Plato S Theaetetus As A Second Apology

Zina Giannopoulou argues that Theaetetus—Plato's most systematic examination of knowledge—is a philosophically sophisticated elaboration of Apology that successfully differentiates Socrates from the sophists. In Apology Socrates defends his philosophical activity partly by distinguishing it from sophistic practices, and in Theaetetus he enacts this distinction: the self-proclaimed ignorant and pious Socrates of Apology poses as the barren practitioner of midwifery, an art that enjoys divine support, and helps his pregnant interlocutor to engender his ideas. Whereas sophistic expertise fills others' souls with items of dubious epistemic quality, Socratic midwifery removes, tests, and discards falsities. In Theaetetus Plato drapes the Socrates of Apology with obstetric garb and stages a philosophical contest between him and the seemingly wise men with whose definitions Theaetetus' soul teems, chief among whom is Protagoras. By proving the indefensibility of these definitions, Socrates challenges their authors' wisdom—since for him no one can justifiably be said to have knowledge if he cannot give an account of knowledge. On the other hand, his own inability to procure the definition he seeks confirms his assertion that he lacks wisdom. Giannopoulou goes on to explore how in Apology Socrates claims that his wisdom consists in his awareness of his lack of wisdom, and in Theaetetus he validates this claim: his attempt to discover what knowledge is, coupled with his intellectual barrenness, shows both that he does not have what he is looking for and why this is the case.

Zina Giannopoulou offers a new reading of Theaetetus, Plato's most systematic examination of knowledge, alongside Apology, Socrates' speech in defence of his philosophical practice, and argues that the former text is a philosophical elaboration of the latter.

Originally published in 1933, this book examines the arguments surrounding the relation of Plato's Apology to the actual speech delivered by Socrates at his trial. Hackforth compares Plato's account to that of Xenophon, and examines Plato's possible philosophical or historical motives in the creation of his account of Socrates' defence. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Platonic or Socratic philosophy.

Apology is Plato's version of the speech given by Socrates as he defended himself in 399 BC against the charges of "corrupting the young, and by not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other daimonia that are novel." Socrates begins by telling the jury that their minds were poisoned by his enemies when they were young and impressionable. He says his reputation for sophistry comes from his enemies, all of whom are envious of him, and malicious. He says they must remain nameless, except for Aristophanes, the comic poet. He later answers the charge that he has corrupted the young by arguing that deliberate corruption is an incoherent idea. Socrates says that all these false accusations began with his obedience to the oracle at Delphi. He tells how Chaerephon went to the Oracle at Delphi, to ask if anyone was wiser than Socrates. When Chaerephon reported to Socrates that the god told him there is none wiser, Socrates took this as a riddle. He himself knew that he had no wisdom "great or small" but that he also knew that it is against the nature of the gods to lie. Socrates then went on a "divine mission" to solve the paradox (that an ignorant man could also be the wisest of all men) and to clarify the meaning of the Oracles' words. He systematically interrogated the politicians, poets and craftsmen. Socrates determined that the politicians were imposters, and the poets did not understand even their own poetry, like prophets and seers who do not understand what they say. Craftsmen proved to be pretentious too, and Socrates says that he saw himself as a spokesman for the oracle (23e). He asked himself whether he would rather be an impostor like the people he spoke to, or be himself. Socrates tells the jury that he would rather be himself than anyone else.

This book meets the need to revise the standard interpretations of an apparently aporetic dialogue, full of eloquent silences and tricky suggestions, as it explores, among many other topics, the dramatis personae, including Plato's self-references behind the scene and the role of Socrates on stage, the question of method and refutation and the way dialectics plays a part in the dialogue. More especifically, it contains a set of papers devoted to perception and Plato's criticism of Heraclitus and Protagoras. A section deals with the problem of the relation between knowledge and thinking, including the the aviary model and the possibility of error. It also emphasizes some positive contributions to the classical Platonic doctrines and his philosophy of education. The reception of the dialogue in antiquity and the medieval age closes the analysis. Representing different hermeneutical traditions, prestigious scholars engage with these issues in divergent ways, as they shed new light on a complex controversial work.

The Theaetetus is one of the most widely studied of any of the Platonic dialogues because its dominant theme concerns the significant philosophical question, what is knowledge? In this new interpretation of the Theaetetus, Paul Stern provides the first full-length treatment of its political character in relationship to this dominant theme. Stern argues that this approach sheds significant light on the distinctiveness of the Socratic way of life, with respect to both its initial justification and its ultimate character.

The Apology of Socrates (Greek: Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους, Apología Sokrátous; Latin: Apologia Socratis), written by Plato, is a Socratic dialogue of the speech of legal self-defence which Socrates (469-399 BC) spoke at his trial for impiety and corruption in 399 BC.[1] Specifically, the Apology of Socrates is a defence against the charges of "corrupting the youth" and "not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other daimonia that are novel" to Athens (24b).[2] Among the primary sources about the trial and death of the philosopher Socrates, the Apology of Socrates is the dialogue that depicts the trial, and is one of four Socratic dialogues, along with Euthyphro, Phaedo, and Crito, through which Plato details the final days of the philosopher Socrates. The Apology of Socrates begins with Socrates addressing the jury of perhaps 500 Athenian men to ask if they have been persuaded by the Orators Lycon, Anytus, and Meletus, who have accused Socrates of corrupting the young people of the city and impiety against the pantheon of Athens. The first sentence of his speech establishes the theme of the dialogue-that philosophy begins with an admission of ignorance. Socrates later clarifies that point of philosophy when he says that whatever wisdom he possesses comes from knowing that he knows nothing (23b, 29b). In the course of the trial, Socrates imitates, parodies, and corrects the Orators, his accusers, and asks the jury to judge him by the truth of his statements, not by his oratorical skill (cf. Lysias XIX 1,2,3; Isaeus X 1; Isocrates XV 79; Aeschines II 24). Socrates says he will not use sophisticated language-carefully arranged ornate words and phrases-but will speak using the common idiom of the Greek language. Socrates says that he will speak in the manner he has used in the agora and at the money tables which he states is his native tongue and the fashion of his country. Although offered the opportunity to appease the prejudices of the jury, with a minimal concession to the charges of corruption and impiety, Socrates does not yield his integrity to avoid the penalty of death. The jury condemns Socrates to death.