Reasoning And Public Health New Ways Of Coping With Uncertainty

This book argues that in order to be truly effective, public health must embrace a group of reasoning strategies that have traditionally been characterized as informal fallacies. It will be demonstrated that these strategies can facilitate judgements about complex public health issues in contexts of uncertainty. The book explains how scientists and lay people routinely resort to the use of these strategies during consideration of public health problems. Although these strategies are not deductively valid, they are nevertheless rationally warranted procedures. Public health professionals must have a sound understanding of these cognitive strategies in order to engage the public and achieve their public health goals. The book draws upon public health issues as wide ranging as infectious diseases, food safety and the potential impact on human health of new technologies. It examines reasoning in the context of these issues within a large-scale, questionnaire-based survey of nearly 900 members of the public in the UK. In addition, several philosophical themes run throughout the book, including the nature of uncertainty, scientific knowledge and inquiry. The complexity of many public health problems demands an approach to reasoning that cannot be accommodated satisfactorily within a general thinking skills framework. This book shows that by developing an awareness of these reasoning strategies, scientists and members of the public can have a more productive engagement with public health problems.

This textbook examines the ways in which arguments may be used and abused in medicine and health. The central claim is that a group of arguments known as the informal fallacies – including slippery slope arguments, fear appeal, and the argument from ignorance – undertake considerable work in medical and health contexts, and that they can in fact be rationally warranted ways of understanding complex topics, contrary to the views of many earlier philosophers and logicians. Modern medicine and healthcare require lay people to engage with increasingly complex decisions in areas such as immunization, lifestyle and dietary choices, and health screening. Many of the so-called fallacies of reasoning can also be viewed as cognitive heuristics or short-cuts which help individuals make decisions in these contexts. Using features such as learning objectives, case studies and end-of-unit questions, this textbook examines topical issues and debates in all areas of medicine and health, including antibiotic use and resistance, genetic engineering, euthanasia, addiction to prescription opioids, and the legalization of cannabis. It will be useful to students of critical thinking, reasoning, logic, argumentation, rhetoric, communication, health humanities, philosophy and linguistics.

Competence in scientific reasoning is one of the most valued outcomes of secondary and higher education. However, there is a need for a deeper understanding of and further research into the roles of domain-general and domain-specific knowledge in such reasoning. This book explores the functions and limitations of domain-general conceptions of reasoning and argumentation, the substantial differences that exist between the disciplines, and the role of domain-specific knowledge and epistemologies. Featuring chapters and commentaries by widely cited experts in the learning sciences, educational psychology, science education, history education, and cognitive science, Scientific Reasoning and Argumentation presents new perspectives on a decades-long debate about the role of domain-specific knowledge and its contribution to the development of more general reasoning abilities.

The first reference on rationality that integrates accounts from psychology and philosophy, covering descriptive and normative theories from both disciplines. Both analytic philosophy and cognitive psychology have made dramatic advances in understanding rationality, but there has been little interaction between the disciplines. This volume offers the first integrated overview of the state of the art in the psychology and philosophy of rationality. Written by leading experts from both disciplines, The Handbook of Rationality covers the main normative and descriptive theories of rationality—how people ought to think, how they actually think, and why we often deviate from what we can call rational. It also offers insights from other fields such as artificial intelligence, economics, the social sciences, and cognitive neuroscience. The Handbook proposes a novel classification system for researchers in human rationality, and it creates new connections between rationality research in philosophy, psychology, and other disciplines. Following the basic distinction between theoretical and practical rationality, the book first considers the theoretical side, including normative and descriptive theories of logical, probabilistic, causal, and defeasible reasoning. It then turns to the practical side, discussing topics such as decision making, bounded rationality, game theory, deontic and legal reasoning, and the relation between rationality and morality. Finally, it covers topics that arise in both theoretical and practical rationality, including visual and spatial thinking, scientific rationality, how children learn to reason rationally, and the connection between intelligence and rationality.

In 1986, the emergence of a novel brain disease in British cattle presented a unique challenge to scientists. How that challenge was addressed has been the subject of a public inquiry and numerous academic studies conducted to date. However, none of these investigations has sought to examine the reasoning of scientists during this critical period in the public health of the UK. Using concepts and techniques in informal logic, argumentation and fallacy theory, this study reconstructs and evaluates the reasoning of scientists in the ten-year period between 1986 and 1996. Specifically, a form of presumptive reasoning is described in which extensive use is made of arguments traditionally identified as informal fallacies. In the context of the adverse epistemic conditions that confronted scientists during the BSE epidemic, these arguments were anything but fallacious, serving instead to confer a number of epistemic gains upon scientific inquiry. This book argues for a closer integration of philosophy with public health science, an integration that is exemplified by the case of scientific reasoning during the BSE affair. It will therefore be of interest to advanced students, academics, researchers and professionals in the areas of public health science and epidemiology, as well as philosophical disciplines such as informal logic, argumentation and fallacy theory and epistemology.

This book provides an overview of the current research in the interdisciplinary area of personal assistants (PA) and cognitively inspired systems. It discusses the most relevant topics in this highly diversified domain, like reasoning, health, personalization, robotics, and ethical and social issues. Personal assistants (PA) are a relatively new concept directed at people with cognitive or physical disabilities, and is expanding to include complex platforms such as sensors, actuators, monitoring abilities and decision processes. Designed for a general audience, it is also of interest to undergraduates, graduates and researchers involved with intelligent systems, ambient intelligence or ambient assisted living. The content goes from an introduction of the field (aimed at undergraduates and a general readership) to specific and complex architectures (aimed at graduates and researchers).

This book is a printed edition of the Special Issue "Sustainable Business Models" that was published in Sustainability