Peddling Peril

“THE UNLEASHED POWER OF THE ATOM HAS CHANGED EVERYTHING SAVE OUR MODES OF THINKING, AND WE THUS DRIFT TOWARD UNPARALLELED CATASTROPHE.” —ALBERT EINSTEIN With the revelation of Iran’s secret uranium enrichment facilities, North Korea’s brazen testing of missiles and nuclear weapons, and nuclear-endowed Pakistan’s descent into instability, the urgency of the nuclear proliferation problem has never been greater. Based on his extensive experience in tracking the illicit nuclear trade as one of the world’s foremost proliferation experts, in Peddling Peril David Albright offers a harrowing narrative of the frighteningly large cracks through which nuclear weapons traffi ckers—such as Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan—continue to slip. Six years after the arrest of Khan, the networks he established continue to thrive, with black markets sprouting up across the globe. The dramatic takedown of the leader of the world’s largest and most perilous smuggling network was originally considered a model of savvy detection by intelligence and enforcement agencies, including the CIA and MI6. But, as Albright chronicles, the prosecutions of traffickers that were much anticipated have not come to pass, and Khan himself was released from house arrest in February 2009. Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea all use statesponsored smuggling networks that easily bypass export regulations and avoid detection. Albright illuminates how these networks have learned many ways to trick suppliers across the globe, including many in the United States, into selling them vital parts, and why, despite the fact that, since 2007, several dozen companies have been indicted—with some pleading guilty—for suspicion of participating in illicit trade, very few prosecutions have been achieved. Peddling Peril charts the dealings of several of these companies. Albright also reports on the hopeful story of the German company Leybold’s decision to become an industry watchdog, and shows how this story reveals just how effective corporate monitoring and government cooperation would be if more serious efforts were made. Concluding with a detailed plan for clamping down tightly on the illicit trade, Albright shows the way forward in the vital mission of freeing the world of this terrifying menace.

How well do strategic trade controls function to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and other WMD? The Peddling Peril Index (PPI) for 2019/2020 is the latest edition of our comprehensive and in-depth ranking of the effectiveness of national strategic trade controls. It ranks 200 countries, territories, and entities according to their capabilities and demonstrated success in implementing export, import, transit, and transshipment controls of strategic goods and technologies. These controls are key to thwarting the spread of nuclear weapons, other destructive weapons, and the means to make them to additional states and non-state actors. The PPI assesses the actual implementation of strategic trade controls by each nation, among groups of countries with similar supply potential, and thematically. It evaluates a broad set of 101 indicators that build on an extensive survey of national legislation, enforcement, ability to monitor and detect illicit trade, and ability to prevent proliferation financing. The PPI reflects more than two decades of work by the Institute on understanding and characterizing illicit nuclear trade. The PPI seeks to highlight where countries are leading or lagging in their implementation of strategic trade controls, and to provide a basis for countries to improve their efforts. The goal is to work for strengthened strategic trade control systems worldwide.

“THE UNLEASHED POWER OF THE ATOM HAS CHANGED EVERYTHING SAVE OUR MODES OF THINKING, AND WE THUS DRIFT TOWARD UNPARALLELED CATASTROPHE.” —ALBERT EINSTEIN With the revelation of Iran’s secret uranium enrichment facilities, North Korea’s brazen testing of missiles and nuclear weapons, and nuclear-endowed Pakistan’s descent into instability, the urgency of the nuclear proliferation problem has never been greater. Based on his extensive experience in tracking the illicit nuclear trade as one of the world’s foremost proliferation experts, in Peddling Peril David Albright offers a harrowing narrative of the frighteningly large cracks through which nuclear weapons traffi ckers—such as Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan—continue to slip. Six years after the arrest of Khan, the networks he established continue to thrive, with black markets sprouting up across the globe. The dramatic takedown of the leader of the world’s largest and most perilous smuggling network was originally considered a model of savvy detection by intelligence and enforcement agencies, including the CIA and MI6. But, as Albright chronicles, the prosecutions of traffickers that were much anticipated have not come to pass, and Khan himself was released from house arrest in February 2009. Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea all use statesponsored smuggling networks that easily bypass export regulations and avoid detection. Albright illuminates how these networks have learned many ways to trick suppliers across the globe, including many in the United States, into selling them vital parts, and why, despite the fact that, since 2007, several dozen companies have been indicted—with some pleading guilty—for suspicion of participating in illicit trade, very few prosecutions have been achieved. Peddling Peril charts the dealings of several of these companies. Albright also reports on the hopeful story of the German company Leybold’s decision to become an industry watchdog, and shows how this story reveals just how effective corporate monitoring and government cooperation would be if more serious efforts were made. Concluding with a detailed plan for clamping down tightly on the illicit trade, Albright shows the way forward in the vital mission of freeing the world of this terrifying menace.

How well do strategic export controls function to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction? The Peddling Peril Index (PPI) is the first comprehensive and in-depth ranking of the effectiveness of strategic export controls by country. It ranks 200 countries, territories, and entities according to their capabilities and demonstrated successes in implementing export controls. These controls are key to thwarting the spread of nuclear weapons, other destructive weapons, and the means to make them to additional states or non-state actors. The PPI assesses the actual implementation of strategic export controls by each nation, among groups of countries such as suppliers and transshipment countries, and thematically. It evaluates a broad set of indicators that build on an extensive survey of countries' export controls, including international commitment, legislation, ability to detect illicit trade, proliferation financing, and enforcement. The PPI project grew out of more than two decades of work by the Institute on understanding and characterizing illicit nuclear trade. A 2010 book, Peddling Peril, by Institute founder and president David Albright, is the project's namesake. The PPI seeks to highlight where countries are lagging in implementing strategic export controls and to provide information and a basis for countries to improve their efforts. Its goal is to work for strengthened export control systems worldwide.

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