Phenomenology And Mind 2022

Andrea Cimino, Dermot Moran, Andrea Staiti, Introduction Ingrid Vendrell Ferran, Emotions and Sentiments: Two Distinct Forms of Affective Intentionality Nicola Spano, The Foundation of Evaluation and Volition on Cognition: A New Contribution to the Debate over Husserl’s Account of Objectifying and Non-objectifying Acts Alexis Delamare, Are Emotions Valueceptions or Responses to Values? Husserl’s Phenomenology of Affectivity Reconsidered Veniero Venier, Husserl and Non-Formal Ethics Emanuele Caminada, Things, Goods, and Values: The Operative Function of Husserl’s Unitary Foundation in Scheler’s Axiology Cristiano Vidali, The Experience of Value. The Influence of Scheler on Sartre’s Early Ethics Paola Premoli De Marchi, The Axiology of Dietrich von Hildebrand. From Phenomenology to Metaphysics Roberta Guccinelli,„Schatten der Irresponsivität“: Pathos ohne Response/Response ohne Pathos. Trauma, Widerstand und Schelers Begriff der seelischen Kausalität REVIEW Eugene Kelly, Review of Roberta de Monticelli’s Towards a Phenomenological Axiology

Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by such great European philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. As the century advanced, Anglophone philosophers increasingly developed their own distinct styles and methods of studying the mind, and a gulf seemed to open up between the two traditions. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually illuminating.

INTRODUCTION Paolo Di Lucia and Lorenzo Passerini Glazel, Introduction. Veritas in Dicto, Veritas in Re Amedeo Giovanni Conte, Three Paradigms for a Philosophy of the True: Apophantic Truth, Eidological Truth, Idiological Truth SECTION I. Truth of Language (De Dicto Truth) vs. Truth of Things (De Re Truth) Roberta De Monticelli, Ockham’s Razor, or the Murder of Concreteness. A Vindication of the Unitarian Tradition Richard Davies, Monadic Truth and Falsity Stefano Caputo, One but not the Same Paolo Heritier, True God and True Man: Some Implications SECTION II. Truth of Things and the Normative and Axiological Dimensions of Reality Anna Donise, A Stratified Theory of Value Venanzio Raspa, On Emotional Truth Sergei Talanker, No True Persuasive Definition Marginalizes? Carlos Morujão, Subjective Meanings and Normative Values in Alfred Schutz’s Philosophy of Human Action SECTION III. Truth, Validity, and Normativity Pedro M. S. Alves, A Phenomenological Analysis of the Nomothetic Noema. Discussing the De Dicto and De Re Formulations of Normative Sentences Wojciech Żełaniec, Things We Must Never Do (If Any) Sara Papic, Can Linguistic Correctness Provide Us with Categorical Semantic Norms? Virginia Presi, Custom in Action. Ferdinand Tönnies’ Ontology of the Normative SECTION IV. Truth and Validity in Action: Norm Effectiveness and Nomotropic Behaviour Pascal Richard, Norms as “Intentional Systems” Alba Lojo, The Semantic Conception of Efficacy and Constitutive Rules: Mapping a Tough Relationship Giovanni Bombelli, Normativity, Truth, Validity and Effectiveness. Remarks Starting from the Horizon of the “Common Sense” SECTION V. Further Contributions Caterina Del Sordo and Roberta Lanfredini, Matter at a Crossroads: Givenness vs Forceful Quality Stefano Colloca, On the Deontic Validity of the General Exclusive Norm Alessandro Volpe, Doing Justice to Solidarity: On the Moral Role of Mutual Support

The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: • what is phenomenology? • naturalizing phenomenology and the cognitive sciences • phenomenology and consciousness • consciousness and self-consciousness • time and consciousness • intentionality • the embodied mind • action • knowledge of other minds • situated and extended minds • phenomenology and personal identity. This second edition includes a new preface, and revised and improved chapters. Also included are helpful features such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and a glossary, making The Phenomenological Mind an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

wide criticism both from Western and Eastern scholars.