Russia S Coercive Diplomacy

Russia's place in the world as a powerful regional actor can no longer be denied; the question that remains concerns what this means in terms of foreign policy and domestic stability for the actors involved in the situation, as Russia comes to grips with its newfound sources of might.

"As Robert Art makes clear in a groundbreaking conclusion, those results have been mixed at best. Art dissects the uneven performance of coercive diplomacy and explains why it has sometimes worked and why it has more often failed."--BOOK JACKET.

During the Cold War, Soviet influence and Leninist ideology were inseparable. But the collapse of both systems threw Russian influence into limbo. In this book, James Sherr draws on his in-depth study of the country over many years to explain and analyse the factors that have brought Russian influence back into play. Today, Tsarist, Soviet and contemporary approaches combine in creative and discordant ways. The result is a policy based on a mixture of strategy, improvisation and habit. The novelty of this policy and its apparent successes pose possible dangers for Russia's neighbours, the West and Russia itself.

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? This book argues that they are useful for deterrence but not for offensive purposes.

This volume explores sanctions as instruments of coercive diplomacy, delving into a number of theoretical arguments and combining different perspectives from international law and international relations scholars and practitioners.

Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction adapts Clausewitz's framework to highlight the dynamic relationship between the main elements of strategy: purpose, method, and means. Drawing on historical examples, Antulio J. Echevarria discusses the major types of military strategy and how emerging technologies are affecting them. This second edition has been updated to include an expanded chapter on manipulation through cyberwarfare and new further reading.

Kenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can also credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies.

Mounting costs, risks, and public misgivings of waging war are raising the importance of U.S. power to coerce (P2C). The best P2C options are financial sanctions, support for nonviolent political opposition to hostile regimes, and offensive cyber operations. The state against which coercion is most difficult and risky is China, which also happens to pose the strongest challenge to U.S. military options in a vital region.