Poppy Fields 2005

Oscillations in opium poppy production in Afghanistan have long been associated with how the state was perceived, such as after the Taliban imposed a cultivation ban in 2000-1. The international community's subsequent attempts to regulate opium poppy became intimately linked with its own state-building project, and rising levels of cultivation were cited as evidence of failure by those international donors who spearheaded development in poppy-growing provinces like Helmand, Nangarhar and Kandahar. Mansfield's book examines why drug control - particularly opium bans - have been imposed in Afghanistan; he documents the actors involved; and he scrutinizes how prohibition served divergent and competing interests. Drawing on almost two decades of fieldwork in rural areas, he explains how these bans affected farming communities, and how prohibition endured in some areas while in others opium production bans undermined livelihoods and destabilized the political order, fuelling violence and rural rebellion. Above all this book challenges how we have come to understand political power in rural Afghanistan. Far from being the passive recipients of violence by state and non-state actors, Mansfield highlights the role that rural communities have played in shaping the political terrain, including establishing the conditions under which they could persist with opium production.

The control of illicit-drug trafficking and drug use is a difficult and complex process that involves a variety of prevention, control, treatment, and law enforcement strategies. Eradication strategies for controlling illicit-drug crops are used to target the beginning of the drug-supply chain by preventing or reducing crop yields. Mycoherbicides have been proposed as an eradication tool to supplement the current methods of herbicide spraying, mechanical removal, and manual destruction of illicit-drug crops. Some people regard them as preferable to chemical herbicides for controlling illicit-drug crops because of their purported specificity to only one plant species or a few closely related species. As living microorganisms, they have the potential to provide long-term control if they can persist in the environment and affect later plantings. Research on mycoherbicides against illicit-drug crops has focused on three pathogens: Fusarium oxysporum f.sp. cannabis for cannabis (Cannabis sativa), F. oxysporum f.sp. erythroxyli for coca (Erythroxylum coca and E. novogranatense), and Crivellia papaveracea or Brachycladium papaveris (formerly known as Pleospora papaveracea and Dendryphion penicillatum, respectively) for opium poppy (Papaver somniferum). Feasibility of Using Mycoherbicides for Controlling Illicit Drug Crops addresses issues about the potential use of the proposed mycoherbicides: their effectiveness in eradicating their target plants; the feasibility of their large-scale industrial manufacture and delivery; their potential spread and persistence in the environment; their pathogenicity and toxicity to nontarget organisms, including other plants, fungi, animals, and humans; their potential for mutation and resulting effects on target plants and nontarget organisms; and research and development needs. On the basis of its review, the report concludes that the available data are insufficient to determine the effectiveness of the specific fungi proposed as mycoherbicides to combat illicit-drug crops or to determine their potential effects on nontarget plants, microorganisms, animals, humans, or the environment. However, the committee offers an assessment of what can and cannot be determined at the present time regarding each of the issues raised in the statement of task.

The World Drug Report 2005 provides one of the most comprehensive overviews of illicit drug trends at the international level. In addition, this year it presents the work of UNODC in two new areas of research: an estimate of the financial value of the world drug market, and the preliminary steps towards the creation of an illicit drug index. The analysis of trends, some going back 10 years or more, is presented in Volume 1. Detailed statistics are presented in Volume 2. Taken together these volumes provide the most up to date view of today's illicit drug situation.

A new wartime classic from two legends of children's literature! Michael Morpurgo and Michael Foreman have teamed up with the British Legion to tell a new story inspired by the history of the poppy. When John McCrae wrote his famous poem "In Flanders Field" among the trenches of war-torn Belgium, neither he nor a local village girl who saves a discarded draft of it could know what enormous power that poem would have on generations to come.

Afghanistan's drug industry is a central issue for the country's state-building, security, governance, and development agenda.

A Washington Post Best Book of 2021 ​The #1 New York Times bestselling investigative story of how three successive presidents and their military commanders deceived the public year after year about America’s longest war, foreshadowing the Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, by Washington Post reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize finalist Craig Whitlock. Unlike the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had near-unanimous public support. At first, the goals were straightforward and clear: defeat al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of 9/11. Yet soon after the United States and its allies removed the Taliban from power, the mission veered off course and US officials lost sight of their original objectives. Distracted by the war in Iraq, the US military become mired in an unwinnable guerrilla conflict in a country it did not understand. But no president wanted to admit failure, especially in a war that began as a just cause. Instead, the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations sent more and more troops to Afghanistan and repeatedly said they were making progress, even though they knew there was no realistic prospect for an outright victory. Just as the Pentagon Papers changed the public’s understanding of Vietnam, The Afghanistan Papers contains “fast-paced and vivid” (The New York Times Book Review) revelation after revelation from people who played a direct role in the war from leaders in the White House and the Pentagon to soldiers and aid workers on the front lines. In unvarnished language, they admit that the US government’s strategies were a mess, that the nation-building project was a colossal failure, and that drugs and corruption gained a stranglehold over their allies in the Afghan government. All told, the account is based on interviews with more than 1,000 people who knew that the US government was presenting a distorted, and sometimes entirely fabricated, version of the facts on the ground. Documents unearthed by The Washington Post reveal that President Bush didn’t know the name of his Afghanistan war commander—and didn’t want to meet with him. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted that he had “no visibility into who the bad guys are.” His successor, Robert Gates, said: “We didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda.” The Afghanistan Papers is a “searing indictment of the deceit, blunders, and hubris of senior military and civilian officials” (Tom Bowman, NRP Pentagon Correspondent) that will supercharge a long-overdue reckoning over what went wrong and forever change the way the conflict is remembered.