Rethinking Self Defence

Self-defence – the 'ancient right' – has never been more relevant than in the present era of widespread calls for criminal justice reform. The book substantially advances the patinaed discussion by introducing for the first time a comprehensive value-centric approach to thinking about the defence's deeper rationale. It tackles core issues such as the relative importance of the State's claimed monopoly on force, procedural justice and the need to shore up the justice system's legitimacy and creditworthiness, everyone's presumptive 'right to life,' and the importance of ensuring equal standing between citizens. And, in so doing, the book breaks ground by addressing public perceptions of 'just' and 'right' outcomes, as well as the emphasis legal systems place (and should place) on State power.

Self-defence – the 'ancient right' – has never been more relevant than in the present era of widespread calls for criminal justice reform. The book substantially advances the patinaed discussion by introducing for the first time a comprehensive value-centric approach to thinking about the defence's deeper rationale. It tackles core issues such as the relative importance of the State's claimed monopoly on force, procedural justice and the need to shore up the justice system's legitimacy and creditworthiness, everyone's presumptive 'right to life,' and the importance of ensuring equal standing between citizens. And, in so doing, the book breaks ground by addressing public perceptions of 'just' and 'right' outcomes, as well as the emphasis legal systems place (and should place) on State power.

This multi-disciplinary book lies in the general areas of forensic psychiatry/psychology, sociology, jurisprudence, criminal law and criminology. It questions traditional assumptions about illness and mental disorder, and deals with the controversial notion that mental disorders (and possibly other 'illnesses') may be to varying extents the fault of the 'sufferer'. It examines how the law can take into account such 'culpable' notions of mental disorder in determining criminal responsibility. This culpability for the defense-causing condition (or 'responsibility for level of criminal responsibility') is called 'meta-responsibility'. The book is divided into two parts. The first section discusses theoretical issues, such as the manner in which traditional illness models relate to meta-responsibility; the insanity defence and other mental condition defences; the relationship of clinical issues such as medication non-compliance and insight to meta-responsibility and the counterfactual notion that consideration of the possible voluntary origins of mental disorder may benefit the criminal and non-criminal mentally disordered. The second section of the book presents a case vignette experiment of mock jurors, examining the effect of a 'meta-responsibility insanity test'.

In NATO Rules of Engagement, Camilla Guldahl Cooper provides a thorough analysis of NATO rules of engagement, and offers clarity on a concept which despite its considerable political, strategic and operational importance, is often misunderstood.

This book defines the right of self-defence as understood in and before 1945 and offers a possible better alternative for interpreting the significance of the precondition provided for in the Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Essay from the year 2023 in the subject Politics - Topic: Public International Law and Human Rights, , language: English, abstract: The law of recourse to force has changed dramatically over the last centuries. The concept of self-defense plays a fundamental role in international relations, shaping the interactions between states and defining the boundaries of acceptable behavior in the global arena. This research endeavors to delve into the complexities surrounding the application and interpretation of the principle of self-defense. By examining historical case studies, international legal frameworks, and contemporary geopolitical events, this study aims to shed light on the multifaceted dimensions of self-defense and the delicate balance between state sovereignty and collective security. The research begins by analyzing the evolution of ‘force’ and self-defense norms and doctrines, tracing their origins from customary international law to the modern legal framework established by the United Nations. It equally investigates the category of force for which self-defense becomes permissible. Furthermore, this research examines critically the debate on the boundaries of self-defense, and questions whether existing legal frameworks adequately address this contemporary challenge. By exploring these intricate dynamics, this research aims to contribute to the ongoing discourse on self-defense, especially in the light of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, and to provide insights into the evolving nature of international law and norms. It seeks to stimulate further dialogue among policymakers, legal experts, and scholars, with the ultimate goal of fostering a more nuanced understanding of self-defense and its implications for global peace and stability.

This book combines a careful philosophical discussion of the rationale justifying self-defence with a detailed discussion of the range of statutory self-defence requirements, as well as discussions of numerous other relevant issues (i.e. putative self-defense, excessive self-defense, earlier guilt and battered women). The book argues that before formulating definitions for each aspect of self-defence (necessity, proportionality, retreat, immediacy, mental element, etc.) it is imperative to determine the proper rationale for self-defence and, only then to derive the appropriate solutions. The first part contains an in-depth discussion of why society allows a justification for acts but does not excuse the actor from criminal liability, and the author critically analyzes current theories (culpability of the aggressor; autonomy of the attacked person; protection of the social-legal order; balancing interests; choice of the lesser evil) and points out the weaknesses of each theory before proposing a new theory to explain the justification of self-defence. The new theory is that for the full justification of self-defence, a balance of interests must be struck between the expected physical injury to the attacked person and the expected physical injury to the aggressor, as well as the relevant abstract factors: the autonomy of the attacked person, the culpability of the aggressor, and the social-legal order. The author demonstrates how ignoring one or more of these factors leads to erroneous results and how the proposed rationale can be applied to develop solutions to the complex questions raised.

In Defending Humanity, internationally acclaimed legal scholar George P. Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin, a leading expert on international criminal law, tackle one of the most important and controversial questions of our time: When is war justified? When a nation is attacked, few would deny that it has the right to respond with force. But what about preemptive and preventive wars, or crossing another state's border to stop genocide? Was Israel justified in initiating the Six Day War, and was NATO's intervention in Kosovo legal? What about the U.S. invasion of Iraq? In their provocative book, Fletcher and Ohlin offer a groundbreaking theory on the legality of war with clear guidelines for evaluating these interventions. The authors argue that much of the confusion on the subject stems from a persistent misunderstanding of the United Nations Charter. The Charter appears to be very clear on the use of military force: it is only allowed when authorized by the Security Council or in self-defense. Unfortunately, this has led to the problem of justifying force when the Security Council refuses to act or when self-defense is thought not to apply--and to the difficult dilemma of declaring such interventions illegal or ignoring the UN Charter altogether. Fletcher and Ohlin suggest that the answer lies in going back to the domestic criminal law concepts upon which the UN Charter was originally based, in particular, the concept of "legitimate defense," which encompasses not only self-defense but defense of others. Lost in the English-language version of the Charter but a vital part of the French and other non-English versions, the concept of legitimate defense will enable political leaders, courts, and scholars to see the solid basis under international law for states to intervene with force--not just to protect themselves against an imminent attack but also to defend other national groups.