People S Diplomacy Of Vietnam

This is the first full-length book on the concept of “People’s Diplomacy,” promoted by the president of North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, at the peak of the Vietnam War from 1965-1972. It holds great appeal for historians, international relations scholars, diplomats, and the general reader interested in Vietnam. A form of informal diplomacy, people’s diplomacy was carried out by ordinary Vietnamese including writers, cartoonists, workers, women, students, filmmakers, medical doctors, academics, and sportspersons. They created an awareness of the American bombardment of innocent Vietnamese civilians, and made profound connections with the anti-war movements abroad. People’s diplomacy made it difficult for the United States to prolong the war because the North Vietnamese, together with the peace movements abroad, exerted popular pressure on the American presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon to end the conflict. It was much more effective than the formal North Vietnamese diplomacy in gaining the support of Westerners who were averse to communism. It damaged the reputation of the United States by casting North Vietnam as a victim of American imperialism.

In 1960 revolutionaries in South Viet Nam created the National Liberation Front, a political and military organization committed to overthrowing the Saigon government and liberating Viet Nam south of the seventeenth parallel. The role of the NLF during the war has been hotly debated, with officials in Washington claiming from the outset that the NLF was merely a puppet of Hanoi. Based on over a hundred interviews with former Communist cadre and high ranking Party officials as well as extensive archival research in Viet Nam, Robert K. Brigham's is a definitive work that provides a focus on the NLF not found elsewhere. It contributes greatly to our understanding of the Viet Nam War and encourages a reassessment of that conflict. Brigham assesses the impact of the NLF's diplomatic strategy on the conduct and outcome of hostilities, explores the origin and pursuit of its policy objectives, and defines its true relationship with North Viet Nam. He contends that the NLF's success in convincing the world that it was independent of Hanoi was critical in upsetting the political and military balance in South Viet Nam and frustrating the U.S. war effort. In addition, he argues that differences in goals among Communists--building socialism in the north, liberating the south--resulted in disagreements over responses to American intervention, and he shows how these differences entered into foreign relations and seriously undermined revolutionary efforts.

John Colvin's career as one of Her Majesty's Representatives in Foreign Parts never scaled the greatest heights of the ambassadorial ladder, but it did lead to two unusual postings, which he describes in this book. In 1966 he was sent to Hanoi at a time when the Vietnam War began to assume its full rigour, and his verdict on the American involvement, contrary to the widely-held view, is that they did not leave Indo-China without credit or achievement. His next posting was as Ambassador to the People's Republic of Mongolia. His memories of that remote but lovely country, which dwell as much upon topographical as political aspects, provide an insight into life in what was then a Russian satellite state, far removed from the centre of world affairs.

Today Vietnam is one of America’s strongest international partners, with a thriving economy and a population that welcomes American visitors. How that relationship was formed is a twenty-year story of daring diplomacy and a careful thawing of tensions between the two countries after a lengthy war that cost nearly 60,000 American and more than two million Vietnamese lives. Ted Osius, former ambassador during the Obama administration, offers a vivid account, starting in the 1990s, of the various forms of diplomacy that made this reconciliation possible. He considers the leaders who put aside past traumas to work on creating a brighter future, including senators John McCain and John Kerry, two Vietnam veterans and ideological opponents who set aside their differences for a greater cause, and Pete Peterson—the former POW who became the first U.S. ambassador to a new Vietnam. Osius also draws upon his own experiences working first-hand with various Vietnamese leaders and traveling the country on bicycle to spotlight the ordinary Vietnamese people who have helped bring about their nation’s extraordinary renaissance. With a foreword by former Secretary of State John Kerry, Nothing Is Impossible tells an inspiring story of how international diplomacy can create a better world.

In 1986, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) adopted the Doi Moi (Renovation) policy at its sixth national congress, opening up a new chapter in the country’s modern history. Under Doi Moi, Vietnam has undergone significant socio-economic, political and foreign policy reforms that have transformed the country in many meaningful ways. This edited volume aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the multiple aspects and transformations of Vietnam’s foreign policy over the past thirty years. The book is divided into three sections. The first covers the broader framework of Vietnam’s foreign policymaking and the historical evolution of Vietnam’s diplomacy under Doi Moi. The second examines Vietnam’s bilateral relationships with its major partners, namely the United States, China, Japan, India, Russia, its smaller neighbours (Cambodia and Laos), and ASEAN. Finally, the book looks into two major issues in Vietnam’s current foreign policy: the management of the South China Sea disputes and the international economic integration process. As the most informative, updated and comprehensive volume on Vietnam’s foreign policy under Doi Moi, the book is a useful reference source for academics, policymakers, students as well as anyone interested in contemporary Vietnam in general and its foreign policy in particular.

The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) had its beginning in 1930, in a mountain cave near the China border, with Vo Nguyen Giap and thirty-three others. Giap, with Ho Chi Minh's help, built up this minuscule army from a semi-guerrilla status into a force numbering over one million in the regular army and another three million in paramilitary elements. Pike discusses in depth the relationship of this small, underdeveloped country to Russia, to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, to China. He also accounts for Hanoi's victory in the Vietnam War and discusses the North Vietnam strategy that has proved so successful against three of the world's greatest powers.

This book explores how Vietnam's leadership conceptualises and conducts public diplomacy (PD) and offers a comparative analysis with regional powers. Drawing on social constructivism as its theoretical framework it investigates the rationale behind an authoritarian regime's implementation of public diplomacy to contribute to a better understanding of the broader framework of foreign-domestic policy. This theoretical and practical exploration of Vietnam's PD in cases of cultural diplomacy, South China Sea diplomacy and online activism situates it in the general academic and theoretical discussion on soft power. Key variables to the conceptualisation and conduct of Vietnam's PD, namely national interest, national identity and changing information technologies, especially the Internet and social media, are also thoroughly investigated. With crosscutting themes ranging from politics and international relations to communication studies, it will appeal to students and scholars of identity politics, populism and nationalism.

After a war breaks out, what factors influence the warring parties' decisions about whether to talk to their enemy, and when may their position on wartime diplomacy change? How do we get from only fighting to also talking? In The Costs of Conversation, Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that states are primarily concerned with the strategic costs of conversation, and these costs need to be low before combatants are willing to engage in direct talks with their enemy. Specifically, Mastro writes, leaders look to two factors when determining the probable strategic costs of demonstrating a willingness to talk: the likelihood the enemy will interpret openness to diplomacy as a sign of weakness, and how the enemy may change its strategy in response to such an interpretation. Only if a state thinks it has demonstrated adequate strength and resiliency to avoid the inference of weakness, and believes that its enemy has limited capacity to escalate or intensify the war, will it be open to talking with the enemy. Through four primary case studies—North Vietnamese diplomatic decisions during the Vietnam War, those of China in the Korean War and Sino-Indian War, and Indian diplomatic decision making in the latter conflict—The Costs of Conversation demonstrates that the costly conversations thesis best explains the timing and nature of countries' approach to wartime talks, and therefore when peace talks begin. As a result, Mastro's findings have significant theoretical and practical implications for war duration and termination, as well as for military strategy, diplomacy, and mediation.