Responsibility And Criminal Liability

autonomy principally in tenns of the agent's conscious choice of ends or conduct. From this, the cognitivist emphasis on mental states and their contents naturally follows. The presence of specified mental states, as signifying agent choice, thus becomes the hallmark of responsible conduct. Capacities model theorists, by contrast, interpret personal autonomy and agent responsibility in tenns of the looser notion of 'control'. From this perspective, conscious choosing is but one (highly responsible) instance of such control, and the presence or absence of mental states is primarily relevant to detennining degrees of responsibility. The examination of these two models occupies the bulk of this manuscript. Exploration of the capacities model and criticism of the orthodox view also generate treatment of legal issues such as the use of negligence liability, the nature of criminal omissions, the character of various legal defenses, and so on. Chapters 2 and 3 set out some of the thematic arguments outlined above and introduce tenninology and useful distinctions. Chapters 4 through 7 provide substantive analyses of agent responsibility and of standards of criminal liability. In these chapters, I argue for the comparative superiority of the capacities model of responsibility and offer recommendations for changes in current legal conceptions and standards of liability. Each chapter centers on an element of individual responsibility and related legal concerns. The final chapter, Chapter 8, comprises an overview of the integrated theory of responsibility and liability and its comparison with the traditional view.

Publsihed in 1998, this book examines the relationship between responsibility and criminal liability through an analysis of provocation and related criminal defences. It begins by identifying fundamental questions about the role of justifications and excuses in the criminal law as they emerge from the discussion of philosophical theories of responsibility. Following an outline of the distinction between murder and manslaughter and its history, the basic doctrinal issues relating to the nature and rationale of provocation and other partial defences are then identified and discussed in depth, together with the circumstances under which these defences can be raised. Although the analysis focuses, for the most part, on English law, the references to other legal systems which are included in the work add an important comparative perspective to the discussion of the issues. The book should be of special interest to criminal lawyers, legal theorists and students interested in comparative criminal law and jurisprudence.

In this long-awaited book, Antony Duff offers a new perspective on the structures of criminal law and criminal liability. His starting point is a distinction between responsibility (understood as answerability) and liability, and a conception of responsibility as relational and practice-based. This focus on responsibility, as a matter of being answerable to those who have the standing to call one to account, throws new light on a range of questions in criminal law theory: on the question of criminalisation, which can now be cast as the question of what we should have to answer for, and to whom, under the threat of criminal conviction and punishment; on questions about the criminal trial, as a process through which defendants are called to answer, and about the conditions (bars to trial) given which a trial would be illegitimate; on questions about the structure of offences, the distinction between offences and defences, and the phenomena of strict liability and strict responsibility; and on questions about the structures of criminal defences. The net result is not a theory of criminal law; but it is an account of the structure of criminal law as an institution through which a liberal polity defines a realm of public wrongdoing, and calls those who perpetrate (or are accused of perpetrating) such wrongs to account.

Anchored by the normative framework, this book aims to clarify the basis for individual criminal liability for persons who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes. The objective of this monograph is to clarify the rules to enable international courts and tribunals to identify the extent to which individual criminal liability attaches to the financing of core crimes, as well as the legal basis for such liability. By clarifying the criminal liability of individual who finance entities that perpetrate core crimes, this book also seeks to clarify the mental elements of the mode of liability of aiding and abetting. This is achieved through a thorough analysis of the applicable rules in the international arena, as well as through the comparative analysis.

This book offers a unique comparison between state and individual responsibility for international crimes and examines the theories that can explain the relationship between these two regimes. The study provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the relevant international practice from the standpoint of both international criminal law, and in particular the case law of international criminal tribunals, and state responsibility. The author shows the various connections and issues arising from the parallel establishment of state and individual responsibility for the commission of the same international crimes. These connections indicate a growing need to better co-ordinate these regimes of international responsibility. The author maintains that a general conception, according to which state and individual responsibility are two separate sets of secondary rules attached to the breach of the same primary norms, can help to solve the various issues relating to this dual responsibility. This conception of the complementarity between state and individual responsibility justifies co-ordination and consistent application of these two different regimes, each of which aims to foster compliance with the most important obligations owed to the international community as a whole.

This classic collection of essays, first published in 1968, has had an enduring impact on academic and public debates about criminal responsibility and criminal punishment. Forty years on, its arguments are as powerful as ever. H.L.A. Hart offers an alternative to retributive thinking about criminal punishment that nevertheless preserves the central distinction between guilt and innocence. He also provides an account of criminal responsibility that links the distinction between guilt and innocence closely to the ideal of the rule of law, and thereby attempts to by-pass unnerving debates about free will and determinism. Always engaged with live issues of law and public policy, Hart makes difficult philosophical puzzles accessible and immediate to a wide range of readers. For this new edition, otherwise a reproduction of the original, John Gardner adds an introduction engaging critically with Hart's arguments, and explaining the continuing importance of Hart's ideas in spite of the intervening revival of retributive thinking in both academic and policy circles. Unavailable for ten years, the new edition of Punishment and Responsibility makes available again the central text in the field for a new generation of academics, students and professionals engaged in criminal justice and penal policy.

In the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, major offences committed by individuals have been subject to progressive systematisation in the framework of international criminal law. Proposals developed within the context of the League of Nations coordinated individual liability and State responsibility. By contrast, international law as codified after World War II in the framework of the United Nations embodies a neat divide between individual criminal liability and State aggravated responsibility. However, conduct of State organs and agents generates dual liability. Through a critical analysis of key international rules, the book assesses whether the divisive approach to individual and State responsibility is normatively consistent. Contemporary situations, such as the humanitarian crises in Syria and Libya, 9/11 and the Iraq wars demonstrate that the matter still gives rise to controversy: a set of systemic problems emerge. The research focuses on the substantive elements of major offences, notably agression, genocide, core war crimes, core crimes against humanity and terrorism, as well as relevant procedural implications. The book is a useful resource for practitioners, policymakers, academics, students, researchers and anyone interested in international law and politics.

This book offers an in-depth study of the command responsibility doctrine, pursuant to which military commanders and civilian leaders can be held responsible for the crimes committed by their subordinates that they failed to prevent or punish. This form of responsibility has gained much attention in the last years; however, it still presents several open questions and critical difficulties arise in its application. The author traces the roots of such criminal responsibility, from its military origins to its first appearances in international case law after World War II. Particular attention is given to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals, which extensively elaborated on the issue, and to the provision of Article 28 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. The book provides a systematic analysis of command responsibility, outlining its different forms and finding a proper role for it within the complex net of responsibilities that connotes the commission of international crimes. This book is an important contribution to the literature and worldwide discussion on command responsibility and therefore highly recommended to scholars of international law, criminal law and international criminal law as well as to all practitioners (judges, legal assistants, prosecutors, defence counsels) working at or with international tribunals, experts in the military field, investigators dealing with international crimes, NGOs and journalists. Chantal Meloni is working as a Researcher at the Criminal Law Department of the UniversitàdegliStudi of Milan, Italy. Since several years she specializes in international criminal law. She spent long research periods abroad, in particular at the Humboldt Universität of Berlin in Germany. She also worked at the International Criminal Court as a Legal Assistant in Chambers.