Parliamentary Sovereignty

This book has four main themes: (1) a criticism of 'common law constitutionalism', the theory that Parliament's authority is conferred by, and therefore is or can be made subordinate to, judge-made common law; (2) an analysis of Parliament's ability to abdicate, limit or regulate the exercise of its own authority, including a revision of Dicey's conception of sovereignty, a repudiation of the doctrine of implied repeal and the proposal of a novel theory of 'manner and form' requirements for law-making; (3) an examination of the relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and statutory interpretation, defending the reality of legislative intentions, and their indispensability to sensible interpretation and respect for parliamentary sovereignty; and (4) an assessment of the compatibility of parliamentary sovereignty with recent constitutional developments, including the expansion of judicial review of administrative action, the Human Rights and European Communities Acts and the growing recognition of 'constitutional principles' and 'constitutional statutes'.

A starting point for the study of the English Constitution and comparative constitutional law, The Law of the Constitution elucidates the guiding principles of the modern constitution of England: the legislative sovereignty of Parliament, the rule of law, and the binding force of unwritten conventions.

Offers a distinctive account of the rule of law and legislative sovereignty within the work of Albert Venn Dicey.

Adopting a political constitutionalist view of the British constitution, this book critically explores the history of legal and political thought on parliamentary sovereignty in the UK. It argues that EU membership strongly unsettled the historical precedents underpinning UK parliamentary sovereignty. Successive governments adopted practices which, although preserving fundamental legal rules, were at odds with past precedents. The author uses three key EU case studies – the financial transactions tax, freedom of movement of persons, and the working time directive – to illustrate that since 1973 the UK incorporated EU institutions which unsettled those precedents. The book further shows that the parliament’s place since the referendum on Brexit in June 2016 and the scrutinising of the terms of the withdrawal agreement constitute an enhanced, new constitutional resettlement, and a realignment of parliament with the historical precedent of consent and its sovereignty.

The Human Rights Act 1998 is criticised for providing a weak protection of human rights. The principle of parliamentary legislative supremacy prevents entrenchment, meaning that courts cannot overturn legislation passed after the Act that contradicts Convention rights. This book investigates this assumption, arguing that the principle of parliamentary legislative supremacy is sufficiently flexible to enable a stronger protection of human rights, which can replicate the effect of entrenchment. Nevertheless, it is argued that the current protection should not be strengthened. If correctly interpreted, the Human Rights Act can facilitate democratic dialogue that enables courts to perform their proper correcting function to protect rights from abuse, whilst enabling the legislature to authoritatively determine contestable issues surrounding the extent to which human rights should be protected alongside other rights, interests and goals of a particular society. This understanding of the Human Rights Act also provides a different justification for the preservation of Dicey's conception of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK Constitution.

An original account of the British constitution, this book explains how the requirements of constitutional law depend on underlying considerations of legal and political theory and defends an account of the British constitution as a source of individual freedom, grounded in a persuasive interpretation of the common law constitutional tradition.

The status of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in the contemporary UK Constitution is much contested. Changes in the architecture of the UK Constitution, diminishing academic reverence for the doctrine, and a more expansive vision of the judicial role, all present challenges to the relevance, coherence and desirability of this constitutional fundamental. At a time when the future of the sovereignty of Parliament may look less than assured, this book develops an account of the continuing significance of the doctrine. It argues that a rejuvenation of the manner and form theory is required to understand the present status of parliamentary sovereignty. Addressing the critical challenges to the doctrine, it contends that this conception of legally unlimited legislative power provides the best explanation of contemporary developments in UK constitutional practice, while also possessing a normative appeal that has previously been unrecognised. This modern shift to the manner and form theory is located in an account of the democratic virtue of parliamentary sovereignty, with the book seeking to demonstrate the potential that exists for Parliament – through legislating about the legislative process – to revitalise the UK's political constitution.