Poland Alone

Poland was the 'tripwire' that brought Britain into the Second World War, but it was largely the fear of the new Nazi-Soviet Pact rather than the cementing of an old relationship that created the formal alliance. But neither Britain, nor Poland's older ally, France, had the material means to prevent Poland being overrun in 1939. The broadcast, 'Poland is no longer alone' had a distinctly hollow ring. During the next four years the Polish Government in exile and armed forces made a significant contribution to the allied war effort; in return the Polish Home Army received a paltry 600 tons of supplies. Poland Alone focuses on the bloody Warsaw Uprising of 1944, when the Polish Resistance attempted to gain control of their city from the German Army. They expected help from the Allies but received none, and they were left helpless as the Russians moved in. The War ended with over five million Poles dead, three million of whom died in the concentration camps. Jonathan Walker examines whether Britain could have done more to save the Polish people in their crisis year of 1944, dealing with many different aspects such as the actions of the RAF and SOE, the role of Polish Couriers, the failure of British Intelligence and the culpability of the British Press.

Poland was the 'tripwire' that brought Britain into the Second World War but neither Britain, nor Poland's older ally, France, had the material means to prevent Poland being overrun. The broadcast, 'Poland is no longer alone' had a distinctly hollow ring. During the next four years the Polish Government in exile and armed forces made a significant contribution to the Allied war effort; in return the Polish Home Army received a paltry 600 tons of supplies. Poland Alone focuses on the climactic year of 1944 when the Polish Resistance attempted to gain control of Warsaw from the Germans. A bloody uprising ensued, but little help was received from the Allies. After the Warsaw Poles were massacred, the Red Army finally moved into the city and then occupied the whole country. Jonathan Walker examines whether Britain could have done more to save the Polish people and the victims of the Holocaust. While Allied political and military leaders clashed over the level of support for the Poles, SOE, RAF and Intelligence personnel fought a bitter covert war to help the Polish resistance fighters. The War ended with over five million Poles dead. Had Britain betrayed her ally?

This book takes a long-term view of environmental policy in Poland, which thus serves as an example to increase our understanding of environmental policy making in general in the former Eastern bloc countries. The perspective adopted also includes the pre-transition period, since the transformation process cannot be understood without reference to the preceding period. The book investigates the driving forces underlying policy changes, both prior to and after the transition, and identifies elements both of change and continuity - topics that have hitherto been neglected in the literature. A change of political system in Poland did not lead to a major change in the thrust of environmental policy: the policy makers adopted a cautious approach to new instruments and institutions during the transition period. What did change with the transition was the implementation aspect: the effectiveness of environmental policy increased dramatically after the abolition of socialism. The rule of law meant that the state administration and the polluters were subordinated to the legal system, thus increasing the power to environmental policy. Readership: Researchers and students interested in the environment and the countries in transition.

This book offers a unique perspective for understanding how and why the Second World War in Europe ended as it did—and why Germany, in attacking the Soviet Union, came far closer to winning the war than is often perceived. Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe challenges this conventional wisdom in highlighting how the re-establishment of the traditional German art of war—updated to accommodate new weapons systems—paved the way for Germany to forge a considerable military edge over its much larger potential rivals by playing to its qualitative strengths as a continental power. Ironically, these methodologies also created and exacerbated internal contradictions that undermined the same war machine and left it vulnerable to enemies with the capacity to adapt and build on potent military traditions of their own. The book begins by examining topics such as the methods by which the German economy and military prepared for war, the German military establishment's formidable strengths, and its weaknesses. The book then takes an entirely new perspective on explaining the Second World War in Europe. It demonstrates how Germany, through its invasion of the Soviet Union, came within a whisker of cementing a European-based empire that would have allowed the Third Reich to challenge the Anglo-American alliance for global hegemony—an outcome that by commonly cited measures of military potential Germany never should have had even a remote chance of accomplishing. The book's last section explores the final year of the war and addresses how Germany was able to hang on against the world's most powerful nations working in concert to engineer its defeat.

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