Philosophy Science And Psychoanalysis

The perennial interest in psychoanalysis shows no signs of abating and the longevity of psychoanalytic theory is seen in the varied extensions and elaborations of Freudian thinking in the fields of neuroscience and cognitive theory. Nevertheless, the scientific standing of psychoanalysis has long been questioned and developments in the fields of the philosophy of science and psychology require a fresh assessment of the scientific standing of psychoanalysis. While there are a range of views on the topic of whether psychoanalysis is in fact scientific, any satisfactory approach to understanding mind and behaviour requires an approach that is at once both philosophic and scientific. Accordingly, to even approach the question regarding the scientific nature of psychoanalysis, a foundation comprising a sophisticated conceptual and philosophical framework is required. This volume represents the junction where philosophy, science, and psychoanalysis meet and presents arguments critical and supportive of the scientific standing of psychoanalysis.

This study is a philosophical critique of the foundations of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis. As such, it also takes cognizance of his claim that psychoanalysis has the credentials of a natural science. It shows that the reasoning on which Freud rested the major hypotheses of his edifice was fundamentally flawed, even if the probity of the clinical observations he adduced were not in question. Moreover, far from deserving to be taken at face value, clinical data from the psychoanalytic treatment setting are themselves epistemically quite suspect.

To celebrate Adolf Griinbaum's sixtieth birthday by offering him this bouquet of essays written for this purpose was the happy task of an autonomous Editorial Committee: Wesley C. Salmon, Nicholas Rescher, Larry Laudan, Carl G. Hempel, and Robert S. Cohen. To present the book within the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science was altogether fitting and natural, for Griinbaum has' been friend and supporter of philosophy of science at Boston University for twenty-five years, and unofficial godfather to the Boston Colloquium. To regret that we could not include contributions from all his well-wishers, critical admirers and admiring critics, is only to regret that we did not have an encyclopedic space at the committee's disposal. But we, and all involved in this book, speak for all the others in the philo sophical, scientific, and personal worlds of Adolf Griinbaum in greeting him on May 15, 1983, with our wishes for his health, his scholarship, his happiness. Our gratitude is due to Carolyn Fawcett for her care and accuracy in editing this book, and for the preparation of the Index; and to Elizabeth McMunn for her help again and again, especially in preparation of the Bibliography of the Published Writings of Adolf Griinbaum; and to Thelma Griinbaum for encouraging, planning, and cheering. Boston University R.S.C. Center for the Philosophy and History of Science M.W.W.

This book records one of the few times in the United States that a distinguished group of psychoanalysts met with an equally distinguished group of philosophers of science in a free, critical interchange of view on the scientific status of the field.

This by now well-known pioneering dialogue on Freudian analysis is concerned not with therapeutic implications, individual or social, of psychoanalysis or of any other brand of psychology, but solely with the status of psychoanalysis as a scientific theory. Matching talents with a distinguished group of philosophers and social scientists, psychoanalysts made their claims and willingly subject them to the methodological scrutiny common to the sciences and the philosophy of science. This book records one of the few times in the United States that a distinguished group of psychoanalysts met with an equally distinguished group of philosophers of science in a free, critical interchange of view on the scientific status of the field. While a sense of the event’s excitement is captured here, it also had clear results, such as an expanded notion of psychoanalysis as a scientific theory, and a clear realization that certain elements in psychoanalysis are substantially beyond the boundaries of causal inference or the rules of logic. Two opening statements by Heinz Hartmann and Ernest Nagel set the tone for the debate and discussion that followed. These are followed by social scientific statements of Abram Kardiner, Ernest van den Haag, and Alex Inkeles, followed by the philosophers Morris Lazerowitz, Donald C. Williams, and Anthony Flew. Such distinguished scholars as Adolf Grunbaum, Michael Scriven, Gail Kennedy, Arthur Pap, Philipp Frank. Arthur C. Danto, Max Black and others, round out this pioneering effort in the literature of intellectual combat. Sidney Hook applies to his vision of psychoanalysis the same compelling rigor he applied to other would-be advocates of a science beyond ordinary scientific method or safeguards. He nonetheless points out that even therapeutic success is not the last word, but must itself be tested on a variety of measures: statistical no less than analytical. This remains a courageous and disturbing work, one that commands attention among practicing psychiatrists, psychoanalysts—and their would-be patients.

The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis was first published in 1956. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. This first volume of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science presents some of the relatively more consolidated research of the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science. The work of the Center, which was established in 1953 through a grant from the Louis W. and Maud Hill Family Foundation, has so far been devoted largely to the philosophical, logical, and methodological problems of psychology. Some of the twelve papers in this volume are concerned with broad philosophical foundations; others consider specific problems of method or interpretation. The contributors, some of whom are represented in the authorship of more than one paper, are Herbert Feigl, director of the Center; Rudolf Carnap; B.F. Skinner; Michael Scriven; Albert Ellis; Antony Flew; L. J. Cronbach; Paul E. Meehl; R. C. Buck; and Wilfrid Sellars.

The relationship existing between science and psychoanalysis has long been tense, critical, even hostile. Andr Haynal addresses this relationship by examining three questions: how is psychoanalytic "knowledge" established? what methodology and epistemology underlie psychoanalytic theory? and what are the historical circumstances that have shaped psychoanalysis? Haynal is familiar with the full spectrum of analytic thought and begins with a systematic discussion of analytic theory. The second part of the book covers a series of historical topics and includes discussions of Freud and his relations with his followers. A chapter on Freud and his "favorite disciple," Sandor Ferenczi, is an engrossing account of the complex intellectual and personal connection the two men shared. The relationship existing between science and psychoanalysis has long been tense, critical, even hostile. Andr Haynal addresses this relationship by examining three questions: how is psychoanalytic "knowledge" established? what methodology and epistemology underlie psychoanalytic theory? and what are the historical circumstances that have shaped psychoanalysis? Haynal is familiar with the full spectrum of analytic thought and begins with a systematic discussion of analytic theory. The second part of the book covers a series of historical topics and includes discussions of Freud and his relations with his followers. A chapter on Freud and his "favorite disciple," Sandor Ferenczi, is an engrossing account of the complex intellectual and personal connection the two men shared.

Lacan critiqued imaginary intuition for confusing direct perception with unconscious pre-conceptions about people and the world. The emphasis on description goes hand in hand with a rejection of theory and the science of the unconscious and a belief in the naive self-transparency of the world. At the same time, knowing in and of the Real requires a place beyond thinking, multi-valued forms of logic, mathematical equations, and different conceptions of causality, acausality, and chance. This book explores some of the mathematical problems raised by Lacan's use of numbers and the interconnection between mathematics and psychoanalytic ideas. Within any system, mathematical or otherwise, there are holes, or acausal cores and remainders of indecidability. It is this senseless point of non-knowledge that makes change, and the emergence of the new, possible within a system. This book differentiates between two types of void, and aligns them with the Lacanian concepts of a true and a false hole and the psychoanalytic theory of primary repression.