Power Concentration In World Politics

This book discusses the role of space, time and cyclical behavior in world politics. More specifically, the political-economic role of lead economies – the world’s most innovative economies for finite periods of time – in world politics. These represent unusual concentrations of new technologies, energy sources, and military capabilities of global reach that play disproportional roles in the conduct of international affairs and the provision of limited governance at the most macro level. They also possess close links to economic growth and intense conflict. The book describes the economic, military and political processes behind the systemic leadership of a state at the international level. It also highlights the economic preconditions of systemic leadership, such as economic monopoly of new technologies and energy, which underlie the system leader’s material advantage over others. Analyzing lead economies and the evolution of power over a number of centuries, the author demonstrates how disruptions wrought by the emergence of new technologies and energy sources are partly responsible for global conflicts. This book appeals to international relations scholars as well as anyone interested in the political economy of systemic leadership, growth, and conflict in world politics.

Agencies and policies instituted to streamline Ottawa's planning process instead concentrate power in the hands of the Prime Minister, more powerful in Canadian politics than the U.S. President in America. Riveting, startling, and indispensable reading.

Since the beginning of organized societies, power and leadership have operated in human hierarchies, which are concentrating power in an accelerating manner, according to the comprehensive analysis of Dr. Anders Corr in his book The Concentration of Power: Institutionalization, Hierarchy & Hegemony. “This sweeping study belongs next to Niall Ferguson and Jared Diamond in our understanding of how the world works and how it can work better.” — James Kraska, Harvard Law School “A must-read for legislators, military strategists, leading academics, regulators, and anyone interested in the existential threat that the concentration of economic, political, and informational power in an illiberal country like China creates for the leading democracies of the world.” - Kyle Bass, Billionaire investor “…erudite and realistic appraisal of 21st century power politics.” — Alex Gray, former Chief of Staff, White House National Security Council From The Book: “China’s influence in US politics has coincided with the industrialization of China, at the expense of a deindustrializing US. Global corporations, to which US politicians answer, fled high wages and environmental regulations in the US for low wages and lax environmental standards in China. Now, the US is paying the price and might not recover sufficiently to defend itself against China’s growing military. The strategic ambitions of one nation can and have upset the United Nations and the balance between powers. Now the Western world must understand the imminent threats from the hegemonic ambitions of China.” Hierarchy is the “institutionalization of power,” according to Dr. Corr’s The Concentration of Power, an institutionalization that is concentrating and accelerating over historical time, from prehistory to the present. Corr develops twelve historical theories and applies them to the greatest conflicts of the past and present, including during the age of empires, the present competition between superpowers such as the United States and China, as well as conflicts between the nation-state and emerging supranational powers such as the European Union and United Nations. Corr’s theories apply to domestic politics as well, as illustrated by the evolution of conflicts between communism, fascism, and liberal democracy. Corr argues that the concentration of power acts as a ratchet. It concentrates when conditions are ripe, and force is applied. Due to mechanisms like subsidies, transfers, and corruption, however, power does not easily return to an unconcentrated state when conditions are not ripe. This dynamic dynamic of the ratchet drives international and domestic concentration of power, with no apparent end other than a global illiberal hegemon at some point in the future. In sum, The Concentration of Power is a short history of the world, from the beginning to what the evidence indicates should be its logical conclusion. From politics to unions, associations, corporations, and the military, Dr. Corr analyzes them and provides readers with a sense of what the world could face if we allow hierarchy to continue its historical development toward global and illiberal hegemony. Be it in China, the United States, or the European Union, all are vying for global influence and the utilization of the structure of the United Nations to promote either the principles of human rights and democracy, or in the case of Beijing, the exact opposite. This clash between democracy and autocracy on a global level could turn into a final war of world proportions. No greater stakes have ever existed in world history.

Consisting of a selection of Keohane's most recent essays, this absorbing book address such core issues as interdependence, institutions, the development of international law, globalization and global governance.

Joseph Nye coined the term "soft power" in the late 1980s. It is now used frequently—and often incorrectly—by political leaders, editorial writers, and academics around the world. So what is soft power? Soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade. Whereas hard power—the ability to coerce—grows out of a country's military or economic might, soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. Hard power remains crucial in a world of states trying to guard their independence and of non-state groups willing to turn to violence. It forms the core of the Bush administration's new national security strategy. But according to Nye, the neo-conservatives who advise the president are making a major miscalculation: They focus too heavily on using America's military power to force other nations to do our will, and they pay too little heed to our soft power. It is soft power that will help prevent terrorists from recruiting supporters from among the moderate majority. And it is soft power that will help us deal with critical global issues that require multilateral cooperation among states. That is why it is so essential that America better understands and applies our soft power. This book is our guide.

This book explores the effects and consequences of major global power and major regional power status attribution on the foreign policies of states striving for such status and the consequences of status differentiation for the international system and the post-Cold War international order.

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.