Russia Bolshevism And The Versailles Peace

This book describes disagreements among the diplomats in Paris over the Russian problem, and it analyzes Allied policy toward Russia as it developed at the conference and led into a halfhearted intervention in Russia in 1919. It covers the period from the Armistice until January 1920. Originally published in 1967. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

This book examines the international impact of Bolshevism in the period between the two World Wars. It explores both the significance of the ‘Bolshevik threat’ in European countries and colonies, as well as its spread through the circulation of ideas and people during this period. Focusing on the interplay between international relations and domestic politics, the volume analyses the rise of Bolshevism on the international stage, incorporating insights from India and China. The chapters show how the interwar international order was challenged by the ideology, which infiltrated a range of political societies. While it was incapable of overthrowing national systems, Bolshevism constituted a credible threat, which favoured the spread of fascist and nationalist trends. Offering the first detailed account of the Bolshevik danger at an international level, the book draws on multi-national and multiarchival research to examine how the peril of Bolshevism paradoxically allowed a stabilization of the post-World War I Versailles system.

The Weimar Republic provides both a clear historical narrative of this critical period in German history and a detailed analysis of the scholarly research in the field

A major re-interpretation of international relations in the period from 1919 to 1939. Avoiding such simplistic explanations as appeasement and British decline, Keith Neilson demonstrates that the underlying cause of the Second World War was the intellectual failure to find an effective means of maintaining the new world order created in 1919. With secret diplomacy, alliances and the balance of power seen as having caused the First World War, the makers of British policy after 1919 were forced to rely on such instruments of liberal internationalism as arms control, the League of Nations and global public opinion to preserve peace. Using Britain's relations with Soviet Russia as a focus for a re-examination of Britain's dealings with Germany and Japan, this book shows that these tools were inadequate to deal with the physical and ideological threats posed by Bolshevism, fascism, Nazism and Japanese militarism.

We have known for many decades that the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 "failed", in the sense that it did not prevent the outbreak of World War II. This book investigates not whether the Paris Peace Conference succeeded or failed, but the historically specific international system it created. It explores the rules under which that system operated, and the kinds of states and empires that inhabited it. Deepening the dialogue between history and international relations theory makes it possible to think about sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in new ways. Sovereignty in 1919 was about not just determining of answers demarcating the international system, but also the questions. Sovereignty in 1919 was about remaking the world. Most histories of the Paris Peace Conference stop with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany on 28 June 1919. Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 considers all five treaties produced by the conference as well as the Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey in 1923. It is organized not chronologically or geographically, but according to specific problems of sovereignty. A peace based on "justice" produced a criminalized Great Power in Germany, and a template problematically applied in the other treaties. The conference sought to unmix lands and peoples in the defeated multinational empires by drawing boundaries and defining ethnicities. The conference sought not so much to oppose revolution as to instrumentalize it in the new international system. The League of Nations, so often taken as the supreme symbol of the failure of the conference, is better considered as a continuation of the laboratory of sovereignty established in Paris.

The third edition of this acclaimed textbook on peace-making after the First World War advances that the responsibility for the outbreak of a new, even more ruinous, war in 1939 cannot be ascribed entirely to the planet's most powerful men and their meeting in Paris in January 1919 to reassemble a shattered world. Giving a concise overview of the problems and pressures these key figures were facing, Alan Sharp provides a coherent introduction to a highly complex and multi-dimensional topic. This is an ideal resource for undergraduate and postgraduate students taking modules on the Versailles Settlement, European and International History, Modern History, Interwar Europe, The Great War, 20th Century Europe, German History, or Diplomatic History, on either history courses or international relations/politics courses.