Rethinking The Principles Of War

This work features the fresh thinking of twenty-eight leading authors from a variety of military and national security disciplines. Following an introduction by Lt. Gen. James Dubik, Commander I Corps, U.S. Army, the anthology first considers the general question of whether there is a distinctly American way of war. Dr. Colin Gray's opening essay "The American Way of War: Critique and Implications" provides a state of the question perspective. Sections on operational art, with writers addressing the issues in both conventional and small wars; stability and reconstruction; and intelligence complete the volume. Among the well-known contributors are Robert Scales, Mary Kaldor, Ralph Peters, Jon Sumida, Grant Hammond, Milan Vego, and T.X. Hammes. The anthology is part of a larger Rethinking the Principles project, sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation and the U.S. Navy to examine approaches to the future of warfare. Footnotes, index, and a bibliographic essay make the work a useful tool for students of war and general readers alike.

Interpretations of war as driven by politics and state rationale, formulated most importantly by the nineteenth-century practitioner Carl von Clausewitz, have received strong criticism. Political explanations have been said to fall short in explaining conflicts in the Balkans, Africa, Asia and the attacks of September 11 2001 in the United States. This book aims to re-evaluate these criticisms by not only carefully scrutinising Clausewitz's arguments and their applicability, but also by a careful reading of the criticism itself. In doing so, the contributions on this book present empirical evidence on the basis of several case studies, addressing various aspects of modern war, such as the actors, conduct and purposes of war. The book concludes that while the debate on the nature of war has far from run its course, the interpretation of war as postulated by Clausewitz is not as inapplicable as some have claimed.

The crisis is upon us: We have no viable doctrine for tomorrow's wars. Now that the world has entered the information age, principles that have served to enlighten the art of war no longer work. Born of agrarian times and honed during the industrial age, the classical principles of war are, in large part, hopelessly outdated. Radical change is needed now. The Principles of War for the Information Age provides a prescription for this change.

Influenced in part by the writings of Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Henri Jomini, and other strategists, most major militaries have adopted principles of war that are widely promulgated. Marvin Pokrant argues that these commonly accepted principles fail to reflect the ideas that led to them. Looking at the fundamental and enduring concepts behind the original principles of war, Pokrant presents nine new principles of war. To illustrate his points Pokrant uses numerous examples drawn from military history, including land, sea, and air warfare from ancient times to the present. By analyzing and reforming the principles of war, Pokrant provides a modern, relevant, and useful way to guide decisions made in times of war.

The just war tradition is an evolving body of tenets for determining when resorting to war is just and how war may be justly executed. Rethinking the Just War Tradition provides a timely exploration in light of new security threats that have emerged since the end of the Cold War, including ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, threats of terror attacks, and genocidal conflicts within states. The contributors are philosophers, political scientists, a U.S. Army officer, and a senior analyst at the Center for Defense Information. They scrutinize some familiar themes in just war theory from fresh and original angles, and also explore altogether new territory. The diverse topics considered include war and the environment, justice in the ending of war, U.S. military hegemony, a general theory of just armed-conflict principles, supreme emergencies, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, child soldiers, the moral equality of all soldiers, targeted assassination, preventive war, right authority, and armed humanitarian intervention. Clearly written and free of jargon, this book illustrates how the just war tradition can be rethought and applied today.

This compelling account charts the historical emergence of vicarious warfare and its contemporary prominence. It contrasts its tactical advantages with its hidden costs and potential to cause significant strategic harm.

Throughout history, military practitioners, philosophers, and historians have struggled to comprehend the complexities of warfare.1 Most of these efforts produced long, complicated treatises that did not lend themselves to rapid or easy understanding.2 This, in turn, spurred efforts to condense the "lessons" of war into a short list of aphorisms that practitioners of the military art could use to guide the conduct of warfare.3 The culmination of these labors, from the perspective of the U.S. Armed Forces, may be found in what are called the principles of war.4 (See Appendix A.) Currently contained in Joint and Service doctrines, "the principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine."5 But, how solid is that foundation? While the principles have been thoroughly scrutinized at the tactical and operational levels of warfare, the study of their applicability at the strategic level has been less exhaustive.6 Moreover, the principles of war were derived predominantly from the study of Napoleonic and Industrial Age warfare.7 Whether or how these principles apply at the strategic level of war under the conditions of rapid technological change that many are calling the "Information Age" and its military offspring, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), is an open-ended question.8 Because war at the strategic level is an intellectual process9 and the development and implementation of strategy is a creative activity, some form of intellectual framework is required to shape the strategist's thought processes. The principles of war provide such a structure. At the same time, because theory and creativity have limits, they offer a guide to understanding those restrictions. A good strategist-possessed of a comprehensive understanding of the principles-will be able, therefore, to expand creatively upon them, and will also be able to determine if one or more of them can or must be disregarded.10 Finally, a thorough grasp of the intent behind each principle 2 allows the crafting of strategies that reflect the best possible balance among the principles for a particular strategic challenge.11 Once thoroughly understood, the principles of war also may be used as a decisionmaking aid during formulation, planning, and execution of strategy. They can be used to assess current strategic plans, or as an analytic tool to shape new strategies and plans as they are developed. Further, they can be used to examine past strategic activities to derive insights from success or failure, and to extract the pertinent "lessons" that can be applied to future endeavors. It is, of course, always easier to use the principles in retrospect to critique plans and activities than to incorporate them when creating strategies--but those who can do the latter will be hailed as geniuses by future historians. In fact, the principles of war are important exactly because, short of war, it is difficult to identify potential "Napoleons" in our midst. A proper focus on the linkages and tensions among the principles can avoid the stultifying, dogmatic, pro forma use of "checklists" which inevitably creates vulnerabilities to be exploited by a more imaginative opponent. At the same time, innovative application of the principles in simulations and war games can provide a useful education for future generals and strategists, who may be called upon to practice their craft with little or no notice. They are aids, too, in the life-long development of patterns of thought found in the true strategist.