Populists And The Pandemic

Populists and the Pandemic examines the responses of populist political actors and parties in 22 countries around the globe to the COVID-19 pandemic, in terms of their attitudes, rhetoric, mobilization repertoires, and policy proposals. The responses of some populist leaders have received much public attention, as they denied the severity of the public health crisis, denigrated experts and data, looked for scapegoats, encouraged protests, questioned the legitimacy of liberal institutions, spread false information, and fueled conspiracies. But how widespread are those particular reactions? How much variation is there? What explains the variation that does exist? This volume considers these questions through critical analysis of countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa, by leading experts with deep knowledge of their respective cases. Some chapters focus on populist parties, others on charismatic populist leaders. Some countries examined are democracies, others autocracies. Some populists are left wing, others right wing. Some populists are in government, others in opposition. This variation allows for a panoramic consideration of factors that systematically influence or mediate populist responses to the pandemic. The book thus makes a unique contribution to our understanding of the intersection between two of the most pressing social and political challenges of our time. The book will be of interest to all those researching populism, extremism, and political parties and those more broadly interested in political science, public policy, sociology, communications, and economics.

Drawing on his Engelsberg Lectures, Michael Burleigh explores the new global era of national populism. He first probes the nature of mass anger in the West: how might popular discontent be artificially incited and sustained by elite figures claiming to speak for the common people? He then compares empire's difficult aftermaths in Britain and Russia: how does History foster a sense of exceptionality, and how is it exploited by populists, as we've seen again with 2020's 'statue wars'? And finally, he turns to China, where the ruling Communist Party depends on a nationalised version of History for popular support. Covid-19 has created problems for several populist leaders, whose image has suffered amidst the public's new-found respect for expertise and disappointment over their shouty handling of the pandemic. Yet despite Donald Trump's defeat, with extended economic depression looming, Burleigh fears that new post-populists may yet arise.

This edited book provides a first overview of how populist parties responded to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis in Europe. Although populism would normally benefit from crisis situations (e.g., political representation or economic crises), the peculiar nature of this health crisis does not make the benefit obvious. For it to be exploited, a crisis must be politicized. While populists have tried to take advantage of the crisis situation, the impossibility of taking ownership of the COVID-19 issue has made the crisis hard to be exploited. In particular, populists in power have tried to depoliticize the pandemic, whereas radical right-populists in opposition tried to politicize the crisis, though failing to gain the relevant public support. This book considers populist parties in eight European democracies, providing a framework of analysis for their responses to the COVID-19 crisis. It does so by engaging with the literature on crisis and populism from a theoretical perspective and through the lens of the politicization process.

Over the last decade, the world has watched in shock as populists swept to power in free elections. From Manila to Warsaw, Brasilia to Budapest, the populist tide has shattered illusions of an inexorable march to liberal democracy. Eschewing simplistic notions of a unified global populism, this book unpacks the diversity and plurality of populisms. It highlights the variety of constitutional and extraconstitutional strategies that populists have used to undermine the institutional fabric of liberal democracy and investigates how ruling populists responded to the Covid-19 crisis. Outlining the rise of populisms and their governing styles, Wojciech Sadurski focuses on what populists in power do, rather than what they say. Confronting one of the most pressing concerns of international politics, this book offers a vibrant, contemporary account of modern populisms and, significantly, considers what we can do to fight back.

Populism is on the rise across the globe. Authoritarian populist leaders have taken over and solidified their control over many countries. Their power has been cemented during the global coronavirus pandemic, though perhaps the defeat of populist-in-chief Donald Trump in the 2020 US presidential election (despite his continuing protestations to the contrary) has seen the start of the waning of this phenomenon? In the UK Brexit is 'done'; Britain is firmly out of the EU; Covid is vaccinated against; and Boris Johnson has a huge parliamentary majority and, despite never-ending problems, of his own and others' making, his grip on power with a parliamentary majority of more than 80, still seems secure. Meanwhile culture wars continue to rage. How has media, worldwide, contributed, fulled or fought this populism. Cheerleaders? Critics? Supplicants? This book examines those questions in 360 degrees with a distinguished cast of authors from journalism and academia.

Master's Thesis from the year 2021 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: Miscellaneous, grade: 1,0, University of Tubingen (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät), language: English, abstract: Against the backdrop of autocratic opportunism and illiberal behavior during Covid-19, there is a large debate in the field of populism and democracy research about whether populist parties and leaders are strengthened or weakened by the Covid-19 crisis. However, due to the newness of the current crisis, the justification for one side or the other is based more on theoretical assumptions than on reliable empirical research, while the existing empirical studies refer exclusively to the first wave of the pandemic. These examinations often imply that populists tend to benefit from the crisis, since their approval rates either slightly increased during the first wave or remained on the same level. However, as the second and third waves unfold in autumn 2020 and winter/spring 2021, a new picture emerges. Right-wing populist governments in Europe on average appear to be losing public support, although this is not the case in non-populist-governed EU member states. This phenomenon seems puzzling, since it would be more likely to expect that populist governments would gain public support through the crisis. This conclusion not only derives from the “hour of the executive”, but also to the observation that societies in times of crisis attribute a stronger leadership role to their government and express more allegiance than in ordinary times – a finding also known as the "rally-round-the-flag" effect. This would help right-wing populists to present themselves as strong and decisive crisis leaders, which could strengthen their power and popularity as authoritarian leaders. Against this background, the argument is made that the illiberal behavior of right-wing populists, such as authoritarian leadership, corruption, and discriminatory measures, which is assumed constitutive of their behavior, leads to a decline in public support under the conditions of acute threat. Since the relationship between illiberal behavior by right-wing populist governments during Covid-19 and public support has not been systematically investigated yet, this thesis aims to take a first step in this direction by taking a more nuanced view to gain new empirical knowledge regarding why, when, and how a loss of public support for right-wing populist governments can be observed during the first, second, and third wave of the pandemic. The results support the hypothesis while alternative explanations such as containment measures or the economic situation tend to be less relevant.

This book examines different dimensions of digital communication and populism in times of the COVID-19 pandemic. While doing so, it discusses views, opinions, and research results regarding the conditions, experiences, constraints, benefits, and challenges related to the topic - not only using theoretical and methodological approaches but also practical perspectives. The COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic significantly accelerated the technological revolution presenting many social, economic, and political challenges, as it pushed the world into cyberspace to ensure social distancing. At the same time, many populist protests expressed in the digital public sphere massively gained importance during the lockdowns. As a result, one of the most significant consequences of using electronic tools is not only greater e-participation of citizens, but - especially evident through elections during a pandemic - even greater transfer of political communication and election campaigns into the space of new media. The book broadly analyses various contexts of digitalization of communication processes and populist politics from both theoretical and empirical perspectives in various case studies on the digitalization of information, communication, or participation processes during the COVID-19 pandemic in selected European countries and beyond. This book will appeal to students, researchers, and scholars of political communication, political science, electoral studies, digital politics, and democracy, as well as policy-makers interested in a better understanding of digital communication and populism during the Covid-19 pandemic.

What comes after neoliberalism? In these times of health emergency, economic collapse, populist anger and ecological threat, societies are forced to turn inward in search of protection. Neoliberalism, the ideology that presided over decades of market globalisation, is on trial, while state intervention is making a spectacular comeback amid lockdowns, mass vaccination programmes, deficit spending and climate planning. This is the Great Recoil, the era when the neo-statist endopolitics of national sovereignty, economic protection and democratic control overrides the neoliberal exopolitics of free markets, labour flexibility and business opportunity. Looking back to the role of the state in Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hegel, Gramsci and Polanyi, and exploring the discourses, electoral programs and class blocs of the nationalist right and socialist left, Paolo Gerbaudo fleshes out the contours of the different statisms and populisms that inform contemporary politics. The central issue in dispute is what mission the post-pandemic state should pursue: whether it should protect native workers from immigration and the rich against redistributive demands, as proposed by the right’s authoritarian protectionism; or reassert social security and popular sovereignty against the rapacity of financial and tech elites, as advocated by the left’s social protectivism. Only by addressing the widespread sense of exposure and vulnerability may socialists turn the present phase of involution into an opportunity for social transformation.