Party Competition

Party competition for votes in free and fair elections involves complex interactions by multiple actors in political landscapes that are continuously evolving, yet classical theoretical approaches to the subject leave many important questions unanswered. Here Michael Laver and Ernest Sergenti offer the first comprehensive treatment of party competition using the computational techniques of agent-based modeling. This exciting new technology enables researchers to model competition between several different political parties for the support of voters with widely varying preferences on many different issues. Laver and Sergenti model party competition as a true dynamic process in which political parties rise and fall, a process where different politicians attack the same political problem in very different ways, and where today's political actors, lacking perfect information about the potential consequences of their choices, must constantly adapt their behavior to yesterday's political outcomes. Party Competition shows how agent-based modeling can be used to accurately reflect how political systems really work. It demonstrates that politicians who are satisfied with relatively modest vote shares often do better at winning votes than rivals who search ceaselessly for higher shares of the vote. It reveals that politicians who pay close attention to their personal preferences when setting party policy often have more success than opponents who focus solely on the preferences of voters, that some politicians have idiosyncratic "valence" advantages that enhance their electability--and much more.

This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France, and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy positions of their supporters.

This book examines how social cleavage lines shape issue voting and party competition. Based on a study of German elections between 1980 and 1994, it analyzes whether cleavage group members put more weight on policies that address their personal self-interest than voters who are not affected by the cleavage line. Furthermore, it analyzes the consequences of cleavage groups’ deviating patterns of voting behavior for the formal game of party competition. More concretely, the author asks whether equilibrium positions of parties within the policy space are pulled away from the mean due to the more extreme policy demands of cleavage groups in the electorate.

DIVA marriage of behavioral and formal theory to explain the electoral strategies of political parties /div

Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, edited by Andrew T. Guzman, illustrates how domestic competition law policies intersect with the realities of international business. It offers a discussion of what might be done to improve the way in which cross-border business is handled by competition policy. The first part of the book provides country reports written by local experts explaining the extraterritorial reach of national laws. Each country report summarizes existing domestic law and examines the conditions under which each country applies its substantive competition laws to conduct that takes place abroad. These chapters also address the question of comity, meaning the circumstances in which a country would decline to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that another state is the more appropriate jurisdiction. Finally, the extent of cooperation between the local government and other states is examined. In conducting cross-border business activity, these reports provide the reader with a sense of the multiple jurisdictions that a business must consider within the scope of how laws from various states interact and overlap. The countries covered include: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EC, Israel, Japan, Singapore and the United States. The second part of the book offers several proposals for effectively managing these overlapping competition policy regimes. Written by top academics and practitioners, the proposals render some of the most important current thinking on the topic. The country reports and the expert policy proposals together provide a unique perspective on international competition policy and the challenges of the international competition policy regime.

First published in 1976, this classic volume of original essays provides a unique and comprehensive review of the approaches and assumptions that dominate the field of election studies and voting behaviour. Critical reviews of theory and established research are combined with innovative and original studies of a variety of European countries, as well as North America. The volume presents valuable comparative data and methodological insights, including statistical analyses of voting data and critical accounts of major approaches to the representation of voting and party competition. These include party identification (the socio-psychological approach); dimensional analysis (the production of party spaces based on social and political cleavages); and rational choice analysis (the interaction between voters and parties within a policy space). This edition includes a new introduction by Ian Budge.

"To discover who rules, follow the gold." This is the argument of Golden Rule, a provocative, pungent history of modern American politics. Although the role big money plays in defining political outcomes has long been obvious to ordinary Americans, most pundits and scholars have virtually dismissed this assumption. Even in light of skyrocketing campaign costs, the belief that major financial interests primarily determine who parties nominate and where they stand on the issues—that, in effect, Democrats and Republicans are merely the left and right wings of the "Property Party"—has been ignored by most political scientists. Offering evidence ranging from the nineteenth century to the 1994 mid-term elections, Golden Rule shows that voters are "right on the money." Thomas Ferguson breaks completely with traditional voter centered accounts of party politics. In its place he outlines an "investment approach," in which powerful investors, not unorganized voters, dominate campaigns and elections. Because businesses "invest" in political parties and their candidates, changes in industrial structures—between large firms and sectors—can alter the agenda of party politics and the shape of public policy. Golden Rule presents revised versions of widely read essays in which Ferguson advanced and tested his theory, including his seminal study of the role played by capital intensive multinationals and international financiers in the New Deal. The chapter "Studies in Money Driven Politics" brings this aspect of American politics into better focus, along with other studies of Federal Reserve policy making and campaign finance in the 1936 election. Ferguson analyzes how a changing world economy and other social developments broke up the New Deal system in our own time, through careful studies of the 1988 and 1992 elections. The essay on 1992 contains an extended analysis of the emergence of the Clinton coalition and Ross Perot's dramatic independent insurgency. A postscript on the 1994 elections demonstrates the controlling impact of money on several key campaigns. This controversial work by a theorist of money and politics in the U.S. relates to issues in campaign finance reform, PACs, policymaking, public financing, and how today's elections work.

Competition is deeply built into the structures of modern life. It can improve policies, products and services, but is also seen as a divisive burden that pits people against one another. This book seeks to go beyond such caricatures by advancing a new thesis about how competition came to shape our society. Jonathan Hearn argues that competition was 'domesticated', harnessed and institutionalised across a range of institutional spheres in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Responding to crises in traditional forms of authority (hereditary, religious), the formalisation of competition in the economy, politics, and diverse new forms of knowledge creation provided a new mode for legitimating distributions of power in the emerging liberal societies. This insightful study aims to improve our ability to think critically about competition, by better understanding its integral role, for good and ill, in how liberal forms of society work.