Similarly, he highlights the interconnectedness of the political world as he describes how the Cold War played out and as he narrates the series of events--with their unintended consequences--that escalated into World War I. The ramifications of developing a rigorous understanding of politics are immense, as Jervis demonstrates in his critique of current systemic theories of international politics--especially the influential work done by Kenneth Waltz. Jervis goes on to examine various types of negative and positive feedback, bargaining in different types of relationships, and the polarizing effects of alignments to begin building a foundation for a more realistic, more nuanced, theory of international politics. System Effects concludes by examining what it means to act in a system. It shows how political actors might modify their behavior in anticipation of system effects, and it explores how systemic theories of political behavior might account for the role of anticipation and strategy in political action. This work introduces powerful new concepts that will reward not only international relations theorists, but also all social scientists with interests in comparative politics and political theory.

The Rationality of Theism is a controversial collection of brand new papers by thirteen outstanding philosophers and scholars. Its aim is to offer comprehensive theistic replies to the traditional arguments against the existence of God, offering a positive case for theism as well as rebuttals of recent influential criticisms of theism.