Russia In The Middle East And North Africa

After decades of intense interest and rivalry with the USA, the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the USSR officially marked a period of significant retreat of Russia from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). However, with Russia’s economic recovery and the entrenchment of President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s interest in the region has risen anew. Once again seen as a battleground to contest US hegemony, Russia has expanded its political, military and (to a lesser extent) economic relationships across the region. Most apparent in the military intervention in Syria, Russia has also been engaged with traditional rivals Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, stepping into the vacuum left by the US Obama Administration. Is Russia’s reengagement part of a strategy, or is it mere opportunism? Authors with different backgrounds, experiences and origins examine this question via an analysis of the historical drivers of Russian interest in the MENA region and the factors underlying current Russian policies.

The war in Syria has put Russia at the centre of Middle Eastern politics. Moscow's return to the region following a prolonged period of absence has enhanced its geopolitical status at a time it has emerged as a rival to the West. Yet, contrary to the media hype, Vladimir Putin is not set to become the new power-broker in this strategically important part of the world. Co-authored by a team of prominent scholars and analysts from the EU, US, Russia and the Middle East, this book explores Russia's role in the Middle East and North Africa, the diverse drivers shaping its policy, and the response from local players. Chapters map out the history of Russian involvement, before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the impact on key issues such as security and defence, regional conflicts, arms trade, and energy, as well as relations influential states and country clusters such as Iran, the Gulf, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and the Maghreb. It also looks at how the Middle East impacts on Russia's relations with the West. The book offers a balanced assessment of Russian influence, highlighting both the political, diplomatic and commercial gains made thanks to Putin's decision in September 2015 to intervene militarily in Syria and the constraints preventing Moscow from replacing the United States as a regional hegemon.

For far too long, the United States has acted timidly in the face of increased Russian aggression, unwilling to confront Putin for fear of provoking a confrontation. It isn't just the executive branch: Congress has played its role too. For years, administrations have been offering concessions to Russia, and Congress has allowed this to happen. The Bush administration presented a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, a 123 agreement to Congress, despite concerns Russia was then providing Iran with nuclear technology and providing Syria with advanced conventional weapons in violation of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act. President Bush withdrew the proposed nuclear accord, but only after Russia invaded Georgia. That didn't stop the Obama administration from falling into the same trap, officially submitting to the U.S.-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement to Congress in 2010, despite overwhelming evidence of Russian involvement in Iran's nuclear and conventional weapons program and congressional efforts to strengthen sanctions against Iran. Russia is not a U.S. ally, not in Syria, not in Iran, not on human rights issues. Putin is a strong man, and tyrants like him only respond to strength, not just perceived strength, but actual strength. Russia is fragile, and this show of force is just that, a show by Putin. It is time for the U.S. to reclaim its leadership role on the global stage and, particularly, in the Middle East and with respect to Russia.

Kreutz examines the goals and strategies of Russia and the former Soviet Union toward most of the Arab states in the Middle East. The author argues that Russia has been an important actor in the region for over a century and has tried to regain its influence in several countries following its strategic retreat after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. However, according to Kreutz, Moscow does not seek confrontation with the United States or with the West in general in the region. Rather, the Russians are interested in peace and stability in the region, which is close to its borders. Because of that, although Moscow wants to cultivate its links with Israel, it also seeks to reach a peaceful and balanced solution to the Palestinian-Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflicts, taking Palestinian and Arab interests into account. Washington can better engage Moscow as a stabilizing force in the Middle East and as a collaborator in the struggle against Islamic terrorists. At the same time, the United States must be cognizant of where Washington and Moscow diverge. Although Russia may be too weak now to compete with the United States on a global scale, it is not happy to see American or EU encroachment close to its own neighborhood. If we take their weakness for granted and become blind to the possibilities for Russian alliances in the region, we do so to our disadvantage. This book demonstrates Russia's enduring interest and influence in the Arab Middle East.

This book analyses Russia’s strategy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the turbulent period since the inception of the Arab Spring. It explores the key policy challenges faced by Russia in the context of Russia’s relations with both the regional states and the major external powers. The book incorporates chapters on Russia’s involvement in MENA affairs, its intervention in the Syrian civil war, the domestic sources of its foreign policy, its clash with the Western powers over issues pertaining to sovereignty and humanitarian norms, its response to the challenge posed by Islamist extremism, and its political-military and economic interests in the MENA region. The book offers an original, critical analysis of Russia’s thinking and decision-making and examines the implications of its more assertive foreign policy strategy following its military interventions in Syria and Ukraine.

The eyes of the world are on the Middle East. Today, more than ever, this deeply-troubled region is the focus of power games between major global players vying for international influence. Absent from this scene for the past quarter century, Russia is now back with gusto. Yet its motivations, decision-making processes and strategic objectives remain hard to pin down. So just what is Russia up to in the Middle East? In this hard-hitting essay, leading analyst of Russian affairs Dmitri Trenin cuts through the hyperbole to offer a clear and nuanced analysis of Russia's involvement in the Middle East and its regional and global ramifications. Russia, he argues, cannot and will not supplant the U.S. as the leading external power in the region, but its actions are accelerating changes which will fundamentally remake the international system in the next two decades.

Russia's strategic objectives in the Middle East and North Africa : hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, first session, June 15, 2017.

This extraordinary book charts the development of Russia’s relations with the Middle East from the 1950s to the present. It covers both high and low points – the closeness to Nasser’s Egypt, followed by reversal; the successful invasion of Afghanistan which later turned into a disaster; the changing relationship with Israel which was at some time surprisingly close; the relationship with Syria, which continues to be of huge significance; and much more. Written by one of Russia’s leading Arabists who was himself involved in the formation and implementation of policy, the book is engagingly written, extremely insightful, telling us things which only the author is in a position to tell us, and remarkably frank, not sparing senior Soviet and Russian figures from criticism. The book includes material based on the author’s conversations with other leading participants.