Philosophical And Ethical Problems In Mental Handicap

This book examines a range of important conceptual, ethical, social and religious issues arising from mental handicap. It contains a vigorous defence of the contention that mentally handicapped human beings are persons. It attacks both the contemporary philosophical attempts to dismiss the personhood of mentally handicapped people and the genocidal policies which those attempts suggest. It explores the logic of the attitudes which have lead to the marginalisation and oppression of the mentally handicapped.

This book examines a range of important conceptual, ethical, social, and religious issues arising from mental handicap. It contains a vigorous defense of the contention that mentally handicapped human beings are persons. It attacks both the contemporary philosophical attempts to dismiss the personhood of mentally handicapped people and the genocidal policies which those attempts suggest. It explores the logic of the attitudes which have lead to the marginalization and oppression of the mentally handicapped.

Intellectual disability is often overlooked within mainstream disability studies, and theories developed about disability and physical impairment may not always be appropriate when thinking about intellectual (or learning) disability. This pioneering book, in considering intellectually disabled people's lives, sets out a care ethics model of disability that outlines the emotional caring sphere, where love and care are psycho-socially questioned, the practical caring sphere, where day-to-day care is carried out, and the socio-political caring sphere, where social intolerance and aversion to difficult differences are addressed. It does so by discussing issue-based everyday life, such as family, relationships, media representations and education, in an evocative and creative manner. This book draws from an understanding of how intellectual disability is represented in all forms of media, a feminist ethics of care, and capabilities, as well as other theories, to provide a critique and alternative to the social model of disability as well as illuminate care-less spaces that inhabit all the caring spheres. The first two chapters of the book provide an overview of intellectual disability, the debates surrounding disability, and outline the model. Having begun to develop an innovative theoretical framework for understanding intellectual disability and being human, the book then moves onto empirical and narrative driven issue-based chapters. The following chapters build on the emergent framework and discuss the application of particular theories in three different substantive areas: education, mothering and sexual politics. The concluding remarks draw together the common themes across the applied chapters and link them to the overarching theoretical framework. An important read for all those studying and researching intellectual or learning disability, this book will be an essential resource in sociology, philosophy, criminology (law), social work, education and nursing in particular.

Through a series of essays contributed by clinicians, medicalhistorians, and prominent moral philosophers, CognitiveDisability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy addresses theethical, bio-ethical, epistemological, historical, andmeta-philosophical questions raised by cognitive disability Features essays by a prominent clinicians and medicalhistorians of cognitive disability, and prominent contemporaryphilosophers such as Ian Hacking, Martha Nussbaum, and PeterSinger Represents the first collection that brings togetherphilosophical discussions of Alzheimer's disease,intellectual/developmental disabilities, and autism under therubric of cognitive disability Offers insights into categories like Alzheimer's, mentalretardation, and autism, as well as issues such as care,personhood, justice, agency, and responsibility

First published in 1985. Despite the vast number of books available on mental handicap, there had been little published about moral, philosophical or ethical issues. Yet such issues must be faced and indeed answered, either explicitly or implicitly, before any system of education or care for mentally handicapped people can be put into practice. This book reviews a number of issues in this field. Key topics addressed include: respect for retarded people; the notion of equal rights; terminating the lives of severely handicapped infants; and genetic engineering. With the current emphasis on recognising the rights and needs of the handicapped as individuals, this book should represent an important review and be of interest to all concerned with mentally handicapped people.

This project draws together the diverse strands of the debate regarding disability in a way never before combined in a single volume. After providing a representative sampling of competing philosophical approaches to the conceptualization of disability as such, the volume goes on to address such themes as the complex interplay between disability and quality of life, questions of social justice as it relates to disability, and the personal dimensions of the disability experience. By explicitly locating the discussion of various applied ethical questions within the broader theoretical context of how disability is best conceptualized, the volume seeks to bridge the gap between abstract philosophical musings about the nature of disease, illness and disability found in much of the philosophy of medicine literature, on the one hand, and the comparatively concrete but less philosophical discourse frequently encountered in much of the disability studies literature. It also critically examines various claims advanced by disability advocates, as well as those of their critics. In bringing together leading scholars in the fields of moral theory, bioethics, and disability studies, this volume makes a unique contribution to the scholarly literature, while also offering a valuable resource to instructors and students interested in a text that critically examines and assesses various approaches to some of the most vexing problems in contemporary social and political philosophy.

Why write another book on ethics? As practitioners we are involved both in the design and delivery of services to people with mental health problems. In common with all other professionals, our work has led to the experience of ethical dilemmas: typically, these have involved major confrontations, either with our col leagues or our consciences. This book, however, is not limited to a discussion of such major themes. Rather, we have tried to use a broader canvas: ethics, in our view, is really about the judgement of right and wrong in ordinary, everyday life. Ethics are highly personal: we fashion our own personal code from our experi ence of others, and from the 'tests' which bring meaning to our lives. Such experiences shape our individual values. We bring these codes and values to our work. We are not always aware of their influence in our dealings with people. Although we may not always be aware of it, all our actions pose an ethical question. Given that our work involves us in helping others to live ordinary, satisfying lives, this challenge heightens the intensity of our ethical dilemmas. This is most evident where our personal code conflicts with the implicit code of the health setting.

This book is an attempt to address the ethical issues raised by mental illness and its treatment by focusing on the question of autonomy. The mentally ill may be regarded as non-autonomous by virtue of irrationality, which may result in treatment models which deny them a voice. As a counter to this, some have moved to the other extreme and argued that the mentally ill must be regarded as fully autonomous in all circumstances, and consequently that all their wishes regarding treatment must be respected. This book examines the ethical consequences of such simplistic approaches towards autonomy and mental illness, and considers the ethical issues raised by specific forms of treatment. It is suggested in conclusion that improvement in the care and treatment of the mentally ill requires not only a fundamental change in social attitudes but also a less impoverished conception of autonomy than some of those currently employed.