Responsibility For Negation Of International Crimes

History is no longer the exclusive domain of historians, but is now often used as a tool for politics. It is not without reason that the term “state historical policy” has been coined, which must be a kind of aberration for those who believed that the role of history is to objectively determine the course of events. The fact is, however, that the distortion of historical facts, the concealment of crimes is now part of the “information war”. Therefore, new acts of public international law, EU law and national law are introduced in order to combat public condonation, denial or gross trivialisation of the core international crimes which are certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia. States have to determine for themselves how they understand “denial” or “gross trivialization”, which may lead to abuse. In many cases, when introducing criminal law provisions, States wish to decree historical truth, to establish once and for all the general facts and determine who was the victim, and who was the perpetrator. This does not have to be the result of bad will, but of a desire to exclude the possibility of nuance, which could turn into dangerous trivialisation. The aim of this publication is to specify the reasons for holding accountable for denial of international crimes, indicate legal obligations in this respect, look at the Polish case, both in terms of criminal provisions (partly repealed) and standards of a civil law nature, and compare the Polish regulation with the legal systems of other states, which were chosen because of the region (Central and Eastern Europe) or due to having current problems with denial of crimes or doubts about prosecution on this account.

This book offers a unique comparison between state and individual responsibility for international crimes and examines the theories that can explain the relationship between these two regimes. The study provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the relevant international practice from the standpoint of both international criminal law, and in particular the case law of international criminal tribunals, and state responsibility. The author shows the various connections and issues arising from the parallel establishment of state and individual responsibility for the commission of the same international crimes. These connections indicate a growing need to better co-ordinate these regimes of international responsibility. The author maintains that a general conception, according to which state and individual responsibility are two separate sets of secondary rules attached to the breach of the same primary norms, can help to solve the various issues relating to this dual responsibility. This conception of the complementarity between state and individual responsibility justifies co-ordination and consistent application of these two different regimes, each of which aims to foster compliance with the most important obligations owed to the international community as a whole.

When a perpetrator of an international crime argues in his defence that he did not realise that he had violated the law, is this a reason not to punish him? International crimes constitute serious offences and it could be argued that he who commits such an offence must know his act is punishable. After all, everyone is presumed to know the law. However, convicting someone who is mistaken about the wrongfulness of his act may be in violation of the principle ‘no punishment without guilt’. This book investigates when 'mistake of law' should be a reason to exculpate the perpetrator of an international crime. It demonstrates that the issue of 'mistake of law' goes to the heart of individual criminal responsibility and therewith contributes to the development of a more systematic approach toward the structure of international offences. Valuable for academics and practitioners in the field of International Criminal Law.

This book focuses on the concept of state responsibility for international crimes, which gained support following the First World War, but was pushed into the background by the development of the principle of individual criminal responsibility under international law after the Second World War. Jorgensen considers the history and merits of a concept that, it is argued, is currently on the threshold between lex ferenda and lex lata.

1.1 Opening Remarks and Objectives Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 2 be enforced. This is, perhaps, the most renowned citation from the judgment of the Int- national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (“IMT”). In the six decades which have passed since the IMT judgment was handed down, the recognition of the c- cept of individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes has been significantly reinforced and developed, particularly since the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) in the 1990’s and most recently the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The media has, of course, played a crucial role in increasing awareness of this concept, especially amongst the general populace. Indeed, the concept has, arguably, a much higher profile today, than ever before in its history. However, the concept of individual criminal responsibility for core inter- tional crimes is neither as straightforward nor as single-facetted, as might appear on first glance. While the general principle behind the concept does not generate too many difficulties, it is in its practical application that the more challenging aspects of the concept are brought to the fore. Each of these ‘challenging - pects’ can also be described as a ‘pertinent issue’ of the concept of individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes.

This book seeks to understand how and why we should hold leaders responsible for the collective mass atrocities that are committed in times of conflict. It attempts to untangle the debates on modes of liability in international criminal law (ICL) that have become truly complex over the last twenty years, and to provide a way to identify the most appropriate model for leadership liability. A unique comparative theory of ICL is offered, which clarifies the way in which ICL develops as a patchwork of different domestic criminal law notions. This theory forms the basis for the comparison of some influential domestic criminal law systems, with a view to understanding the policy and cultural reasons for their differences. There is a particular focus on the background of the German law which has influenced the International Criminal Court so much recently. This helps to understand, and seek a solution to, the current impasses in the debates on which model of liability should be applied. An entire chapter of the book is devoted to considering why leaders should be held responsible for crimes committed by their subordinates, from legal, moral and pragmatic perspectives. The moral responsibility of leaders is translated into criminal liability, and the different domestic models of liability are translated to the international context, in such a way as to appeal to advanced students of ICL, academics, and practitioners who want to understand the complexities of leadership liability in international criminal law today and identify the best way to approach it. Cassandra Steer is Executive Director of Women in International Security Canada, and Junior Wainwright Fellow at McGill University, Canada. She holds a Ph.D. in Law from the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

In the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, major offences committed by individuals have been subject to progressive systematisation in the framework of international criminal law. Proposals developed within the context of the League of Nations coordinated individual liability and State responsibility. By contrast, international law as codified after World War II in the framework of the United Nations embodies a neat divide between individual criminal liability and State aggravated responsibility. However, conduct of State organs and agents generates dual liability. Through a critical analysis of key international rules, the book assesses whether the divisive approach to individual and State responsibility is normatively consistent. Contemporary situations, such as the humanitarian crises in Syria and Libya, 9/11 and the Iraq wars demonstrate that the matter still gives rise to controversy: a set of systemic problems emerge. The research focuses on the substantive elements of major offences, notably agression, genocide, core war crimes, core crimes against humanity and terrorism, as well as relevant procedural implications. The book is a useful resource for practitioners, policymakers, academics, students, researchers and anyone interested in international law and politics.