Psychology And Metaphysics

The research literature on causal attribution and social cognition generally consists of many fascinating but fragmented and superficial phenomena. These can only be understood as an organised whole by elucidating the fundamental psychological assumptions on which they depend. Psychological Metaphysics is an exploration of the most basic and important assumptions in the psychological construction of reality, with the aim of showing what they are, how they originate, and what they are there for. Peter White proposes that people basically understand causation in terms of stable, special powers of things operating to produce effects under suitable conditions. This underpins an analysis of people's understanding of causal processes in the physical world, and of human action. In making a radical break with the Heiderian tradition, Psychological Metaphysics suggests that causal attribution is in the service of the person's practical concerns and any interest in accuracy or understanding is subservient to this. Indeed, a notion of regularity in the world is of no more than minor importance, and social cognition is not a matter of cognitive mechanisms or processes but of cultural ways of thinking imposed upon tacit, unquestioned, universal assumptions.

This book pursues the very first use of the term “psychology”, which is traced back to 1520. The appearance of the term was not as a part of philosophy. Thus, the main hypothesis of this book is that psychology from the very beginning was a stranger to philosophy. It demonstrates that even Aristotle used his thesis on the soul to delineate philosophy from psychological aspects. It is therefore suggested that psychological wisdom and knowledge has been retained and in popular culture as long as humans have reflected upon themselves. There were, however, several reasons for why psychology appeared as a part of philosophy at around the year 1600. One important factor was Humanism, which among other things had challenged Aristotelian logic. Another important movement was Protestantism. Luther’s emphasis on the need to confess one’s sin, led to a certain interest to explore the human nature. His slogan, “the scripture alone” represented an attack on the close relationship that had existed between theology and philosophy. Yet when philosophy was thrown out of theology, it was left without the basic theological tenets that had guided philosophical speculations for centuries in Europe. Hence, this book pursues how philosophy gradually adopts and includes psychological aspects to rebuild the foundation for philosophy. This culminates partly with the British empiricists. Yet they did not apply the term psychology. It was the German and partly ignored philosopher Christian Wolff, who opened up modern understanding of psychology with the publication of Psychologia empirica in 1732. This publication had a tremendous impact on the enlightenment in the modern Europe.

"This book is an essay in the speculative treatment of certain problems, suggested but not usually discussed in the course of a thorough empirical study of mental phenomena. Inasmuch as these problems all relate to the real nature and actual performances and relations of the human mind, the essay may properly be called metaphysical. Let it be confessed, then, that the author comes forward with a treatise in metaphysics--in the more special meaning of that term. I think, however, that in spite of the marked disfavor into which all metaphysics has fallen in certain quarters, no detailed apology for asking readers for such a treatise need be offered in its Preface. Indeed, the first two chapters of the book are occupied in showing how inevitable is the demand which the science of psychology makes for a further philosophical discussion of all its principal problems. The nature of psychology, however, and the nature of philosophy, and especially the nature of the relations existing between the two, are such as to make it undesirable, if not impossible, to consider in one book all the metaphysical problems which this empirical science suggests. Indeed, the whole sphere of philosophical study scarcely does more than this. A somewhat but not wholly arbitrary selection of problems had, therefore, to be made; and their detailed discussion was then brought under the one title, "Philosophy of Mind." The reasons for the selection are made sufficiently clear in the course of the discussion itself"--Preface. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).

The research literature on causal attribution and social cognition generally consists of many fascinating but fragmented and superficial phenomena. These can only be understood as an organised whole by elucidating the fundamental psychological assumptions on which they depend. Originally published in 1993, Psychological Metaphysics is an exploration of the most basic and important assumptions in the psychological construction of reality, with the aim of showing what they are, how they originate, and what they are there for. Peter A. White proposes that people basically understand causation in terms of stable, specific powers of things operating to produce effects under suitable conditions. This underpins an analysis of people’s understanding of causal processes in the physical word and of human action, which makes a radical break with the Heiderian tradition. Psychological Metaphysics suggests that causal attribution is in the service of the person’s practical concerns and any interest in accuracy or understanding is subservient to this. A notion of regularity in the world is of no more than minor importance in causal attribution, and social cognition is not so much a matter of cognitive mechanisms or processes but more of cultural ways of thinking imposed upon tacit, unquestioned, universal assumptions. Psychological Metaphysics incorporates not only research and theory in social cognition and developmental psychology, but also philosophy and the history of ideas. It will be challenging to everyone interested in how we try to understand the world.

THIS book is an essay in the speculative treatment of certain problems, suggested but not usually discussed in the course of a thorough empirical study of mental phenomena. Inasmuch as these problems all relate to the real nature and actual performances and relations of the human mind, the essay nay properly be called metaphysical. Let it be confessed, then, that the author comes forward with a treatise in metaphysics, - in the more special meaning of that term. I think, however, that in spite of the marked disfavor into which all metaphysics has fallen in certain quarters, no detailed apology for asking readers for such a treatise need be offered in its Preface. Indeed, the first two chapters of the book are occupied in showing how inevitable is the demand which the science of psychology makes for a further philosophical discussion of all its principal problems. If, then, this demand is not made perfectly clear hy the more detailed discussion which follows, it would be quite use-less to put it forward unsupported, at the beginning of my task, in the hope of producing a favorable first impression upon reluctant intelligences. "No one whose peace of mind is sure to be disturbed by any attempt, however carried out, at this form of reflective thinking should venture beyond the titlepa-ge and table of contents of this volume. On the other hand, however, I wish to be held res-ponsible for two things which are required in order to entitle to respect every tre-atise of a similar character. These are, first, the statement of the facts and laws, scientifically established, to which the speculative discussion constantly refers for it own grounds in experience. And for metaphysics which has no foundations in incontestable experience, I have as little respect as has any one. But besides this constant appeal to facts and to laws empirically established, sound reasoning is indispensable for the derivation of acceptable conclusions in any metaphysical enterprise. Any reader, or critic, therefore, who will point out violations of either of these two requirements, will be entitled to grateful recognition for his service, no less by the author than by the readers of this volume. A few words concerning the relations which this book sustains to preceding works by the same author will be helpful for its better understanding. In some sort the entire volume may be regarded as in continuation of a series of works I on psychology, or the Science of mental phenomena. This science, which, as a science, is, and ever must remain, chiefly descriptive, starts many inquiries regar-ding the real nature and relations to the external World..""

This book has a future because it provides a better understanding about timeless matters that never fade away. It makes us aware of determinism and explains the thinking process of the instances that are located in human beings. Furthermore, Classical Metaphysics, Philosophy, and Psychology helps making the difference between objectivity and subjectivity which, in some fields, is not easy to find and gives us the opportunity to diminish and solve the conflicts that erupt inside of us. Finally, it introduces a knowledge that can no longer be disassociated from our hightech world

Excerpt from Philosophy of Mind: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Psychology This book is an essay in the speculative treatment of certain problems, suggested but not usually discussed in the course of a thorough empirical study of mental phenomena. Inasmuch as these problems all relate to the real nature and actual performances and relations of the human mind, the essay may properly be called metaphysical. Let it be confessed, then, that the author comes forward with a treatise in metaphysics, - in the more special meaning of that term. I think, however, that in spite of the marked disfavor into which all metaphysics has fallen in certain quarters, no detailed apology for asking readers for such a treatise need be offered in its Preface. Indeed, the first two chapters of the book are occupied in showing how inevitable is the demand which the science of psychology makes for a further philosophical discussion of all its principal problems. If, then, this demand is not made perfectly clear by the more detailed discussion which follows, it would be quite useless to put it forward unsupported, at the beginning of my task, in the hope of producing a favorable first impression upon reluctant intelligences. As to the kind of metaphysics which it is designed to offer, two or three preliminary remarks seem important. And, first of all, it is to be open and undisguised. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.