Psychoanalysis As Science

The perennial interest in psychoanalysis shows no signs of abating and the longevity of psychoanalytic theory is seen in the varied extensions and elaborations of Freudian thinking in the fields of neuroscience and cognitive theory. Nevertheless, the scientific standing of psychoanalysis has long been questioned and developments in the fields of the philosophy of science and psychology require a fresh assessment of the scientific standing of psychoanalysis. While there are a range of views on the topic of whether psychoanalysis is in fact scientific, any satisfactory approach to understanding mind and behaviour requires an approach that is at once both philosophic and scientific. Accordingly, to even approach the question regarding the scientific nature of psychoanalysis, a foundation comprising a sophisticated conceptual and philosophical framework is required. This volume represents the junction where philosophy, science, and psychoanalysis meet and presents arguments critical and supportive of the scientific standing of psychoanalysis.

This book records one of the few times in the United States that a distinguished group of psychoanalysts met with an equally distinguished group of philosophers of science in a free, critical interchange of view on the scientific status of the field.

In his Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique, Adolf Grunbaum claimed that the arguments supporting psychoanalytic hypotheses are both logically invalid and unsound. They are invalid because they violate the cannons of inductive elimination, and unsound because the clinical data is contaminated by the suggestive influence of the analyst.In a spirited defence of psychoanalysis, the author asserts that Grunbaum's argument over suggestibility is not supported by textual evidence and gives her own formulation of Freud's argument to show how the problem of suggestibility can be dealt with. To counter the charge of the invalidity of the repression argument, the author addresses the two specific objections of Grunbaum: first, that repression can be a maintaining rather than an originating cause of neurotic symptoms, and, second, that by eliminating rival candidates it is possible to formulate a valid argument for repression aetiology. This book is a must-read for all those interested in the stature and reputation of psychoanalysis in the scientific world.

As a discipline, psychoanalysis began at the interface of mind and brain and has always been about those most basic questions of biology and psychology: loving, hating, what brings us together as lovers, parents, and friends and what pulls us apart in conflict and hatred. These are the enduring mysteries of life and especially of early development-how young children learn the language of the social world with its intertwined biological, genetic, and experiential roots and how infants translate thousands of intimate moments with their parents into a genuine, intuitive, emotional connection to other persons. Basic developmental neuroscience and psychology has also of late turned to these basic questions of affiliation: of how it is that as humans our most basic concerns are about finding, establishing, preserving, and mourning our relationships. These areas in broad strokes are the substance of mind and brain, and the last decade has brought much new science to the biology of attachment, love, and aggression.

This study is a philosophical critique of the foundations of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis. As such, it also takes cognizance of his claim that psychoanalysis has the credentials of a natural science. It shows that the reasoning on which Freud rested the major hypotheses of his edifice was fundamentally flawed, even if the probity of the clinical observations he adduced were not in question. Moreover, far from deserving to be taken at face value, clinical data from the psychoanalytic treatment setting are themselves epistemically quite suspect.

This work continues the debate on whether psychoanalysis can be treated as a cognitive science, providing an epistemological rationale for the field's scientific validity, as well as an ethical rationale for its humanism. The authors reject the humanist and empiricist constructions of various theories as "foundationalist," and develop a philosophical foundation which they term "cognitivist." They address issues related to social science and society, and to psychotherapeutic research. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR