Public Credit Rating Agencies

In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, there have been many criticisms weighed against private credit rating agencies. Many claim they only exacerbate financial market volatility by issuing faulty public statements, ratings warnings, and downgrades. This instability increases the uncertainty in business environments and weakens the pace of business investment. Their rating changes also prompt national governments to reduce their spending at a time when fiscal expenditures are crucial for economic recovery. Public Credit Rating Agencies argues for the creation of national public credit rating agencies, offering the first in-depth discussion of their implied role and function operating alongside private agencies. Schroeder provides an up-to-date overview of the ratings industry and the government bodies that monitor its activities. She suggests that the proper implementation of public credit rating agencies will promote the stability of lending, further development and adaptation of new technology, and increase labor productivity and the profitability of new investment in businesses. Finally, this book clarifies the inconsistencies that have surfaced between public budgeting and a rating agency's evaluation of national budgets.

Credit rating agencies play a critical role in capital markets, guiding the asset allocation of institutional investors as private capital moves freely around the world in search of the best trade-off between risk and return. However, they have also been strongly criticised for failing to spot the Asian crisis in the early 1990s, the Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat collapses in the early 2000s and finally for their ratings of subprime-related structured finance instruments and their role in the current financial crisis. This book is a guide to ratings, the ratings industry and the mechanics and economics of obtaining a rating. It sheds light on the role that the agencies play in the international financial markets. It avoids the sensationalist approach often associated with studies of rating scandals and the financial crisis, and instead provides an objective and critical analysis of the business of ratings. The book will be of practical use to any individual who has to deal with ratings and the ratings industry in their day-to-day job. Reviews "Rating agencies fulfil an important role in the capital markets, but given their power, they are frequently the object of criticism. Some of it is justified but most of it portrays a lack of understanding of their business. In their book The Rating Agencies and their Credit Ratings, Herwig and Patricia Langohr provide an excellent economic background to the role of rating agencies and also a thorough understanding of their business and the problems they face. I recommend this book to all those who have an interest in this somewhat arcane but extremely important area." -Robin Monro-Davies, Former CEO, Fitch Ratings. "At a time of unprecedented public and political scrutiny of the effectiveness and indeed the basic business model of the Credit Rating industry, and heightened concerns regarding the transparency and accountability of the leading agencies, this book provides a commendably comprehensive overview, and should provide invaluable assistance in the ongoing debate." -Rupert Atkinson, Managing Director, Head of Credit Advisory Group, Morgan Stanley and member of the SIFMA Rating Agency Task Force "The Langohrs have provided useful information in a field where one frequently finds only opinions or misconceptions. They supply a firm base from which to understand changes now underway. A well-read copy of this monograph should be close to the desk of every investor, issuer and financial regulator, legislator or commentator." -John Grout, Policy and Technical Director, The Association of Corporate Treasurers

øŠAline Darbellay analyzes the obvious system relevance of credit rating agencies in depth and assesses the possible options for regulatory responses to this systemic issue. Thereby, the book is based on a fruitful comparative legal approach and formul

The global crisis revealed that credit rating agencies (CRAs) are capable of bringing about potential distortions in the financial sector, thereby resulting in a reduction in market confidence which, in turn, influences negotiations and expectations. CRAs need to be held accountable for lack of transparency and inaccurate ratings, however the existing regulatory framework does not secure adequate investor protection. This book provides a new and important contribution to research in the area, at a crucial time in the debate around financial regulation and investment regimes.

We explore through both an economics and regulatory lens the frictions associated with credit rating agencies in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While ratings and other public signals are an efficient response to scale economies in information production, these also can discourage independent due diligence and be a source of systemic risk. Though Dodd-Frank pulls back on the regulatory use of ratings, it also promotes greater regulation of the rating agencies. We highlight the diverse underlying views towards these competing approaches to reducing systemic risk. Our monograph also discusses the subtle contrasts between credit rating agencies and other types of due diligence providers, such as auditors, analysts and proxy-voting advisors. We discuss the frictions associated with paying for information in the context of credit ratings; while the issuer-pay model has been identified as a major issue because of potential conflict of interests, we argue that it has several advantages over the investor-pay model in promoting market transparency. We develop a formal reputation model to explore the underlying nature of rating inflation and how the reputational trade-off is affected by various aspects of the rating process such as regulatory constraints, the fee structure, asymmetric information between issuers and investors and the extent of competition among rating agencies. The monograph also uses our illustrative framework to highlight tension between rating accuracy and economic efficiency when ratings influence project value in the presence of feedback effects. We discuss how selective disclosure of ratings by the issuer distorts the distribution of observed ratings. Selection also provides an alternative explanation for why solicited (purchased) ratings exceed unsolicited (complimentary) ratings and helps interpret the greater SEC support for unsolicited ratings in recent years as illustrating the theory of the second best. We explore the impact of greater competition on welfare, building upon a variety of frameworks. Our analysis points to several ways in which ratings matter as well as techniques for documenting such effects.

Credit rating agencies play a powerful and contentious role in the governance of global financial markets. Introducing an original framework for delegating political authority to private actors, this book explains common trends in the regulatory use of private ratings for public purposes and analyzes regulatory changes after the Financial Crisis.

This title is a guide to ratings, the ratings industry, and the mechanics and economics of obtaining a rating. It sheds light on the role that the agencies play in the international financial markets.